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I. Chapter 1: Judicial Co-Operation and Economic Recovery in Europe 
(JCOERE) Report 2: Introduction 
 Introduction 
The JCOERE Project is focussed on the concept of co-operation1 between courts and between 
courts and practitioners across Member States of the European Union. The specific subject 
matter of the JCOERE Project concerns the obligations imposed by the European Insolvency 
Regulation (Recast)2 on courts in European Member States to co-operate in cross-border 
insolvency matters. Additional obligations are placed on insolvency practitioners to co-
operate. Furthermore, in light of new initiatives in the area of corporate restructuring3 the 
JCOERE Project focussed on this important policy initiative and hypothesised that the nature 
of the rules typically involved in preventive restructuring frameworks might present further 
obstacles to co-operation between courts. These rules were both substantive and procedural 
in nature. Because the JCOERE Project focussed on co-operation and communication 
obligations contained in the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) it was appropriate to 
choose a type of insolvency process covered by this Regulation.4 However, many of the issues 
raised in this part of the Project and described in this second Report are equally applicable to 
a broader range of initiatives concerning judicial and court-to-court co-operation in the 
European Union. This broader issue is fundamental to continued European integration. Where 
 
1 Throughout this report, it should be noted that the spelling of co-operate (cooperate) and co-operation (cooperation) will alternate. This is 
because they are used interchangeably within the documentation and literature that we have used and referred to throughout the Report. 
For example, Chapter 2 utilises ‘cooperate’, as that is the spelling found in the EIR Recast. The JCOERE Project itself, by contrast and as 
articulated above, has ‘co-operation’ in its title. This is also the case for words such as co-ordinate (coordinate) and co-ordination 
(coordination). 
2 Council Regulation (EU) 848/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) [2015] 
OJ L 141/19. [Hereinafter EIR Recast]. See a full discussion of the EIR Recast in Chapter 2. 
3 European Commission, ‘Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency’ [2014] OJ L 74/65, COM 
(2014) 1500 final. 
4 As we examined how Member States approached preventive restructuring in their domestic frameworks both prior to and in anticipation 
of implementation of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 1023/2019 it became apparent that some domestic legislative processes aimed 
at corporate rescue were already covered by the European Insolvency Regulation (Annex A) whilst others were not. This in effect means that 
some preventive restructuring frameworks in Member States will benefit from co-operation obligations in the Regulation, others will not. It 
is also important to note that the Preventive Restructuring Directive itself allows Member States the choice of whether or not to include the 
implementing process in Annex A of the Regulation. See Recital 13 and 14 of the PRD. See further Lorenzo Stanghellini and Andrea Zorzi, 





an obligation is imposed on courts to co-operate, the obvious question is whether there is a 
specific obligation imposed on members of the judiciary specifically to co-operate. This 
question is answered affirmatively by some commentators but this report takes the view in 
Chapters 3 and 5 that this is an open-ended issue. 
 The European Project and Judicial Co-operation 
At the time of writing, the issue of corporate and business insolvency and rescue has 
unfortunately become acute due to the COVID 19 pandemic. The broader public health and 
economic threats have yet again raised high level issues concerning the nature of the 
European project. As President Emmanuelle Macron has observed, the debate focusses on 
whether the European Union is simply a market project or a political project5 and has stated 
inter alia that: ‘If the European Union is to succeed as a political project sustained and 
continued attention must be paid to issues of co-operation and co-ordination in legal spheres.’  
 A European Judiciary 
While Chapter 4 of this Report considers matters relating to legal and judicial culture in detail, 
this section will briefly consider the question of whether there is a distinctive European legal 
tradition or culture.  Whether this exists or not or has more potential for development, this is 
nevertheless the context in which co-operation obligations will operate. Effective court-to-
court co-operation is dependent upon aligned legal principles and values, such as the rule of 
law and judicial independence. The importance of these factors is evident in the emphasis 
placed upon them in the EU’s criteria for accession. 
As is commonly known, the European Union sets out membership criteria for each accession 
state, which are contained in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49).6 A subsequent 
declaration was made in June 1993 by the European Council in Copenhagen7 which led to the 
denomination of these more detailed criteria as the ‘Copenhagen criteria.’ The criteria 
address three areas that form the basis of negotiations with a particular candidate state, 
namely the political, economic and legislative areas. These areas are used to guide accession 
states towards EU membership. The legislative criteria focus on what are called ‘rule of law’ 
issues that are in turn governed by the Rule of Law Framework.8 The Framework was 
introduced by the European Commission in March 2014 and has three stages, namely a 
Commission Rule of Law Assessment, a Commission Rule of Law Opinion and a Commission 
 
5 Roula Khalaf, ‘Transcript, Emmanuel Macron: ‘We are at a moment of truth’ (English)’, Financial Times (Paris, April 14th, 2020) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/317b4f61-672e-4c4b-b816-71e0ff63cab2> [Last accessed April 30th, 2020]. 
6 Council Treaty of Maastricht on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1, Article 49. See further accession criteria explained at: European 
Commission, ‘Conditions for Membership’ (06 December 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-
membership_en> [Last Accessed April 27th, 2020]. 
7 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, 21 and 22 June 1993’ (1993) 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>. [Last Accessed 27 April 2020].  
8 European Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) COM (2014) 0158 final. Venice Commission 





Rule of Law Amendment.9 The official view is that the entire process is based on a continuous 
dialogue between the Commission and the Member State concerned, with the Commission 
keeping the European Parliament and Council informed.  
1.3.1 Enforcing the Copenhagen criteria 
When agreed in 1993, there was no mechanism for ensuring that any country that was already 
an EU Member State was compliant with these criteria. However, arrangements have now 
been put in place to police compliance, following the ‘sanctions’ imposed against the Austrian 
government of Wolfgang Schüssel in early 2000 by the other 14 Member States' 
governments.10 This process can end with the invocation of Article 7(1) of the TEU, which was 
threatened in relation to Poland some years later. 
More recently the Commission took action in 2016 and 2017 against Poland in relation to the 
treatment of members of the judiciary. In its statement on the 26th July 2017, it stated that 
the reform of the judiciary in Poland ‘amplifies the systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland 
already identified in the rule of law procedure started by the Commission in January 2016’. 
The Commission went on to request that the Polish authorities address the identified 
problems within a month of this decision and particularly requested the Polish authorities ‘not 
to take any measure to dismiss or force the retirement of Supreme Court judges’. The 
Commission stated that it was ready to implement ‘the Article 7(1) procedure’11 – a formal 
warning by the EU that can be issued by four fifths of the Member States in the Council of 
Ministers. 
At the time, a specific connection was made between this issue, the rule of law generally, and 
the importance of an independent judiciary as an essential precondition for EU membership. 
The statement of the Commission President Jean Claude Juncker at the time emphasised that 
a system that included the ability of a state to dismiss judges at will could not operate in the 
EU, noting that: ‘Independent courts are the basis of mutual trust between our Member 
States and our judicial systems.’12 In other words, a commonly created judiciary is essential to 
mutual trust between Member States and obviously to detailed court-to-court co-operation. 
Vice President Franz Timmermans set out the issue even more explicitly, describing that the 
courts of each Member State, in this case the courts of Poland, are expected to provide an 
effective remedy in case of violations of EU law, in which case they act as the ‘judges of the 
Union.’13 This statement sets up an interesting situation whereby Member States have their 
 
9 This is explained in a graphic attached to the European Commission Press Release regarding the position of Poland below. 
10 See further, Schüssel v Austria, Ap no. 42409/98 (ECHR 21 February 2002). See also European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution on the 
Political Situation in Austria’ (2 February 2000) B5-0101/2000. 
11 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, Article 7(1). [Hereinafter TEU]. Article 7.1 of the Treaty on 
European Union provides for the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members, to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious 
breach by a Member State of the common values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty (see Annex II). The Commission can trigger this process 
by a reasoned proposal. 





own independent system for appointing judges, but once appointed judges and courts 
become in some way judges of the European Union.  
1.3.2 The Tampere Council 
The vision for further integration of the European Union was underpinned by the holding of 
the Special Council meeting in 1999 in Tampere, Finland, which addressed the need to create 
a ‘European Area of Justice’. Amongst the milestones articulated by the Council, the following 
statement was made regarding the mutual recognition of judicial decisions at Article 33: 
Enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and the necessary 
approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the 
judicial protection of individual rights. The European Council therefore endorses the 
principle of mutual recognition which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of 
judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. The principle 
should apply both to judgements and to other decisions of judicial authorities.14 
The Tampere Council provided a platform for the development of mutual recognition of 
judgements and consequent co-operation between judicial and administrative authorities in 
Europe. Many areas of law ranging from criminal to family to commercial law are now subject 
to specific rules regarding co-operation between Member State courts.15 
 Co-operation, Trust, Recognition, and Harmonisation 
The idea of co-operation is recognised as being underpinned by concepts such as trust in, and 
recognition of, Member State legal systems, in addition to the more complex and ambitious 
pursuit of a harmonisation agenda.16 Because of the complexity of doctrinal issues, 
harmonisation is not as easily achieved as other elements to co-operation. This is highlighted 
by the work with Member State country reports gathered during the first stage of the 
doctrinal research of this Project. Combining all four elements co-operation, trust, 
recognition, and harmonisation will lead to integration of the European Union, but no 
assumptions are made in this Project as to the optimal levels of integration. When the JCOERE 
Project focussed on preventive restructuring frameworks in Report 1 it became apparent that 
there were strong underlying differences regarding policy and implementation of rescue 
processes for corporations and businesses in Europe. Report 1 the of the JCOERE Project 
demonstrated that there were significant differences between policy makers and thought 
influencers (academics) across the European Union on the theory of preventive restructuring. 
In surveying 11 jurisdictions within the EU, benchmarked against the newly passed Preventive 
 
14 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999,’ (1999) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#c?textMode=on> [Last Accessed 27th April, 2020]. 
15 See for example European Commission, ‘Compendium of European Union legislation on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial 
matters (2018 Edition)’, (European Commission, 19 July 2019). 





Restructuring Directive,17 it was clear that there was also significant variation in existing 
processes. Furthermore, the PRD itself allows for continued variation within Member States; 
these range from what this Project has termed ‘robust restructuring processes’, exemplified 
by the use in practice of the English Scheme of Arrangement processes and the Irish 
Examinership process (based on the US Chapter 11 process), to much less aggressive 
restructuring.18 The EIR Recast recognises the reality of ‘widely differing substantive laws’ in 
the insolvency laws of Member States.19 At the same time however, the EIR Recast also 
expresses the aspiration that harmonisation projects will successively bring domestic 
frameworks together, thereby underpinning the elements necessary for further co-operation. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen in Report 1, the PRD expressly supports widely differing 
variations in Member State legislative frameworks with the provision of a range of choices 
allowing for significant variations in types of restructuring processes. 
1.4.1 Co-operation and the EIR Recast 2015 
Whilst Chapter 2 of this Report will outline the terms of the EIR Recast in relation to co-
operation obligations, Chapter 5 will explore some case law on how these may operate. 
However, in the context of this Chapter it is worth emphasising how the obligations imposed 
by the EIR Recast are based on Article 81 TFEU regarding judicial co-operation in civil matters 
with cross-border implications.20 Furthermore, this specific obligation is based on the even 
broader principle of sincere co-operation outlined in Article 4(3) TEU.21  
Despite these observations and indeed European aspirations, our empirical observation is that 
court-to-court co-operation is a matter with which members of the European judiciary are not 
very familiar. Even though we certainly found that there was a general understanding of 
recognition provisions incorporated in the Regulation and in the EIR Recast, there was much 
less experience, if any, of co-operation during the hearing of a case, or indeed expectation 
that such an issue would arise.22 However, the specific co-operation obligations are relatively 
new, having been introduced in the EIR Recast, which although passed in 2015 only began to 
 
17 Council Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, 
on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18. 
[Hereinafter Preventive Restructuring Directive or PRD]. 
18 See Chapter 3 below for further categorisation of the Member States surveyed. 
19 EIR Recast, Recital 21. 
20 See further Renato Mangano, Bob Wessels, Reinhard Dammann, ‘Secondary Insolvency Proceedings (Art 34-52), in Reinhard Bork and 
Kristin van Zwieten (eds) Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
21 See the discussion by Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger, ‘Chapter III Secondary Insolvency Proceedings, Articles 40 – 44’, in 
Moritz Bninkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019). 
22 Discussion at the INSOL Judicial Wing, INSOL European Annual Congress, held in Copenhagen, September 26th, 2019. See further Chapter 





apply on 26 June 2017 (in accordance with Article 92) and so it is possible that discussion and 
consideration of these issues will become more common over time.23 
 JCOERE Project Summary to Date 
Before considering the nature and development of judicial and court co-operation in the 
European Union, this section will summarise the research of the JCOERE Project to date. As 
noted above, this concerns the development of the theory and law with respect to preventive 
restructuring and rescue within the European Union. In our first Report, we described the 
debate within the Member States regarding the concepts, which are fundamental to 
restructuring. These concepts were explained in an academic context in Chapter 4 of our first 
Report, relying heavily on commentary from US academics familiar with Chapter 1124 type 
restructuring processes. Our first Report demonstrated the heated nature of the debate, 
which is taking place in European academic circles triggered by the passing of the PRD.  
Second, we concluded that the academic debate has clearly influenced the development of 
the PRD itself, given that the Commission-DG Justice established and consulted with a range 
of academic commentators in the Commission Group of Experts on restructuring and 
insolvency law (E03362). In addition, the first JCOERE Report reflected on pre-existing 
preventive restructuring frameworks in various Member States, including for example 
Ireland’s Examinership, the Italian debt restructuring processes, and the French sauvegarde. 
The various iterations of the PRD as described in Chapter 5 of the first JCOERE Report 
underline this. The contribution of various academic projects including the CODIRE25 project 
to the development of the PRD is also important. 
Third, in picking some controversial provisions in preventive restructuring we pursued the 
hypothesis that court-to-court co-operation would be challenged by the very nature of 
restructuring. We saw that the intellectual liveliness of the academic debate was both an 
influence in terms of continued divergence but also reflective of quite divergent approaches 
to restructuring leading up to, and following, the passing of the PRD. Some of this divergence 
also arises from the challenge of matching quite diverse legal systems with a harmonising 
piece of legislation. It was clear that even where terminology is concerned there are 
misunderstandings, which we highlighted in Chapter 2 of the first Report.  
In addition, as we surveyed different state responses to restructuring, it became clear that 
disagreement and lack of clarity was not only limited to terminology but also existed in 
 
23 Interestingly some commentators assumed that there was an implied obligation to co-operate under the general schema of recognition 
and enforcement in the original 2000 Insolvency Regulation. See Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher and Stuart Isaacs, The EU Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings (3rd edn, OUP 2016), at para 8.402. See also the cases that are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report. 
24 Title 11 of the US Federal Code concerns Bankruptcy Law. Chapter 11 of Title 11 concerns the restructuring process known by the same 
name. For detail on Chapter 11 of the US Federal Bankruptcy Code see: US Courts, ‘Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basics’ (United States Courts) 
<https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics> [Accessed April 1st, 2020]. 
25 Lorenzo Stanghellini, Riz Mokal, Christoph G. Paulus, Ignacio Tirado (CODIRE Project), Best practices in European Restructuring: 





relation to key concepts.26 Key concepts included what is termed ‘the threshold question’, 
namely the question of which companies (those which were tending towards insolvency and 
/ or those which were insolvent but not formally declared to be) could avail of a restructuring 
process; the application of a stay or moratorium to other creditors; the treatment of creditors 
throughout the process in relation to pre-existing priority;27 and approval processes. We 
concluded that following the implementation of the PRD, divergence would persist even in 
relation to these most basic concepts, aggravated in this context by the extensive scope within 
the PRD for differential implementation of its provisions. 
Fourth, the peculiar interplay between the EIR Recast and the PRD and other restructuring 
processes raises a range of questions for the potential for mutual recognition under the EIR 
Recast, let alone co-operation, upon which we will expand in this Report.  
 Framework of the Second Report 
Chapter 2 considers the evolution of the EIR Recast with particular emphasis on co-operation 
and co-ordination obligations imposed on both courts and insolvency practitioners.28 Our 
focus is on corporate rescue. The EIR Recast addresses obligations to co-operate in relation to 
insolvency processes affecting a single debtor, in our case a single corporate entity, but goes 
on to describe similar obligations in relation to corporate groups.29 In Chapter 3 the Report 
will return to our survey of the Member States; first, to place substantive differences in the 
broader context of judicial and court co-operation and second, to describe what we broadly 
define as procedural rules that present obstacles to court-to-court co-operation. This Chapter 
will be supported by information gathered in the second half of Part III of the JCOERE 
Questionnaire, which was distributed during the first phase of our research. Accordingly, in 
Chapter 3 we will combine our assessment of the level of disagreement regarding key 
concepts and substantive rules with our discussion of procedural rules to indicate the 
potential challenges to co-operation.  
1.6.1 Engaging with the European Judiciary 
During the JCOERE Project we have been fortunate enough to have access to the Judicial Wing 
of INSOL Europe. We first met the Judicial Wing at the INSOL Europe Annual Conference in 
Athens, Greece in 2018 where an initial presentation of the Project was made and greeted 
with considerable interest from members of the judiciary who were present. The presentation 
 
26 See Renato Mangano, on legal certainty being a key element underpinning co-operation: ‘From “Prisoner’s Dilemma” to Reluctance to Use 
Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314. 
27 For a discussion on APR V RPR, see Irene Lynch Fannon, ‘‘An Irish Perspective on the Cram-down provisions in the Preventive Restructuring 
Directive 1023/2019 EU, Guest Editorial’ (2019) 27(3) International Insolvency Review 1; Stephen Lubben, “The Overstated Absolute Priority 
Rule” (20 March 2015), available at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2581639>; Riz Mokal, “The New Relative Priority 
Rule” (paper presented at the International Insolvency Institute, 17 June 2019, slide 4). This point was repeated by Mokal at the INSOL Europe 
Academic Forum, Copenhagen 25th and 26th September, 2019). See further Chapter 4 of this Report. 
28 EIR Recast, Recital 20 and Articles 41-44. 





covered both the expected enactment of the PRD (which was passed the following June in 
2019) and the idea of court-to-court cooperation and the consequent obligations to co-
operate imposed by the EIR Recast 848/2015. At that time, the members of the Judicial Wing 
were extremely interested in engaging with the Project. In fact, the concept of judicial co-
operation in insolvency processes was also the subject of a presentation by members of the 
judiciary at the main INSOL Europe Congress held in the following days in Athens. At that 
point, the judicial members on the panel expressed some reservations about the burden of 
being obliged to co-operate in cross-border insolvency cases.30 Practical difficulties were also 
discussed, including language barriers and knowledge of Member State processes. In addition, 
in terms of protocols facilitating co-operation, a matter which is the subject of Chapter 6 of 
this Report, the participating members of the judiciary expressed a preference for developing 
co-operation protocols on a case by case basis,31 views which are also reflected in the 
responses to the Judicial Survey discussed in Chapter 8 of this Report. 
At the second meeting in which JCOERE presented its findings to the INSOL Europe Judicial 
Wing, this time at the INSOL Europe Annual Congress in Copenhagen, the JCOERE Project was 
well advanced. At a special meeting the progress of the JCOERE Project presented a case study 
based on an Irish Examinership case.32 At this meeting the views of the members present were 
that once the process was covered in Annex A of the EIR Recast there would indeed be co-
operation. However, practical barriers to co-operation were raised, in particular, the difficulty 
of accessing information on other Member State’s domestic processes. In some jurisdictions 
for example, judges were directed to specific, approved sources of information, whereas in 
other jurisdictions this process was considerably more open-ended. As it happens, one of the 
final tasks of this Project is to create a database of cases for members of the judiciary to 
access. In addition, language and equivalence of legal terms and concepts was also considered 
an issue. 
In the latter part of the Project a judicial survey was distributed, which sought information 
regarding knowledge of processes and responses to obligations to co-operate and calls for co-
operation. In particular, the survey queried the information on awareness of existing 
protocols on co-operation. All of this is discussed in both Chapters 6 and 8 of this Report. 
The JCOERE project has been invited to present its findings at a virtual meeting of the INSOL 
Judicial Wing in September and presented an open panel to the Society of Legal Scholars (held 
virtually this year) on differences in judicial reasoning in European courts. Finally, all going 
well the JCOERE project will conduct its final event live in Dublin in November 2020. 
 
30 See proceedings of the INSOL Europe Annual Congress, Athens, 2019. INSOL Europe, ‘Past Events: INSOL Europe Annual Congress 2018: 
Athens, Greece’ (INSOL Europe 2018) < https://www.insol-europe.org/events/past_events/0/start_date/asc/2018> [Last Accessed April 27th 
2020]. 
31 This seems to reflect experience of actual cases as described in Chapters 3, 5 and 7 of this Report. 




1.6.2 Common and Civil Law cultures  
During the Project we also became aware of continuing differences between jurisdictions 
regarding the judicial function, broadly described. Lawyers from a common law tradition place 
great emphasis on the role of the judicial branch in interpreting legislation. It has always been 
part of the accepted tension within the European Union that there was some difference 
between common law countries within the EU33 and civil law countries (which represent the 
majority of Member States) on the scope of judicial discretion, although this difference was 
not considered to be generally significant. To our surprise, however, this difference emerged 
in discussions surrounding the PRD, pre-existing domestic restructuring processes and the role 
of the courts. Civil lawyers expressed distrust of the role of courts as described by their 
common law colleagues as arbiters of technical evidence regarding the viability of an 
enterprise,34 described the development of tests and application of fairness in domestic 
restructuring frameworks as being ’random’35 where common lawyers described a case by 
case development of these tests. In one conference a commentator described the role of the 
US courts as ’capricious’ in interpreting the terms of Chapter 11.36 We consider these ongoing 
differences arising from legal culture in Chapter 4 of this Report. 
1.6.3 Differences in qualifications and training 
In addition, the creation of a European judiciary, a phrase that has emerged in European policy 
documents, is quite a challenging project given differences in training, practical backgrounds, 
and cultures. We return to these ideas in Chapter 4. In the meantime, it is worth noting that 
the EU continues to monitor judicial functions generally within the EU as a whole, issuing 
documents such as the EU Justice Scoreboard for public consideration. In preliminary remarks 
in the 2019 edition of this document, Věra Jourová, European Commissioner for Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality states that:  
We all should share the same objective of improving our European judiciary, as 
without independent and efficient justice systems, there can be no rule of law, no trust 
from citizens, and no business and investment-friendly environment.37 
 
 
33 England and Wales, Northern Ireland within the UK (excluding Scotland) are traditionally described as common law countries. England and 
Wales being a particularly dominant jurisdiction insofar as corporate rescue was concerned during the recession from 2007-2012/13. 
Similarly, the Republic of Ireland is a common law jurisdiction with a written Constitution. Cyprus is a third common law jurisdiction within 
the EU and Malta a final jurisdiction whose laws have roots in common law and civil law combined. 
34 Tomáš Richter, ‘Negotiating a restructuring plan: confirmation, cross-class cram-down and valuation’ (Paper presented at ERA Conference, 
Trier, 7 November 2019). 
35 Discussions at YANIL arising from the delivery by Aoife Finnerty (JCOERE) of a paper on the Irish Examinership Process entitled ‘Preventive 
Restructuring – Is Ireland a leader in the EU?’ (YANIL Conference, Copenhagen, 24 September 2019). 
36 Observations by Nicolaes Tollenaar at the ERA Conference in Trier, November 2019. Nicolaes WA Tollenaar, ‘The concept of a restructuring 
– the underlying economic and legal principles’ (Paper presented at ERA Conference, Trier, 7 November 2019).  
37 See for example European Commission, ‘The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard’ (Communication) COM (2019) 198/2 final. This is the 7th edition 






The independence of the judiciary is one of the key concepts addressed in the Justice 
Scoreboard. Interestingly, scores in relation to the perceived independence of the judiciary 
amongst companies illustrate that Ireland and the Netherlands (both with proactive rescue 
processes) score highly,38 the UK a little less so. Cyprus as a common law country scored well 
below these figures.39 
 The Judiciary and Cross-border Insolvency Co-operation 
As the Project continued, and our engagement with members of the judiciary and the 
practising communities increased, more interesting questions arose. For the main part, these 
focussed on the presence of any formal types of co-operation, the frequency of these issues 
arising in reality, and how the issue of co-operation or otherwise was pre-empted in a number 
of different ways. These developments will lead to a consideration of the obligations 
themselves in the body of this Report and whether there is actually any need for the 
imposition of formal obligations, such as those present in the EIR Recast. Chapter 5 of this 
Report highlights some of these issues through a discussion of case law which, in turn, 
describes real commercial situations where these issues have arisen. As we progressed in our 
research, we realised the nature of co-operation in EU insolvency matters remains unclear. It 
seems that a lot of assumptions have been made regarding this matter, which will be explored 
further as case law develops into the future. That said we are conscious of the fact that the 
EIR Recast (with its enhanced co-operation obligations) is a relatively new piece of legislation, 
dating back only 3 years from the time of the beginning of the project in 2018 and so perhaps 
it is too early to say what its real effects are, or indeed how these enhanced obligations to co-
operate will be interpreted over time, particularly in the even newer context of a pan 
European preventive restructuring framework.  
 Co-Operation Guidelines, Examples, and Experience 
In keeping with our original research agenda (as indicated to the EU Commission DG Justice) 
we will also consider awareness of, and the application of, existing best practice guidelines for 
co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases. Chapter 6 will provide an account of these 
current existing guidelines on co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases, particularly 
those applicable in the European sphere. Chapter 6 will also explore how co-operation is 
 
38 ibid at p. 45. In Ireland 30% rated judicial independence as very good with 70% as fairly good. In the UK these figures were 20% and 60% 
approximately. The Netherlands the figures were 25% and 73% approximately. Other common law countries such as Cyprus scored lower 
with 12% and just over 50% scoring very good and fairly good perception of judicial independence.  
39 This is also interesting as Cyprus introduced a rescue procedure which is similar to Ireland’s examinership process which has been judged 
a failure. See further Kayode Akintola and Sofia Ellina, 'The Use and Abuse of Corporate Insolvency Rescue Procedures: A Contextual 
Evaluation of the United Kingdom and Cyprus' in Jennifer L. L. Gant (ed), Party Autonomy and Third Party Protection in Insolvency Law (INSOL 
Europe 2019) 137-154. See generally Michael Peel, ‘Moscow on the Med: Cyprus and its Russians’ Financial Times (Limassol and Nicosia, 
May 15th, 2020), and see further Council of Europe, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures in Cyprus, Fifth Round 





envisaged under the UNCITRAL Model Law, which includes provisions on co-operation that 
are similar to the EIR Recast. Chapters 5 and 8 of this Report will include information on 
judicial awareness and use of these guidelines gleaned from our engagement with members 
of the European judiciary through the Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe.40 
Chapter 7 will then give an insight into how the United States, as a federalised jurisdiction 
similar in some respects to the structure of the EU, deals with interstate insolvencies, 
particularly with regard to forum determination and cross-border case coordination. The 
latter of these two aspects will mainly explore how coordination occurs often through 
bespoke protocols created on a case-by-case basis.  
The final substantive chapter of this Report, Chapter 8, will present our findings of a survey 
distributed among three judicial focus groups in English, Italian, and Romanian. The purpose 
of this survey was to determine the experience of members of the European judiciary with 
both court-to-court co-operation in cross-border cases and their awareness and utilisation of 
the guidelines discussed in Chapter 6.41 The final Chapter will then offer our conclusions and 
reflections on the content of this Report. 
 Chapter 2: Transition 
The next Chapter will give an exposition of the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) 
848/2015 applicable from 26 June 201742 developing from the original European Insolvency 
Regulation 1346/2000.43 It provides an explanation of the policy and regulatory framework 
within which the obligation placed on courts to co-operate arises. In particular, it will focus on 
the evolution of the co-operation obligations under both versions of the EIR, including how 
the EU views the meaning of judicial co-operation and what kinds of actions are expected or 
recommended in this area. These obligations will be examined in terms of both the recitals 
and the articles within which they are seated and how they developed between the two 






40 Materials of relevance, which were presented at these meetings, are attached in an Annex to this Report. 
41 A copy of this survey distributed through domestic networks of our partner researchers UNIFI, who accessed an Italian network of 
insolvency judges, UTM who accessed those in the Romanian Magistracy having experience in hearing insolvency cases, and Ireland and 
through the Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe is attached in an Annex II to this Report.  
42 EIR Recast, art 92. 
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1. 
 The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  




The content of this document represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility.  
The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 




II. Chapter 2: Court-to-court and Judicial Co-Operation1 in the 
European Union  
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 2 
In Chapter 3 of Report 1, we considered the evolution of the European Insolvency Regulation2 
and the subsequent EIR Recast (848/2015)3 from various conventions and negotiations taking 
place since the 1960s, which exemplify the movement toward further integration of the 
European Union. During those early decades, but particularly during the period immediately 
preceding the adoption of the EIR Recast, the discussion between universalism and 
territorialism, which had taken place in the United States academy, sparked the interests of 
some academics on this side of the Atlantic.4 However, no EU policy documents proactively 
engage with this theoretical debate5 and it is clear that the incrementalist approach6 was 
adopted in the European Union, thereby avoiding a binary classification of approaches to 
issues of recognition and cooperation.  
This Chapter will trace the evolution of the EIR Recast and, in particular, the evolution of the 
cooperation obligations. In doing so, it will consider how the EU addresses what is meant by 
judicial cooperation and what kinds of action are envisaged. Section 2.2 is broken into three 
parts. First, it begins with a discussion of the EIR and considers its historical background and 
some of the factors that prompted its introduction. The next section progresses to considering 
the specific cooperation obligations for individual debtors found in the EIR and discusses the 
changes to these requirements introduced by the Recast. The third part of section 2.2 
 
1 The remainder of this chapter will adopt the spelling cooperation, so that is the spelling in the EIR and the EIR Recast.  
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1. [Hereinafter EIR]. 
3 Council Regulation (EU) 848/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) [2015] 
OJ L 141/19. [Hereinafter EIR Recast]. 
4 See for example Gerard McCormack, ‘Universalism in Insolvency Proceedings and the Common Law’ (2012) 32(2) J Legal Studies 325; ‘US 
Exceptionalism and UK Localism: Cross-Border Insolvency Law in Comparative Perspective' (2016) 36 Legal Stud 136; Reinhard Bork ‘The 
European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2017) 26 Int Insolv Rev 246. 
5 See for example Emilie Ghio, ‘Cross-border Insolvency and Rescue Law Theory: Moving Away from the Traditional Debate on Universalism 
and Territorialism’ (2018) 29(12) ICCLR 713. 
6 A phrase adopted by Emilie Ghio in the European context from American insolvency academic, John Pottow. See John Pottow, ‘Procedural 





considers the changes made to the EIR Recast during the inter-institutional negotiations and 
highlights some of key differences between what the Commission proposed and what was 
eventually passed. Section 2.3 considers the relationship between the EIR, the EIR Recast and 
the regulation of groups of companies. It is split into three parts: the first considers 
cooperation obligations for groups of companies; the second discusses the regulation of 
proceedings for groups of companies; and the third looks at the differences between the 
Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast and what was finally agreed, giving some context to 
the divergent views of the institutions.7 
2.2 The European Insolvency Regulation and the Obligation to Cooperate 
2.2.1 Introduction to the EIR and its Recast 
Amongst others, Reinhard Bork, Paul Omar and Kristin van Zwieten trace the history of the 
EIR back to the 1970 draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements, 
Compositions, and Similar Proceedings,8 wherein those drafting the Convention recognised 
that insolvency proceedings in one State had to produce effects in other States in order to be 
in any way effective.9 As appears to be common in relation to insolvency matters – and indeed 
other matters subject to regulation – within the EU, it was concluded that the unification of 
domestic laws would be too time-consuming and laborious. Instead, the drafters chose to 
adopt a procedural framework based upon on the concept that one proceeding opened in one 
Member State would have effect across the EU (or EEC, as it was then). Despite a long 
negotiation period, a subsequent draft convention and an EC Council Working Party review in 
the 1980s, consensus on the matter could not be reached, resulting in the endeavour being 
shelved.10 The idea was revived in the 1990s and resulted in the 1995 Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings, which envisaged inter alia the operation of main and secondary 
proceedings and the interaction and coordination of the two. The 1995 Convention was not 
ratified by the United Kingdom; thus, it was not ratified by all Member States as was required. 
Interestingly, Denmark, which opted out of the EIR and by extension the Recast in accordance 
 
7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM744 final of 12 December 2012 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings (2012) 2012/0360 (COD). 
8 European Economic Community ‘Preliminary Draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements, Compositions, and Similar 
Proceedings’ COM (1970) 3.327/1/XIV/70-E, art 2: ‘The proceedings specified in this Convention, when instituted in one of the Contracting 
States, shall have full legal effect in the other Contracting States and shall be a bar to the institution of any other such proceedings in those 
States.’  
9 Kristin van Zwieten ‘Introduction’ in Reinhard Bork and Kristin van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) (para 15). For other discussions, see Paul Omar ‘Genesis of the European Initiative in Insolvency Law’ (2003) 
12 Int. Insolv. Rev. 147. Reinhard Bork ‘The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2017) 
26 Int. Insolv. Rev. 246, 251. See also JCOERE Report 1, section 3.2 ‘History and Development of European Insolvency Coordination’. For a 
fuller historical overview, see also Chapter 3 of Report 1 of the JCOERE Project. 
10 Miguel Virgós and Etienne Schmit, ‘Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings of 3 May 1996’, EC Council Document 6500/96, 7. 
In the early 1990s, the ‘Istanbul Convention’ was presented by the Council of Europe, as distinct from the Council of the European Union or 
the European Council. It differed from the previous attempts at a convention in that it would permit multiple insolvency proceedings related 
to a single debtor to be opened across states, instead, regulating aspects of such proceedings. It too, was unsuccessful, however, Paul Omar 
argues that it may have provided a ‘fresh impetus’ to the EU to pursue a convention; Paul J Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate 2004) 
73. See also Kristin van Zwieten ‘Introduction’ in R Bork and K van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation (Oxford 





with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed the 1995 
Convention.11 In 1999, the Convention text of the Convention returned in the form of a 
Council Regulation, namely the Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings (1346/2000) or 
the ‘EIR’. Its purpose, as far as preceding conventions and bilateral agreements were 
concerned, was clear: it was to replace such agreements from the point at which it entered 
into force.12 In general, it has been viewed as not only achieving its central aim of coordinating 
insolvency proceedings in Europe but also as constituting an important step toward judicial 
cooperation within the European Union.13 
The review of the EIR and its subsequent overhaul, which took place in 2015, was mandated 
by the Regulation itself. Article 46 mandated the Commission to report on the application of 
the EIR to the Parliament, Council and the EESC within a specified timeline. If necessary, the 
Commission report was to be accompanied by a proposal for the modification of the EIR.14 
Generally, the aim of this review and modification of the EIR was considered to be an exercise 
in filling ‘perceived gaps in the original instrument’ rather than a tearing down and rebuilding 
of the EIR, perhaps reflecting the idea that the EIR was generally viewed to be fit for purpose.15 
As was the case with the introduction of the Preventive Restructuring Directive, the overall 
stated objective of the revision of the EIR was ‘to improve the efficiency of the European 
framework for resolving cross-border insolvency cases in view of ensuring a smooth 
functioning of the internal market and its resilience in economic crises’.16 The Commission 
itself noted in the Proposal for the Recast that the EIR was ‘functioning well in general’ but 
that it was desirable to improve upon the application of certain provisions ‘in order to enhance 
the effective administration of cross-border insolvency proceedings’.17  
2.2.2 EIR & EIR Recast: Cooperation obligations 
The principle of cooperation is not exclusive to the EIR or its Recast; rather as Reinhard Bork 
has pointed out, it has ‘its foundations in the European law principle of EU Member States 
assisting one another’, for example in Article 4(3) of the TEU.18 A considerable difference 
 
11 See Report 1 of the JCOERE Project and in the JCOERE Country Report on Denmark for further information on Denmark and the EIR and 
Recast <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1jurisdiction/report1jurisdictiondenmark/>. 
12 EIR, art 44. Examples of the agreements that were replaced were the Convention between France and Austria on Jurisdiction, Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments on Bankruptcy, signed at Vienna on 27 February 1979 and the Convention between Italy and Austria on 
Bankruptcy, Winding-up, Arrangements and Compositions, signed at Rome on 12 July 1977 (EIR, art 44 (e)(g)).  
13 Reinhard Bork and Renato Mangano, European Cross-Border Insolvency Law (OUP 2016) 16. 
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1, art 46.  
15 Kristin van Zwieten ‘Introduction’ in Reinhard Bork and Kristin van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation 
(Oxford University Press, 2016). See also Gerard McCormack ‘Reforming The European Insolvency Regulation: A Legal And Policy Perspective’ 
(2014) 10 Journal of Private International Law 41 and Francisco Garcimartín ‘The EU Insolvency Regulation Recast: Scope and Rules on 
Jurisdiction’ available at <http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6333/Rules_on_jurisdiction.pdf>. 
16 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM744 final of 12 December 2012 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings (2012) 2012/0360 (COD), 3.  
17 ibid 12. 
18 Reinhard Bork ‘The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2017) 26 Int. Insolv. Rev. 
246, 259. See also the judgment in the Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU «ADAX»/Ryszard Adamiak v Christianapol 





between the EIR and the EIR Recast was the addition of new and stronger cooperation 
obligations, which Renato Mangano contends is consistent with both ‘a commonly shared 
idea that private international law is based on cooperation’ and ‘an established tradition of 
common law courts and practitioners dealing with cross-border cases’. This theme of the 
relationship between cooperation and the rules of private international law will be considered 
in more detail in Chapter 5.19 In the EIR, there was a duty to cooperate, but this was confined 
to cooperation between liquidators. Article 31(1) of the EIR stated: 
Subject to the rules restricting the communication of information, the liquidator in the 
main proceedings and the liquidators in the secondary proceedings shall be duty 
bound to communicate information to each other. They shall immediately 
communicate any information which may be relevant to the other proceedings, in 
particular the progress made in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed 
at terminating the proceedings. 
Article 31(2) stated: 
Subject to the rules applicable to each of the proceedings, the liquidator in the main 
proceedings and the liquidators in the secondary proceedings shall be duty bound to 
cooperate. 
Furthermore, Article 31(3) of the EIR required that the liquidator in the main proceedings be 
given an early opportunity by the liquidator in the secondary proceedings to submit proposals 
on the liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings. The intention behind 
these articles was clear: to require communication and cooperation in order to coordinate 
multiple proceedings, thereby increasing efficiency and clarity and decreasing cost. The 
cooperation requirements in the EIR were not without their issues, however. First, the 
cooperation requirements only specified liquidators. Although the cooperation requirements 
in the EIR were interpreted more broadly by some courts20 and despite many Member States 
having domestic legislation requiring cooperation between national courts and the foreign 
insolvency court presiding over the main proceedings.21 It still remained that only liquidators 
were explicitly bound to cooperate. Accordingly, the co-operation provisions in the EIR Recast 
were drafted, in part, to solve this issue.  
Second, it could be suggested that there are issues of clarity, particularly with the applicable 
recital, Recital 20. Bernard Santen, for example, argues that ‘neither the recitals nor the 
 
acknowledged. See also chapter 3 of this Report for a discussion of article 81 of the TEFU (judicial cooperation in civil matters with cross-
border implications) as a potential basis for the (increased) cooperation requirements in the regulation.  
19 Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border 
Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314, 315.  
20 Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU «ADAX»/Ryszard Adamiak v Christianapol sp. z o.o ECLI:EU:C:2012:739: ‘[T]he 
principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Art 4(3) TEU requires the court having jurisdiction to open secondary proceedings, in applying 
those provisions, to have regard to the objectives of the main proceedings and to take account of the scheme of the Regulation, which, as 
observed in paragraphs 45 and 60 of this judgment, aims to ensure efficient and effective cross-border insolvency proceedings through 
mandatory coordination of the main and secondary proceedings guaranteeing the priority of the main proceedings.’ 





articles provide[d] insight into the application of ‘cooperation’ or ‘coordination’.22 He goes on 
to query if there was actually any difference between the two or if they are ‘(largely) identical 
concepts’.23 While his argument that ‘no insight’ is provided could be considered a little harsh 
– Recital 20 of the EIR does give explanations of how coordination24 and cooperation25 can be 
achieved – it is perhaps fair to say that the language employed lacked precision. For example, 
the explanation of cooperation provided by Recital 20 could be construed as meaning 
‘communication’, as it refers to ‘exchanging a sufficient amount of information’.26 
‘Coordination’ is primarily explained as being achieved through cooperation,27 which is in turn 
explained as above, as potentially meaning communication (‘exchanging a sufficient amount 
of information’). Furthermore, Renato Mangano contends that the lack of specific provisions 
expressly allowing liquidators to conclude agreements and protocols meant that in civil law 
jurisdictions, at least, there was evidence of liquidators being hesitant to enter into such 
arrangements and no evidence of cooperation between courts.28 In other words, the absence 
of certainty resulted in an reluctance towards cooperating.29 The Recast, as will be 
demonstrated below, goes some way to ameliorating perceived issues of clarity.  
The EIR Recast specified two types of cooperation and coordination. First, it added a 
requirement for cooperation and coordination between courts,30 something that was viewed 
as preferable to leaving such cooperation ‘to the realm of implication and inference’.31 Plainly, 
as Gerard McCormack asserts, this is because courts may interpret the existence and extent 
of such a requirement differently were it not specifically provided for in the Regulation. 
Arguably, this potential for difference in inference would be particularly acute within the 
common and civil law divide; it might be remembered that Renato Mangano contends that a 
major difference between common law and civil law courts was the ‘established tradition’ of 
the former dealing with cross-border cases and cooperating therein.32 This importance of the 
difference in legal cultures and traditions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this 
Report.  
 
22 Bernard Santen ‘Communication and cooperation in international insolvency: on best practices for insolvency office holders and cross-
border communication between courts’ (2015) 16 ERA Forum 229, 231. 
23 ibid. 
24 ‘In order to ensure the dominant role of the main insolvency proceedings, the liquidator in such proceedings should be given several 
possibilities for intervening in secondary insolvency proceedings which are pending at the same time.’ Coordination is also explained as being 
achieved by cooperating.  
25 ‘[I]n particular by exchanging a sufficient amount of information’. 
26 EIR, Recital 20.  
27 ‘Main insolvency proceedings and secondary proceedings can, however, contribute to the effective realisation of the total assets only if all 
the concurrent proceedings pending are coordinated. The main condition here is that the various liquidators must cooperate closely …’; EIR, 
recital 20.  
28 Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border 
Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314, 317. 
29 ibid.  
30 As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, in view of article 2(6)(ii) of the EIR Recast, ‘court’ can also be interpreted to refer to 
‘administrative authority’ or more broadly, a body legally empowered to open insolvency proceedings. 
31 Gerard McCormack ‘Reforming the European Insolvency Regulation: A Legal and Policy Perspective’ (2014) 10(1) J Private Int’l L 41, 54. 
32 Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border 





If an insolvency or restructuring proceeding is included in Annex A of the EIR Recast:  
(…)a court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which 
has opened such proceedings, shall cooperate with any other court before which a 
request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such 
proceedings, to the extent that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules 
applicable to each of the proceedings.33 
The only exception to this requirement is where cooperation would be incompatible with the 
rules applicable to the proceedings in question, an exception which one could argue defers 
appropriately to the domestic courts and national rules. While it may be unlikely that there 
would be provisions contained within a domestic framework that would explicitly prohibit 
cooperation, arguably a jurisdiction with such a framework would do as the Dutch have and 
create it with the intention that it to be outside the EIR. Examples of national rules comprised 
of rules of both a substantive and procedural nature that may have the result of impeding 
cooperation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this Report. The remainder of 
Article 42 expands on and further explains how this duty to cooperate may be fulfilled.34  
Second, the EIR Recast added a requirement for cooperation between insolvency 
practitioners and courts. Article 43(1) requires that an insolvency practitioner in main 
insolvency proceedings cooperate and communicate with any court that has opened 
secondary proceedings, or which has a request to do so. The same requirement applies to an 
insolvency practitioner in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings vis-à-vis the court of 
main jurisdiction. Finally, it also mandates that an insolvency practitioner in territorial or 
secondary insolvency proceedings cooperates and communicates with a court that has also 
opened territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings, or one which has a request to do so. 
Article 43(2) then refers to the means of cooperation laid out in Article 42(2) and (3). 
In addition, the EIR Recast amended the original Article 31 duty to cooperate – now Article 41 
– which was outlined above. The primary change from the EIR was the inclusion of an 
additional means of how the cooperation should occur via article 41(2)(b), namely that the 
insolvency practitioners shall ‘explore the possibility of restructuring the debtor and, where 
such a possibility exists, coordinate the elaboration and implementation of a restructuring 
plan’.35 Naturally, in light of the PRD being passed in 2019, an interface between these two 
 
33 EIR Recast, art 41(1). 
34 EIR Recast, art 42(2): ‘In implementing the cooperation set out in paragraph 1, the courts … may communicate directly with, or request 
information or assistance directly from, each other provided that such communication respects the procedural rights of the parties to the 
proceedings and the confidentiality of information.’ 
EIR Recast, art 42(3): ‘The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any means that the court considers appropriate. 
It may, in particular, concern: (a) coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners; (b) communication of information by any 
means considered appropriate by the court; (c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; (d) 
coordination of the conduct of hearings; (e) coordination in the approval of protocols, where necessary.’ 





legal instruments exists, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.36 Other aspects 
of the article were refined, or reworded without substantial change; for example, the second 
sentence of the original Article 3137 became: 
[A]s soon as possible communicate to each other any information which may be 
relevant to the other proceedings, in particular any progress made in lodging and 
verifying claims and all measures aimed at rescuing or restructuring the debtor, or at 
terminating the proceedings, provided appropriate arrangements are made to protect 
confidential information.38 
The requirement in Article 31(3) that the liquidator in the main proceedings be given an early 
opportunity by the liquidator in the secondary proceedings to propose the liquidation or use 
of the assets (secondary proceedings) saw minor changes. It became a requirement to 
‘coordinate the administration of the realisation or use of the debtor's assets and affairs’, 
which when explained, in practical terms, broadly meant the same as the old article 31(3).39 
The recitals applicable to cooperation also saw significant changes between the EIR and the 
Recast. Two new recitals were added, Recitals 49 and 50, presumably with the intention of 
expanding on the ideas of cooperation, communication and coordination within insolvency 
proceedings. Recital 49 applies to cooperation between insolvency practitioners and the 
court, emphasising the view that their entry into agreements and protocols with a view to 
facilitating ‘cross-border cooperation’ of multiple cross-border proceedings concerning the 
same debtor (or members of the same group of companies) should be permitted. The 
Commission explained the inclusion of explicit reference to agreements and protocols in the 
Recast as a means of acknowledging their practical importance and promoting their use.40 It 
explains that such arrangements may (i) take a variety of forms, in other words be written or 
oral; (ii) may vary in scope, ranging from generic to specific; and interestingly may (iii) cover 
parties taking or refraining from taking certain steps or actions. Recital 50 pertains to court-
to-court cooperation, providing that cooperation and coordination in that instance may be 
achieved by the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner for multiple insolvency 
proceedings concerning the same debtor or for different members of a group of companies.41  
 
 
36 Aspects of this interface were also touched upon in Chapter 4 of Report 1 of the JCOERE Project. See also Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the 
Shadows of US Insolvency Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 Eur Bus Org L Rev 615.  
37 ‘They shall immediately communicate any information which may be relevant to the other proceedings, in particular the progress made 
in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed at terminating the proceedings.’ 
38 EIR Recast, art 41(2)(a).  
39 EIR Recast, art 41(2)(c): ‘coordinate the administration of the realisation or use of the debtor's assets and affairs; the insolvency practitioner 
in the secondary insolvency proceedings shall give the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings an early opportunity to 
submit proposals on the realisation or use of the assets in the secondary insolvency proceedings.’ 
40 Proposal, 9; Just for clarity, it is worth noting that the Proposal did not originally contain a recital referring to agreements and protocols. 
The reference was only included in article 31 (now article 48).  
41 The caveat is that such an appointment must be compatible ‘with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings, in particular with any 





2.2.3 The evolution of the EIR Recast: European Union institutions42  
It is worth noting that the Proposal for the EIR Recast did not sail through the various EU 
institutions; rather, it went through considerable EU negotiations before being passed, a 
process which took two and a half years, two European Parliament readings, four Council 
debates and inter-institutional negotiations (trilogue), amongst other input. With that said, 
much of the debate centred elsewhere and not around the issues, articles, and recitals directly 
relevant to cooperation; however, there were some changes of note. As discussed in the 
previous section, the review of the EIR and resulting changes were mandated by the 
Regulation itself.  
Before examining the specific amendments made to proposed recitals and articles, it is worth 
bearing one overarching change in mind: across the Regulation, there was a change in 
terminology from ‘liquidator’ to ‘insolvency practitioner’, reflecting the fact that perhaps an 
update in terminology was needed from the EIR and indeed, from the proposal for its reform. 
Arguably, this change in terminology was desirable in order to reflect the shift in scope that 
took place between the EIR and the Recast; a focus on insolvency procedures in the former to 
encompassing restructuring and pre-insolvency procedures in the latter. A related possibility 
is that it was not envisaged that rescue processes would be included in the EIR when it was 
originally drafted, particularly given the wording of Article 1, which states: ‘This Regulation 
shall apply to collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of 
a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator.’ Yet, across the procedures contained in Annex 
A are frameworks that do not require a ‘liquidator’ and instead utilise a different professional; 
thus, ‘insolvency practitioner’ is certainly a more appropriate term for these professionals. 
For example, the Irish Examinership procedures uses an ‘examiner’, who is an insolvency 
practitioner; liquidation, which requires a liquidator, is a separate procedure entirely. While a 
liquidator is an insolvency practitioner in Ireland, the corollary is not always the case, as a 
liquidator is just one of the roles that can be held by an insolvency practitioner. There are a 
number of other procedures in Annex A, both in the EIR and the Recast, that do not necessarily 
have ‘liquidators’, such as the Italian concordato preventivo, the French Sauvegarde,43 and the 
Dutch surséance van betaling.44 Thus, Article 2 of the Commission Proposal was amended and 
rather than defining ‘liquidator’,45 as had been the case in the Proposal, the EIR Recast defines 
an ‘insolvency practitioner’.46 Practically, the change may have been minimal, as ‘liquidators’ 
 
42 This section discusses the changes to the cooperation obligations in the EIR Recast.  
43 And its variations; Sauvegarde accélérée, and Sauvegarde financière accélérée, 
44 The public procedure under the WHOA, which is intended to be included in Annex A, is another example. For further information on the 
procedures in France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, amongst others, see JCOERE Report 1, Chapters 6-8.  
45 Defined by the Proposal as: ‘(i) any person or body whose function is to administer or liquidate assets of which the debtor has been 
divested or to supervise the administration of his affairs. Those persons and bodies are listed in Annex C; (ii) in a case which does not involve 
the appointment of, or the transfer of the debtor's powers to, a liquidator, the debtor in possession.’ Commission Proposal (COM) 744 final 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM744 final of 12 December 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings [2012] 2012/0360 (COD) [Hereinafter ‘Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast’] art 2(b). 
46 An ‘”insolvency practitioner” means any person or body whose function, including on an interim basis, is to: (i) verify and admit claims 





in the EIR were understood in line with a prescribed list of professionals (Annex C) that clearly 
included a range of insolvency practitioners other than liquidators. For example, it included 
the Irish examiner and commissario (Italy) and when recast, included the administrateur 
judiciaire and mandataire judiciaire (France), amongst others.47 The question does, however, 
legitimately arise as to why certain procedures were included in the EIR, which did not appear 
to fit comfortably, or at all, in the scope of the regulation as outlined in Article 1.  
Aside from the change in terminology proposed by both the Council and the Parliament, the 
changes to recitals and articles relevant to this research emanated principally from the 
Council. Arguably, the amendments to the recitals were relatively minor, appearing to be 
more for the sake of clarity rather than substantive change. For example, the Commission 
Proposal for Recital 4848, which stated that main and secondary insolvency proceedings could 
only contribute to ‘the effective realisation of the total assets’ if proceedings were 
‘coordinated’, was expanded and softened a little:49 
Main insolvency proceedings and secondary insolvency proceedings can contribute to 
the efficient administration of the debtor's insolvency estate or to the effective 
realisation of the total assets if there is proper cooperation between the actors 
involved in all the concurrent proceedings.50 
Recital 48 then goes on to define ‘proper cooperation’ in a similar manner to how 
‘coordinated’ was defined in the Proposal, namely as the insolvency practitioners and courts 
‘cooperating closely’ by exchanging ‘sufficient … information’.51 Finally, as was articulated 
above, the references to ‘liquidator’ were removed and replaced with ‘insolvency 
practitioner’.52  
Interestingly, neither recital 49 nor 50 were included in the Commission Proposal and thus, 
were added during the inter-institutional negotiation process. Even though the Commission 
referred to agreements and protocols in the relevant article, perhaps the addition of recital 
49 was to further emphasise an important status for such arrangements in order to eliminate 
the reluctance of practitioners in civil law countries to their use, which was identified as an 
issue by Renato Mangano.53  
 
which the debtor has been divested; (iv) liquidate the assets referred to in point (iii); or (v) supervise the administration of the debtor's 
affairs. The persons and bodies referred to in the first subparagraph are listed in Annex B’; EIR Recast, art 2(5).  
47 For the full list of professionals included coming within the meaning of ‘liquidator’, see EIR, Annex C and for ‘insolvency practitioner’, see 
EIR Recast, Annex C.  
48 Recital 20 from the Proposal was renumbered recital 48 in the final EIR Recast.  
49 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, Recital 20. 
50 EIR Recast, Recital 48. 
51 ibid. 
52 This was the only change suggested by the European Parliament, though it suggested use of the term ‘insolvency representative’ rather 
than the agreed term ‘insolvency practitioner’. 
53 Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border 





As articulated previously, the primary articles pertaining to cooperation in the EIR Recast are 
articles 41 – 43. Before discussing the amendments to those articles, it is interesting to note 
that article 44, which prohibits courts from charging costs to each other for cooperation and 
communication, was neither a standalone article in the Commission Proposal nor was the 
requirement written with the same specificity. The Commission had required that 
cooperation be ‘free of charge’ as part of article 31a (now article 42).54 Arguably, this 
amendment goes a long way towards eliminating any confusion as to the intention of the 
article, which one could describe as a prohibition on one court from charging another in a 
different Member State for the privilege of cooperation.  
As explained above, the function of article 41 is to lay out the provisions that govern 
cooperation between insolvency practitioners. The only amendment to article 41 was the 
insertion of subsection 3, which extends the cooperation requirements contained in the first 
two paragraphs to ‘situations where … the debtor remains in possession of its assets’. Perhaps 
it could be argued that this change is another reflection of the regulation moving scope from 
predominantly insolvency and liquidation to also encompassing pre-insolvency and rescue.  
The change made to article 42(1) appears to be relatively minor; it was amended to add the 
requirement that the appointment of the independent person or body acting on its 
instructions must not be incompatible with the rules applicable to them. Across articles 42 
and 43, ‘territorial proceedings’ were added to the list of proceedings concerning the same 
debtor that should be coordinated where possible. Finally, article 42(3) was amended to 
include ‘coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners’ as a means of 
implementing the court-to-court cooperation requirement;55 the others being 
communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court; 
coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; 
coordination of the conduct of hearings and coordination in the approval of protocols.56 
Arguably, this addition demonstrates consistency with the new recital 50.57 
The primary amendment to article 43(1) was an extension of the obligation of insolvency 
practitioners in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings to cooperate and 
communicate with courts, which had opened or had a request to open other territorial or 
secondary insolvency proceedings. In the Commission Proposal the obligation only explicitly 
applied to the insolvency practitioner in the main proceeding vis-à-vis the court with a 
secondary proceeding (request) or the insolvency practitioner in the secondary proceeding 
vis-à-vis the court with main proceedings. Naturally, the omission may have resulted in the 
 
54 Article 31a(2) originally read: 2. The courts referred to in paragraph 1 may communicate directly with, or to request information or 
assistance directly from each other provided that such communication is free of charge and respects the procedural rights of the parties to 
the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.  
55 EIR Recast, art 42(3)(a).  
56 EIR Recast, art 42(3)(b)-(e); ‘where necessary’ was added to art 42(3)(e). 
57 ‘Similarly, the courts of different Member States may cooperate by coordinating the appointment of insolvency practitioners. In that 
context, they may appoint a single insolvency practitioner for several insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor or for different 
members of a group of companies, provided that this is compatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings, in particular with 




insolvency practitioner involved in secondary or territorial proceedings having no obligation 
to cooperate with a court in another Member State also involved in a secondary or territorial 
proceeding. 
2.3 EIR & EIR Recast: Cooperation Obligations and the Regulation of 
Groups of Companies 
2.3.1 EIR & EIR Recast: Cooperation obligations for groups of companies 
As described in the introduction, a significant issue with the EIR appeared to be connected to 
its effectiveness where groups of companies were concerned; the primary issue being that 
‘coordination’ in the EIR was not explicitly and effectively regulated for groups of companies. 
Thus, where the previous section (2.2) outlined and discussed the changes to cooperation and 
coordination requirements for single debtors, this section will discuss the EIR and the Recast, 
its articles and recitals, with groups of companies as the focus. In its Proposal for the EIR 
Recast, the Commission acknowledged that almost half of respondents that took part in the 
public consultation process viewed the EIR as failing to work efficiently for insolvencies 
consisting of members of a multinational group of companies.58 Furthermore, it was noted 
that the lack of regulation was diminishing ‘the prospects of successful restructuring of 
group[s] [of companies] as a whole’ resulting instead in their break-up.59 In spite of this clear 
sentiment expressed by the Commission, its Proposal for amending the EIR did not contain 
express provisions on coordinated group proceedings, arguably a notable omission. As will be 
discussed in section 2.3.3, the framework for group coordinated proceedings was added 
during the inter-institutional negotiation of the Recast.  
Perhaps it goes without saying that the types of insolvency proceedings that most need 
effective coordination, efficiency and organisation are those concerning large groups of 
companies with potentially intricate structures, as evidenced by complex and challenging 
cases such as Eurofood.60 Eurofood concerned the resolution of a dispute over the COMI of 
Eurofood IFSC, a subsidiary of the Italian parent company, Parmalat SpA. This case will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, however, cases such as this illustrate, albeit it briefly in 
this Chapter, the challenges that arose from the lack of regulation of groups of companies in 
the EIR and highlight ‘bitter clashes between courts and insolvency practitioners belonging to 
different jurisdictions’.61 In spite of the legislative void where groups were concerned, there 
was some evidence that certain domestic courts overcame the lack of regulation by adopting 
an ‘integrated economic unit’ approach.62 This refers to the practice of considering the affairs 
 
58 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, 5. 
59 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, 3.  
60 C-341/04 [2006] ECR I-3813. 
61 Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border 
Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314, 318. 





of the group of companies as a whole, which in turn can lead to a finding that related 
companies have their COMI in the same state despite being incorporated elsewhere.63 With 
that said, however, differences in inferences still posed a problem as this use of the integrated 
economic unit approach was not universal, thereby leading to potential discrepancies in how 
different group proceedings could be treated. Furthermore, on foot of Eurofood, the CJEU 
seemed not to interpret the issue the way some of the domestic courts had.64 Accordingly, 
and in line with the stated intention of the Commission to create a ‘specific legal framework 
to deal with the insolvency of members of a group of companies while maintaining the entity-
by-entity approach’; the Regulation was amended to expressly apply to groups of companies 
to attempt to avoid disputes concerning them from arising.65  
The first step in achieving the aim of express regulation of groups of companies, the opening 
gambit as it were, was to create new recitals to make a clear statement as to the intention of 
the Recast over and above merely referring to ‘groups of companies’ in other recitals.66 Recital 
51 made an unequivocal statement about the purpose of the Recast regarding groups of 
companies, wherein it was stated that the EIR Recast should ensure efficient administration 
of the insolvency proceedings of those companies forming part of a group. Recital 52 provides 
that there should be ‘proper cooperation’ between participants – courts and insolvency 
practitioners – involved in group insolvency proceedings in the same way as is required in the 
case of a single debtor. Recital 54 introduced the concept of the coordinated group 
proceedings, for which procedural rules were to be introduced by the Recast, with recitals 55-
59 providing more detail on their operation. Interestingly, despite the noted advantages of 
coordinated group proceedings, recital 56 provides an ‘out’ in the interest of preserving their 
‘voluntary nature’; it states that insolvency practitioners involved in coordinated proceedings 
‘should be able to object to their participation’.67 Thus, whilst the Recast certainly encourages 
coordination, it does not make it obligatory, perhaps, once again, leaving the door open to 
the potential for inconsistencies across the EU for the sake of compromise.  
To reinforce the intentions expressed by the recitals, the EIR was amended to add articles 
regulating groups of companies. Chapter V of the EIR Recast, which is entitled ‘Insolvency 
Proceedings of Members of a Group of Companies’ is divided into two sections. Section 1, 
entitled ‘Cooperation and Communication’, regulates cooperation between courts, insolvency 
practitioners and courts and insolvency practitioners for groups of companies in a manner 
similar to the way articles 41-43 did for single debtors. The insolvency practitioners are 
obliged to cooperate; such cooperation can be achieved inter alia by communicating relevant 
information as soon as possible and where possible in the circumstances, coordinating the 
creation and implementation of a restructuring plan.68 Additionally for practitioners in 
 
63 ibid. See also Re MPOTEC Gmbh [2006] BCC 681.  
64 Case C-341/04 Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813.  
65 Commission Proposal for the EIR Recast, 59.  
66 For example, the revised recital 6, recitals 49-50.  
67 This is supported by article 64 of the EIR Recast, which will be discussed in more detail in the coming paragraphs.  




proceedings concerning a group, additional powers may be granted to insolvency 
practitioners appointed in one of the proceedings by (some of) the others in order to 
coordinate the administration and supervision of the affairs of the group members and to 
coordinate restructuring efforts, both of which are desirable if feasible per articles 56(2)(b)(c). 
The courts are obliged to cooperate in proceedings concerning groups of companies ‘to the 
extent that such cooperation is appropriate to facilitate the effective administration of the 
proceedings’. Aside from the addition of ‘appropriateness’ as a test or standard, the articles 
concerning court-to-court cooperation for single debtors and groups are virtually identical. 
Finally, insolvency practitioners and courts are obliged to cooperate, again to the extent that 
such cooperation is appropriate to achieving the aims of effective management of the 
proceedings. Interestingly, in proceedings concerning groups, the insolvency practitioner is 
empowered to request information concerning the proceedings of other member of the 
group from the relevant court, again provided that the request is appropriate to achieving its 
aims.69 One could question the necessity of such a provision if the cooperation mandated 
under article 56 was being achieved.  
2.3.2: EIR & EIR Recast: The regulation of proceedings for groups of companies 
Section 2 of Chapter V of the EIR Recast regulates the concept of ‘coordinated group 
proceedings’ referred to in recitals 54-59. Article 61 states that coordination proceedings may 
– as distinct from ‘must’ or ‘shall’ – be requested before any applicable court70 by any 
insolvency practitioner appointed to a member of the group. Therefore, such articles create a 
framework for opening coordinated proceedings, rather than making such proceedings 
mandatory. Article 61 goes on to regulate the contents and form of the request to open 
coordinated group proceedings; first, it must comply with the applicable national law.71 
Second, it must be accompanied by details of the proposed ‘group coordinator’,72 an estimate 
of and proposed division of costs73 and a list of the appointed insolvency practitioners and 
where relevant, the courts and competent authorities.74 Third, an outline of the proposed 
group coordination must also be included with specific reference to how the coordination 
fulfils the article 63(1) criteria.75 
Article 63(1), in turn, details the conditions that should be satisfied by the request for the 
opening of coordinated proceedings, namely its appropriateness to facilitate the effective 
administration of the group insolvency proceedings;76 the absence of a likelihood that any 
 
69 EIR Recast, art 58(b).  
70 ‘Applicable court’ refers to ‘any court having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a member of the group’ (EIR Recast, art 61(1)). 
71 EIR Recast, art 61(2): ‘The request referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made in accordance with the conditions provided for by the law 
applicable to the proceedings in which the insolvency practitioner has been appointed.’ 
72 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(a): ‘a proposal as to the person to be nominated as the group coordinator (‘the coordinator’), details of his or her 
eligibility pursuant to Article 71, details of his or her qualifications and his or her written agreement to act as coordinator’. 
73 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(d).  
74 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(c).  
75 EIR Recast, art 61(3)(b). 





creditor expected to participate in the proceedings will be financially disadvantaged by such 
participation77 and that the group coordinator meets the eligibility criteria to be appointed 
per article 71.78 Once the required time of 30 days, as specified by article 64(2), has elapsed 
and the court is satisfied that the conditions laid out in article 63(1) are met, then the court 
may grant the request.79 This results in the court appointing a coordinator, deciding an outline 
of the coordination and deciding on the estimation and division of costs.80 
Article 64 allows for any appointed insolvency practitioner to object to the inclusion of its part 
of the group in the coordinated proceedings or to object to the proposed coordinator within 
a 30-day period.81 Critically, this objection is determinative and results in the relevant part of 
the group being excluded from coordinated proceedings.82 Furthermore, there appears to be 
no guidance or limitations on the reasoning behind such an objection. Thus, it may be possible 
for insolvency practitioners to object on the basis that they do not wish to relinquish any of 
the value of the proceeding to their business – ‘to keep the business’ so to speak – perhaps 
providing scope for an objection to be lodged on grounds that directly concern neither the 
debtor nor its creditors.83 This concern is not exclusive to the EU. A similar point will be made 
in Chapter 7 (section 7.3) in relation to participation in centralised coordination for insolvency 
practitioners in the United States. Perhaps, more honourably, the reticence to be involved in 
coordinated proceedings may be as a result of the view that local interests – creditors and the 
debtor – can be better served by an uncoordinated approach. Even still, however, the lack of 
a requirement for the insolvency practitioner to provide a justification for requesting 
exclusion from the group coordinated proceedings arguably undermines its effectiveness and 
exposes it to the potential for abuse. 
There is also a specific cooperation requirement pertaining to group coordinated proceedings. 
Similar to the previously discussed cooperation obligations within insolvency proceedings, 
article 74 requires the appointed insolvency practitioners and the coordinator to cooperate 
with each other provided that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules governing 
the proceeding.84 This requirement specifically obliges the appointed insolvency practitioners 
 
77 EIR Recast, art 63(1)(b). 
78 EIR Recast, art 63(1)(c). These eligibility criteria are: 1. ‘The coordinator shall be a person eligible under the law of a Member State to act 
as an insolvency practitioner.’ 2. ‘The coordinator shall not be one of the insolvency practitioners appointed to act in respect of any of the 
group members, and shall have no conflict of interest in respect of the group members, their creditors and the insolvency practitioners 
appointed in respect of any of the group members.’ (EIR Recast, art 71).  
79 EIR Recast, art 68(1).  
80 EIR Recast, art 68(1)(a)-(c).  
81 EIR Recast, art 64(1) & (2). 
82 EIR Recast, art 65(1).  
83 Renato Mangano argues something similar in relation to choice of jurisdiction in insolvency matters: ‘In fact, if each court and insolvency 
practitioner can individually establish which law should apply to and which court should be competent in each cross-border legal relationship 
and which judgments of which other Member States are to be recognised, each court and each insolvency practitioner have an incentive to 
act opportunistically and to pursue the interest of those parties that are located in their own jurisdiction, that is, to overprotect local debtors, 
local creditors, local employees, local company directors, etc.’ Renato Mangano ‘From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Reluctance to Use Judicial 
Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314, 319. 





to communicate information that may be needed by the coordinator to perform his or her 
role.85  
The changes to the EIR brought about by its Recast, though generally viewed as positive, are 
not without criticism. Horst Eidenmuller, for example, comments that the EIR Recast – or 
Proposal for the EIR Recast as it was at the time – ‘falls short’ when it comes to manging group 
insolvencies, i.e. the coordinated group proceedings approach.86 A much better 
administration of group insolvencies, he argues, would be achieved by consolidating the 
procedures, as opposed to the entity-by-entity approach used by the EIR and its Recast.87 
Whether Eidenmuller is correct is perhaps irrelevant to an extent. Perhaps consolidated 
proceedings would work better, however, without both the flexibility of implementation and 
the retention of some control by Member States offered by the Regulation and other similar 
instruments, agreement on their introduction and subsequent amendment would be 
extremely challenging, if not impossible, to reach within the EU. Thus, while he may have a 
point, perhaps it is fair to say that his argument is more about the compromises and 
concessions almost endemic in intra-institutional negotiations and less about a failure to 
choose the best available option. Or perhaps, as Gerard McCormack argues succinctly, such 
policy choices ‘reflect an approach that, in this particular area, progress is best achieved by a 
series of small steps rather than by a great leap forward’.88  
2.3.3 The evolution of Chapter V: European Union institutions 
As was articulated in the opening of section 2.3, a notable omission from the Proposal was a 
clear framework on coordinated group proceedings. Although the Commission noted the lack 
of effectiveness of the EIR where groups of companies were concerned, it did not propose a 
model of coordinated proceedings; instead, the Commission additions to the EIR were 
predominantly the articles that eventually made up Chapter V, Section 1 – articles 56-60 – 
which saw some minor changes during the negotiation process. For example, the primary 
change to article 57, which pertains to cooperation between courts in proceedings concerning 
groups of companies, was the addition of ‘coordination in the appointment of insolvency 
practitioners’ to the means by which the courts could communicate. Arguably, this 
amendment was somewhat unsurprising given that a similar change was made to article 42, 
as discussed previously. While other parts of article 57 were revised, the amendments were 
 
85 EIR Recast, art 74(2).  
86 'A New Framework for Business Restructuring in Europe: The EU Commission's Proposals for a Reform of the European Insolvency 
Regulation and Beyond' (2013) 20 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 133, 148. 
87 ibid. He explains ‘procedural consolidation’ as one insolvency court being ‘designated in charge of the multiple (main) insolvency 
proceedings over the assets of multiple debtors within the group setting’ and one insolvency practitioner being appointed with respect to 
the multiple proceedings. The powers of insolvency practitioners in group proceedings are laid out in article 60.  





of little significance as they neither altered its overall meaning or intention.89 The same can 
be said to the changes made to articles 56 and 58.  
The addition of the articles pertaining to group coordinated proceedings was the most 
considerable change during the intra-institutional negotiations. The addition was advanced 
by the Parliament in the first instance; the report by the Committee on Legal Affairs proposed 
six new articles that, when reformulated during the negotiation process, became Section 2 of 
Chapter V. Interestingly, the Parliament and Commission appeared to be at odds regarding 
the approach that should be taken to remedy the issues with the EIR where groups of 
companies were concerned. In the explanatory statement accompanying its report, the 
Parliament stated that the Commission ‘[was] not following the recommendations of 
Parliament but [focusing] on enhancing the coordination and communication of different 
insolvency proceedings’.90 This was a contrast to what the Parliament had requested from the 
Commission, namely a ‘flexible proposal for the regulation on the insolvency of groups’.91 
Through the additions it proposed, the Parliament viewed itself as ‘formulating a more 
ambitious solution on insolvency of groups of companies’, something which it viewed as a 
compromised between its position and that of the Commission.92 It appears that this 
compromise was desirable all round, as the final text from the Council also contained the 
provisions pertaining to group coordinated proceedings.93  
2.4 Conclusion and Transition 
This Chapter has traced the evolution of the EIR between its 2000 version and its Recast with 
a particular focus on the emergence of the cooperation obligations contained in the Recast. 
While the EIR Recast is sometimes viewed as lacking in the provision of specific instructions 
on how cooperation should occur, it also acknowledges that courts and practitioners may 
create protocols to assist in this task, examples of which are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7 (section 7.3). That said, there remains criticism that the EIR Recast has not 
gone far enough, as discussed in section 2.3.2 of this Chapter.94 Given the value-laden 
characteristics of insolvency and restructuring, it remains a difficult area of law to harmonise 
due to the jurisdiction specific policy arguments that often conflict in where the greatest 
 
89 For example, the provision allowing the appointment of an independent person or body to act on the instructions of a court in order to 
facilitate cooperation, which is in both the final text of the EIR and the Commission Proposal had the caveat ‘provided that this is not 
incompatible with the rules applicable to them’ added by the Parliament; European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs ‘Report on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency 
proceedings’ (2013) A7-0481/2013 COM(2012)0744 – C7-0413/2012 – 2012/0360(COD).  
90 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs ‘Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings’ (2013) A7-0481/2013 COM(2012)0744 – C7-0413/2012 – 
2012/0360(COD) 48. 
91 ibid.  
92 ibid. 
93 Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
insolvency proceedings (recast) dated 12 March 2015 2012/0360 (COD). 
94 Horst Eidenmuller, 'A New Framework for Business Restructuring in Europe: The EU Commission's Proposals for a Reform of the European 




emphasis should lie in the rationale underpinning the mechanisms to resolve financial 
distress.  
The next Chapter 3 will summarise the JCOERE Project’s findings from Report 1 on substantive 
principles in restructuring (preventive or otherwise) mechanisms within the framework of the 
Preventive Restructuring Directive that it was determined may present obstacles to 
cooperation when they are implemented by the Member States. It adopts a taxonomic 
categorisation of Member States in terms of their observed approach to preventive 
restructuring in terms of underlying policy and implementation of the PRD. It will also provide 
pertinent observations on the relationship between harmonisation and cooperation within 
the paradigm of cross-border insolvency. Finally, Chapter 3 will provide a summary of the 
JCOERE Project’s findings in relation to procedural obstacles to court-to-court cooperation, 
including those revealed in the responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire noting that most of 
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III.  Chapter 3: Potential Obstacles to Court-to-court Co-operation in 
Preventive Restructuring Cases 
3.1 Introduction 
The JCOERE Project began with the hypothesis that differences between Member States on 
policy and legal principles, including both substantive and procedural rules, might be 
particularly acute in the context of preventive restructuring. Such differences can present 
obstacles to court-to-court co-operation, practitioner-to-practitioner co-operation and 
practitioner-to-court co-operation. The next subsection (3.1.1) will describe the policy 
objectives behind preventive restructuring. In section 3.2, we provide a summary of our 
findings from Report 1 on variations in substantive law principles arising from pre-existing 
restructuring frameworks in member states and which are generated by the range of options 
contained in the Preventive Restructuring Directive (1023/2019)1.  As we continued with our 
research, including a survey of chosen Member States and participation in various colloquia 
and conferences, our hypothesis was proven to hold true. We found significant differences in 
approaches to preventive restructuring in Member States. We have categorised these 
differing approaches in an original taxonomy which is described in this chapter. The 
categorisation of Member States adopted in this Chapter and described in section 3.3 relied 
on the identification of fundamental differences in policies and approach to preventive 
restructuring generally, which will affect the implementation of the PRD. This Chapter will 
continue in section 3.4 with observations on the relationship between harmonisation and co-
operation. The EIR Recast2 acknowledges the tension between harmonisation, or lack thereof, 
and co-operation or indeed disruptions to the potential for co-operation. For example, it 
countenances the opening of competing or secondary proceedings where:  
[T]he differences in the legal systems concerned are so great that difficulties may arise 
from the extension of effects deriving from the law of the State of the opening of 
proceedings to the other Member States where the assets are located. For that reason, 
the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings may request the 
 
1 Council Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of 26 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and 
on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive 
(EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18. [Hereinafter PRD or Preventive Restructuring Directive]. 
2 Council Regulation (EU) 848/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) [2015] 





opening of secondary insolvency proceedings where the efficient administration of the 
insolvency estate so requires.3 
The findings in relation to procedural obstacles to court-to-court co-operation revealed in the 
responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire will then be discussed and analysed in section 3.5, 
along with other observations relating to the institutions (administrative or judicial) that hear 
cross-border cases and the difficulties that differences here may cause to co-operation and 
mutual trust (3.6). A number of additional potential obstacles will then be discussed in the 
last few sections, including a summary of the views of members of the judiciary expressed to 
researchers during the JCOERE Project. This last section complements the findings of the 
Judicial Survey in Chapter 8.  
3.1.1 A summary of policy objectives relating to preventive restructuring 
Chapter 5 of Report 1 describes the evolution of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 
1023/2019 passed in June 2019. In reflection of this work, this section summarises key 
substantive concepts as they evolved. The principle policy document underlying the 
Preventive Restructuring Directive is the European Commission Recommendation: A New 
Approach to Business Failure (2014).4 Of importance was the idea of improving the efficiency 
of insolvency laws to support economic recovery across the EU.5 We have discussed this at 
length in Report 1, but it is worth reminding ourselves of the specific policy objectives outlined 
in the 2014 Recommendation, which ultimately led to the PRD. These included: 
a. Maximising value to the economy as a whole through the protection or benefit of 
those (these could be individuals or other businesses) connected with businesses at 
risk of insolvency. Individuals could include other businesses as creditors, employees 
of these businesses and owners of businesses. 
b. Saving jobs. 
c. The provision of a ‘second chance’ to ordinary individual sole traders…or 
entrepreneurs. At the time bankruptcy laws in many Member States including Ireland 
and Germany were really restrictive as compared with the frameworks in other 
jurisdictions, for example, England and Wales.6  
d. The recovery of non-performing financial loans. Although not at the forefront of policy 
concerns in 2014, by the time the Preventive Restructuring Directive was passed in 
June 2019, another key concern was that restructuring process would allow specifically 
for the restructuring of corporate debt to the benefit of the banking sector and the 
 
3 idem, Recital 40. 
4 For a discussion of the other policy documents relevant to the PRD, see JCOERE Report 1, Chapter 5, which gives an account of the history 
of the PRD chronologically.  
5 The policy objective was to ‘ensure that viable enterprises in financial difficulties…have access to national insolvency frameworks, which 
enable them to restructure at an early stage with a view to preventing their insolvency…’. European Commission, Recommendation COM 
(2014) 1500 of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency [2014] OJ L 74/65. 





support of the capital markets union. This was a policy issue that was more clearly 
articulated later in the day, very near to the adoption of the Directive and particularly 
afterwards. It was reiterated by Commission officials at various meetings following the 
passing of the Directive. For example, in June 2019 the importance of addressing the 
restructuring of non-performing loans was described by Salla Saastomonien.7 A key 
related issue articulated by the Commission representatives was what they perceived 
to be ‘the significant variance’ between Member States regarding attitudes to 
corporate restructuring and the actual legal frameworks involved. This is borne out by 
our research in Report 1. The view of the Commission was that these variances in turn 
led to a reluctance on the part of businesses to expand across the European Union, 
either by virtue of the increased costs or uncertainty as to their level of exposure in 
other Member States, and very different recovery rates for creditors.  
e. A particular focus on SMEs reflecting sectoral concerns with providing a ‘second 
chance’ for entrepreneurs as described above. Discussion of costs of existing 
restructuring processes was of particular importance and reflected the experience of 
practitioners in many countries. The idea that a rescue process should be available to 
the SME sector was and is of concern to many but whether this is in reality a true 




In its Recommendation, the Commission highlighted the following substantive elements 
which were considered to be desirable for a harmonised approach and which were eventually 
reflected in the PRD: 
• Flexibility of procedures, namely limiting the need for court formalities to where they 
are necessary and proportionate;9 
• Provision for a stay of individual enforcement actions;10 
• Protection of the interests of dissenting creditors, namely that the court should reject 
any restructuring plan that would likely reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below 
what they could reasonably expect to receive, were the debtor’s business not 
restructured. This is indeed where the genesis of the priority debate began;11 
 
7 This point was made by Director Saastomonien at the European Insolvency & Restructuring Conference, held in Brussels, 27th and 28th June 
2019. The key message was the concern to prevent the build-up of non-performing loans, thereby freeing up capital reserved to address 
non-performing loans- which amounted to between 167-520 billion euro - across the European Union. Salla Saastamoinen, Director for Civil 
and Commercial Justice, DG Justice. EIRC Meeting June 27th.  
8 It was felt that this particular aim would help to combat the ‘social stigma’ and legal consequences of an on-going inability to pay off debts. 
Part IV of the Recommendation concerns ‘second chance’ provisions; the Commission recommended that entrepreneurs should be fully 
discharged of their debts within three years from either the date on which implementation of a payment plan began or the date on which 
the court approved the opening of bankruptcy proceedings (Section 30). Per Section 32, however, it was indicated that Member States were 
entitled to introduce more stringent provisions in certain circumstances, for example to discourage entrepreneurs who have acted in bad 
faith or failed to adhere to a repayment plan, or to safeguard the livelihood of the entrepreneur by allowing him / her to keep certain assets. 
9 PRD, art 4(6). 
10 PRD, art 6. 
11 PRD, art 11. For a discussion of APR V RPR, see Irene Lynch Fannon, ‘An Irish Perspective on the Cram-down Provisions in the Preventive 
Restructuring Directive 1023/2019 EU, Guest Editorial’ (2019) 27(3) International Insolvency Review 1; Stephen Lubben, ‘The Overstated 
Absolute Priority Rule’ (20 March 2015), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2581639>; Riz Mokal, ‘The New 
Relative Priority Rule’ (paper presented at the International Insolvency Institute, 17 June 2019, slide 4). This point was repeated by Mokal at 





• Provision for ‘second chance’ that will allow for a full discharge of debt after a specified 
period of time – these are more applicable to entrepreneurs (bankrupts); 
• That the preventive restructuring process should depend on a debtor in possession 
model;12 
• That even though there was a recognition of the need to protect dissenting creditors, 
the preventive restructuring framework would also include the possibility for cram-
down provisions. Thus, a tension was established from the outset between the idea of 
protecting dissenting creditors and the characteristics of a robust restructuring 
framework. In turn this led to the divergence amongst Member States, which is 
categorised in the following section; 13 and 
• Protection for new and interim financing. 14 
This summary informed the areas where we felt it was necessary to interrogate the approach 
of individual Member States, which we have done in our JCOERE Questionnaire.15 Even at this 
time, Commission policy documents emphasised the goal of harmonisation of these complex 
principles across Member States, stating:  
[T]he creation of a level playing field in these areas would lead to greater confidence 
in the systems of other Member States for companies, entrepreneurs and private 
individuals, and improve access to credit and encourage investment.16  
The development of the Preventive Restructuring Directive from these policy beginnings 
through various iterations and debates in the European legislative process demonstrates how 
the substantive rules that are considered to be core to restructuring emerged and became 
part of the PRD. The following section of this Chapter summarises our findings regarding 
differences on substantive legal principles, which we consider will prevent co-operation. As 
the Commission has acknowledged, harmonisation is important and without it, the chances 
for co-operation diminish. 
3.2 Obstacles Arising from Substantive Law: Findings from JCOERE Project 
Report 1 
The following is a brief summary of the findings of JCOERE Report 1. The JCOERE 
Questionnaire focussed on key rules central to preventive restructuring to assess both current 
rules and planned implementation. These key rules included the following principles: 
• The imposition of a stay, which in the PRD is envisaged as being up to 4 months 
normally with a possible extension to 12 months. 
 
12 PRD, art 5. 
13 PRD, art 11.  
14 PRD, art 17. 
15 See JCOERE Report 1, Chapters 6, 7 & 8: <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1chapter/>. 
16 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business 




• The creation of a majority rule principle, which is often described as an intra-class 
cram-down. 
• The optional creation of legal structures allowing for a cross-class cram-down, where 
dissenting creditors may be brought into the restructuring plan (with court approval). 
• The best interests of creditors test which allows the creditors to expect a dividend 
from the restructuring, which is at least as good as what they can expect in alternative 
scenarios. This would mean that in the money creditors would be treated at least as 
well as in alternative scenarios.  
As we proceeded in the analysis of the contributing Member States responses to our JCOERE 
Questionnaire and participated in debates at various multi-national conferences and fora, we 
realised the depth of differences between legal cultures, policy approaches and preferred 
outcomes across the Member States. 
3.2.1 The Member States contributing to the JCOERE Questionnaire and why 
The Project began with Member States which we knew to have ‘robust restructuring 
processes’. These included Ireland and the UK (but in reality, England and Wales). In the 
former, the Examinership process17, modelled on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code had 
operated for 30 years and in the UK, the English Scheme of Arrangement18 had achieved some 
notoriety as a rescue device for large distressed companies during the recent Great Recession. 
What is interesting is that the Irish model was not well known in Europe, but the UK 
framework was extremely well known. A key difference, which we think might explain this 
discrepancy, is that the former was covered by the EIR Recast19 and therefore subject to 
COMI20 requirements, whereas the latter was not. As discussed in Chapter 3 of JCOERE Report 
1, this allowed companies to avail of the English court system once English legal tests 
regarding jurisdiction were satisfied.21 In addition, the English courts exercise fairly flexible 
rules regarding jurisdiction, which are not replicated elsewhere.22 
As outlined in Report 1, our partner countries included one major European country with a 
civil law code, namely Italy to which we added France and Spain, and a former Eastern bloc 
country, Romania to which we added Poland. Following on from that, we added Germany and 
Austria, where we suspected approaches to preventive restructuring differed from the 
countries we had included in our survey to that point. We added the Netherlands because of 
innovations introduced there in anticipation of the PRD and finally, we added Denmark in light 
 
17 See Companies Act 2014, Chapter 2 to Chapter 5. 
18 Companies Act 2006, Part 26. See also Jennifer Payne, Scheme of Arrangement: Theory Structure and Operation (CUP, 2014). 
19 Annex A, EIR Recast. 
20 EIR Recast, Recitals 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33 and Articles 2(9)(viii), 2(11), 3(1), 3(2) and 3(4)(a). 
21Please see JCOERE Report 1 Chapter 3 Section 3.5 for a detailed discussion on the flexibility of the English Scheme jurisdiction: 





of its continuing engagement with the EU despite treaty protocols described below in section 
3.3.7. 
3.2.2 The contributors and their roles 
In terms of garnering information on these countries, we relied on a range of contributors and 
additional sources where any doubts arose. Of course, the danger is that a particular 
representative or commentator, whether practitioner or academic, is not entirely 
representative of the ‘official’ position and so we engaged in specific questions regarding 
substantive legal rules. These were separated out from observations regarding projections of 
legal initiatives or assessments of the policy debate. However, we found that the differences 
in legal approaches were often reflected in differences in policy and opinion. Even within 
jurisdictions we found differences in the characteristics of the commentary. To that end 
academics, for example, were often less pragmatic regarding the role of courts in adjudicating 
matters relevant to insolvency.23 Differences also arose regarding the willingness of judges to 
cede jurisdiction where the EIR Recast might apply, even in the face of dramatic rules such as 
a stay, whereas practitioners were less content with the loss of jurisdictional reach, for 
reasons that are discussed below.24 
3.3  The Classification of States – Our Perspective 
As indicated, it is not proposed to go through the various different approaches to the elements 
of a preventive restructuring framework displayed by Member States and the various legal 
players within those states. Instead we have adopted a classification of Member States that 
is reflective of the JCOERE Project findings from Report 1.25 This classification is original and is 
presented as part of our research. It is not intended to be the final arbiter of the approach of 
Member States to corporate restructuring, but is simply designed to provide a comparative 
perspective on Member States in the context of corporate restructuring.26  
 
 
23 These points were made by Nicolaes W A Tollenaar and Tomáš Richter, at the ERA Conference, held in Trier, 7th and 8th November, 2019.  
24 Discussed in more detail in para 3.10 of this Chapter. 
25 These findings are available on our website – JCOERE Consortium, Report 1: Identifying substantive and procedural rules in preventive 
restructuring frameworks including the Preventive Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations 
(December 2019) < https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/> [Last Accessed June 25th 2020].  
26 Many commentators have presented the view that the Member States which are most likely to attract corporate restructuring business 
are the Netherlands and possibly Ireland. The UK is also regarded as continuing to attract restructuring business in Europe despite Brexit. 
From a practitioners’ perspective this is often presented as a competition for legal business whereas not all of the judiciary are as keen to 
add to the burden of their court work. For example, a note issued by Dentons Solicitors, ‘English Creditors and the new Dutch Scheme of 
Arrangement - A Two Horse Race?’ (June 16 2020) < https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2020/june/16/whoa-english-creditors-
and-the-new-dutch-scheme-of-arrangement-a-two-horse-race>; from Ireland: Deloitte, ‘Business Restructuring Solutions: Solutions to help 
get your business back to growth’ < https://www2.deloitte.com/ie/en/pages/finance/solutions/restructuring-services.html>; An 
international perspective provided from London: Global Restructuring Review, ‘International Debt Restructuring: Can other Jurisdictions 
compete with London and New York? <https://www.shlegal.com/docs/default-source/news-insights-documents/11_16-grr-




3.3.1 Member States with robust restructuring processes: The Common Law 
countries  
It was clear from the beginning of our research that the common law countries within the EU 
have adopted what is described in this Chapter as ‘a robust’ approach to corporate rescue. It 
is difficult to know why this is the case; there is no reason inherent in the nature of the 
common law as a generator of legal rules compared with the civil law, which would suggest 
that one system is more favourable to the creation of rules which impose a stay, or protection 
for dissenting creditors and other characteristics typical of a robust restructuring process. 
There is the possibility of more influence from the US and the perceived importance of 
Chapter 11 of Title XI of the US Bankruptcy Code because of the commonality of systems. 
However, we have arrived at the interim conclusion that the explanation rests with a 
‘commonality of legal culture’, specifically a culture that places the role of the judiciary at the 
centre of legal development; this, we believe, is different from civil law countries. A further 
part of this hypothesis is that restructuring is somewhat dependent on judicial responsiveness 
and that there is more potential for this in common law countries.27 These ideas are discussed 
further in Chapters 4 and 7.  
That said we are a bit wary of the common law - civil law divide as providing the only 
explanation, as we suspect this might be too simplistic. As described below, there are also 
variations among civil law countries, which makes the mostly dualistic approach under the 
legal origins theory too simplistic to explain the variety of differences among the EU Member 
States.28  
Within the common law countries of the EU, there are also problems associated with the 
differences between Schemes of Arrangement and Examinerships. The latter is included in 
the EIR Recast while the former is not, as it is a process derived from Company Law and is 
therefore excluded.29 This has not been detrimental to its use by a variety of foreign 
companies seeking to restructure in the UK. Rather, the flexibility of the ‘sufficient connection 
test’ as opposed to COMI has made it possible to extend availability of the process far more 
broadly than might have been possible had the procedure been subject to COMI. It is still 
 
27 The importance of the English Scheme of Arrangement post the recent financial crisis cannot be denied. The development of Schemes of 
Arrangement is discussed fully in Jennifer Payne, Scheme of Arrangment: Theory Structure and Operation (CUP, 2014). Many European 
companies were restructured under this process. The following cases are examples: Re Drax Holdings Ltd [2003] EWHC 2743 (Ch) and Re 
Rodenstock GmbH, [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch). In addition, English courts are flexible regarding jurisdictional issues. In the first instance English 
law provides that A scheme can be between ‘a company’ and its creditors. This includes any company which is liable to be wound up under 
the Insolvency Act 1986. This can include solvent or insolvent ‘foreign’ companies. The test of whether an English court accepts jurisdiction 
rests on the following questions where a positive answer to any question is sufficient. First the presence of assets in the jurisdiction but this 
is not absolutely necessary. Second whether there are parties who might benefit from a process and finally whether there are one or more 
persons will receive assets are subject to court’s jurisdiction. In Primacom Holding GmbH & Anor v A Group of the Senior Lenders & Credit 
Agricole [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch) and Re Rodenstock GmbH, [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), the English court found that the fact that English law 
governed all creditor arrangements was sufficient. See further, Jenifer Payne, 'Cross-border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping' 
(2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 563, 571: ‘There is much to be said for the view that where the creditors have chosen 
English law, allowing a scheme of arrangement to compromise or transfer the creditors’ debt is entirely appropriate.’ 
28 Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 refers to a number of commentators who have criticised this simple dualistic approach.  





unclear how Brexit will affect the use of the process by European companies as it will not be 
affected by the disapplication of the EIR Recast. However, the recognition of judgements 
under the EU Judgements Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001)30 had supported 
the general effectiveness of English Schemes of Arrangement and whilst some doubt has been 
cast over this approach in recent decisions of both the English courts and the CJEU, this has 
been relied upon by English practitioners. Of interest is the fact that whilst both Schemes of 
Arrangement with very similar characteristics to the English model are available in Ireland, 
the Examinership process has been the preferred approach over many years. 
3.3.2 Civil Law countries with pre-existing rescue processes 
The French sauvegarde procedures include a number of different variations, which have been 
described in Report 1.31 These have been in place for some time since the 1980s. They are 
included in the EIR Recast and plans are afoot to amend the existing legal framework to take 
account of the PRD. The question remains, however, whether any of the existing frameworks 
in France are fully compliant with the implementation of the PRD. It is interesting that France 
resists the cross-class cram-down which, although important in terms of a robust 
restructuring framework, is not a necessary part of implementation. 
3.3.3 Civil Law countries responding to the financial crisis  
Italy 
There are three types of restructuring processes available in Italy and of these, the concordato 
preventivo is covered by the EIR Recast. The concordato preventivo32 includes an optional stay 
and a cross-class cram-down and is subject to court confirmation. The other two procedures 
as described by our contributors, seem to be more administrative in nature. These are 
different types of accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti (purely consensual or binding on a 
minority of dissenting creditors) that envisage an out-of-court phase consisting of negotiation 
and reaching an agreement with creditors with a view to rescuing the company. These are 
subject to court confirmation. To an outsider, the range of options is confusing and therefore 
problematic. The issue of the formal co-operation obligations which arise is determined by 
two questions; the first is whether the process is covered by the EIR Recast. As two out of 
three of the procedures are not covered by the EIR Recast, therefore the issue of whether a 
formal obligation to co-operate does not arise. A second issue is that two out of the three 
procedures are out-of-court procedures. If these processes involve administrative authorities, 
it should not be assumed that co-operation obligations do not apply; in fact, such obligations 
could apply, as they have equal relevance to courts and administrative authorities, a point 
that will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.6. In any event, it is possible that some sort 
 
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1. 
31 La Loi n° 2005-845 du 26 juillet 2005 de sauvegarde des entreprises (Law No. 2005-845 of July 26th, 2005 for the Safeguard of Companies). 




of co-operation would occur. That said, as we discuss in Chapter 4 section 4.3.2, legal certainty 
and foreseeability are fundamental to judicial co-operation and where individual Member 
States present a variety of preventive restructuring procedures, some of which are included 
in the EIR Recast and some of which are not, further uncertainty will arise in relation to both 
issues of recognition and co-operation. In fact, the variety that we now see emerging raises 
the question as to whether there should have been more harmonisation in the PRD once it 
was near finalisation, with less scope of implementation for individual Member States.33 
Spain  
Spain is somewhat similar to Italy with a range of options for restructuring. These provisions 
include a stay and the possibility of including dissenting creditors where a majority approves 
the compromise plan in a particular class. However, at present Spain has no procedure that 
includes a cross-class cram-down as such. Again, as with France, it is not necessary to 
introduce cross-class cram-down as part of the implementation of the PRD and so we can see 
that there is a growing lack of harmonisation between the Member States. 
3.3.4 Innovator countries  
The Netherlands has introduced the WHOA legislation in anticipation of the passing of the 
PRD.34 Interestingly, as the first version of the WHOA was progressing through the Dutch 
parliament, existing Dutch legislation under which a pre-pack restructuring process is possible 
was challenged on behalf of employees of Estro. Its business was restructured and sold to a 
new company, Smallsteps, with all employees being made redundant and some offered new 
contracts. The Dutch pre-pack is available under what was considered a liquidation procedure 
(faillissement), which is why it was believed that the rules requiring the transfer of 
employment contracts35 would not apply in their case, as such rules apply only in procedures 
that are not with a view to the liquidation of the company. The CJEU found that despite the 
identifying features of the procedure under which the pre-pack was created being liquidation, 
because the business would continue to operate, the requirements to transfer employment 
contracts would also apply. This took away an important characteristic upon which the 
perceived competitiveness of the Dutch pre-pack relied: avoiding the highly protective Dutch 
employment regulations by being able to dismiss employees prior to the purchase of the 
employing company under a pre-pack. As a result, the WHOA went back to the proverbial 
 
33 See further JCOERE Consortium, Report 1: Identifying substantive and procedural rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including 
the Preventive Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations (JCOERE Project, 2019) < 
https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/>.  
34 Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord (Act on the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans) (WHOA). 
35 As required by the Acquired Rights Directive: Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings 





drawing board, ostensibly to deal with what was viewed as a disadvantage to its 
competitiveness as a result of the CJEU’s finding in Estro/Smallsteps, among other things.36  
3.3.5 Newer accession states  
Both Poland and Romania have taken the commitment to corporate rescue on board. There 
are elements of the Italian experience in the Romanian legislation. Polish legislation is 
advanced and developed and at present, includes four different possibilities. However, there 
are plans to further develop the processes in keeping with the option for robust restructuring 
processes.  
3.3.6 The Resisters 
Germany 
Effectively, there is no preventive restructuring framework available in Germany but the 
description of German insolvency procedures to this effect seems to rely on the dividing line 
of declared insolvency. In effect, there is no rescue process available before a declared 
insolvency but following a declaration of insolvency, the legislative framework does provide 
for a restructuring process. Once the debtor files for insolvency under the 
Insolvenzverfahren,37 the restructuring or rescue process is available (Insolvenzplan). The 
Insolvenzverfahren is included in the EIR Recast. German law allows for a restructuring plan 
to be approved despite the objections of an entire class, so this would indicate that cross-class 
cram-down is permitted weighed against criteria applied by the court.38 
The apparent preference for relying on the insolvency threshold as a gateway to a 
restructuring process is also influenced by a continued theoretical resistance to pre-
insolvency restructuring, which is described in Chapter 4 of JCOERE Report 1.39 
Austria 
The Austrian Unternehmensreorganistionsgesetz (URG) seems to be a very ‘light touch’ 
restructuring process that appears quite similar to the English (and Irish) Scheme of 
Arrangement insofar as it is essentially a restructuring process, which can be used for a solvent 
restructuring or a restructuring where the company is likely to become insolvent. Despite 
some similarities between this system and the English Scheme of Arrangement, there is also 
 
36Case C-126/16 First Steps Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging and Others v Smallsteps BV [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:489. The CJEU response 
supported the envisaged possibilities for rescue in the PRD but also stated that employees must be protected. There is now a specific 
provision in Article 13 designed to protect workers. The different political response is interesting in contrast to the differing approach to 
worker welfare in the common law countries.  
37 Insolvenzverfahren, the unitary insolvency procedure under Die Insolvenzordnung (The Insolvency Statute or InsO).  
38 See further the description of the German process in Section 3.2 of the report by Stefania Bariatti and Robert Van Galen, Study on a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices TENDER 
NO. JUST/2012/JCIV/CT/0194/A4, (INSOL Europe 2014). In this document the German process is described as potentially occurring once the 
notice of insolvency is published. 





no requirement for court confirmation of the scheme under the URG, which is a clear 
difference. Furthermore, there is no cross-class cram-down. In effect, this would represent a 
bare minimum in terms of the requirements of the PRD.  
In Germany and Austria there seems to be little appetite for a robust restructuring process at 
policy level. Germany had a more robust restructuring process on the books previously (the 
Vergleichsordnung), which we are told was not often used. There is resistance to the 
wholesale rewriting of existing contracts, which tends to characterise restructuring 
agreements. Austria has the same response, which is interesting as we have been informed 
that, as a centre for cross-border insolvency, Austria might experience more of these kinds of 
cases than others. Our Austrian contributor pointed out that the Austrian process, the URG is 
hardly every used. It is unclear why this is the case. 
3.3.7 Outliers 
Denmark 
Of key importance in considering the position of Denmark are Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 
22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. Denmark is not obliged to comply with further 
provisions regarding Title 5 of Part 3 of the TFEU. Therefore, the Danish legislative framework, 
as it currently stands, is not covered by the EIR Recast per Recital 88. Nevertheless, Denmark 
intends to implement the provisions of the PRD. Reflecting the German approach, the Danish 
legislative framework provides for a restructuring plan but only after a formal declaration of 
insolvency has been made. Thus, a new process will be introduced following the terms of the 
PRD. 
3.4 Harmonisation and Co-operation 
As described above, there is general acknowledgement that co-operation is reliant on 
significant degrees of harmonisation. This is acknowledged by the European Commission and 
is also evidenced in practice, with the most obvious example emanating from our comparison 
with the United States in Chapter 7 where a federal arrangement of states operates under a 
federal bankruptcy code. In this latter context, as we show in Chapter 7, issues relating to the 
choice of forum become muted and less complex. It should be noted that despite this marked 
difference between the EU and the US in the context of insolvency law, it is not the case that 
all significant areas of law are harmonised across the US, the most obvious examples being 
tax law and employment laws.40 Corporate law is also an area that is not harmonised across 
the United States. Nevertheless, in this particular arena, the states of Delaware, New York and 
 
40 As regards the latter there is very little harmonised law in relation to individual employment law standards unlike the EU where levels of 
harmonisation are significant. In contrast laws regulating trade unions and collective bargaining are federalised. See generally Irene Lynch 
Fannon, Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism (Hart 2003). Similarly, although there is a federal tax base states in the United States vary 





California represent the majority of cases where choice of forum in corporate law is necessary. 
Thus, it is not accidental that the choice of forum in corporate bankruptcy follows this line. In 
the EU, in contrast, all Member States pursue their own corporate law frameworks, with some 
elements of harmonisation across Europe.41 In addition, tensions between the real seat 
doctrine and the place of incorporation make it difficult to replicate the US experience, 
although corporate mobility is becoming increasingly common in Europe.42 On the whole 
however, it is clear that harmonisation of EU corporate insolvency law has a long way to go 
and this is clearly the case as regards our specific focus on preventive restructuring. Our first 
Report described in detail different approaches of EU Member States and these differences 
become more exaggerated the more one engages in discourse on the subject. The differences 
were adumbrated as early as 201443 in the period leading up to the publication of the 
Commission’s policy document, A New Approach to Business Failure, discussed here and 
elsewhere in our Reports.  
3.5 Procedural Obstacles: Findings from JCOERE Project Report 1  
In our JCOERE  Questionnaire, which we circulated to eleven Member State jurisdictions, we 
identified in advance some issues that we characterised as procedural obstacles and which 
we hypothesised would cause obstacles to co-operation. The EIR Recast itself includes some 
specific provisions regarding choice of forum and / or choice of law issues and in some senses 
therefore, the EIR Recast acknowledges that co-operation has its limits. What is interesting is 
the extent to which the EIR Recast itself embeds obstacles to co-operation in this way; these 
are discussed in the following section. For the moment however, we are focussing on issues, 
which arise in a typical preventive restructuring framework or issues that are specifically 
addressed in the PRD, which may prove to be problematic. 
These include but are not exhaustive of the following issues:  
• Rights in rem as provided for in article 8 of the EIR Recast. This issue was included in 
our JCOERE Questionnaire in anticipation of difficulties arising from it (Qn 11).  
• Constitutional Parameters Delimiting Freedom of Judicial Communication (Qn 12).  
• Training and Competency for Insolvency Judges (Qn 14), which is addressed in Chapter 
4 of this Report (section 4.6).  
3.5.1 Rights in Rem 
Article 8 of the EIR Recast provides particular protection for creditors with rights in rem over 
assets ‘which are situated within the territory of another Member State’.44 Effectively this 
 
41 See inter alia, Shareholders’ Directive, Council Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement [2017] OJ L 132/1.  
42See for example, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-01459 and Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic 
Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] ECR I-09919. 
43 Stefania Bariatti and Robert Van Galen, Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis of the 
Member States’ relevant provisions and practices TENDER NO. JUST/2012/JCIV/CT/0194/A4, (INSOL Europe 2014).  
44 EIR Recast, Art. 8(1): ‘The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third parties in respect of 





means that there is a limitation to the jurisdictional reach of any insolvency proceeding 
opened in one Member State in relation to assets situated in another Member State. In the 
context of the PRD, this imposes a limitation on the reach of any restructuring insofar as it 
affects the rights of a creditor secured with an in rem right. Dahl and Kortleben observe that 
article 8 relates to the right in an asset but not to the asset itself. 45 Thus, where the creditor 
obtains proceeds from the realisation of the asset, the underlying principle is that the asset 
belongs to the insolvency estate so that where there is a surplus generated the surplus reverts 
to the insolvency estate. Where the asset is realised for equivalent value, no further issues 
arise, but where the asset is realised for less than the value of the debt, the creditor will 
become an unsecured creditor of the company for the remainder. This seems a legitimate 
approach in the context of traditional insolvency proceedings. In a restructuring however, the 
question is whether the creditor’s right in a particular asset is protected in this way under the 
European framework. In other words, is the protection in the EIR Recast absolute? It would 
seem to be so. Therefore, the creditor’s right or claim cannot be part of the restructuring 
proceedings as such, unless the creditor specifically agrees to this. This would therefore seem 
to be an ex ante limit on the operation of cram-down or cross-class cram-down provisions.46 
Furthermore, in the scenario where proceeds of the realised asset are insufficient to meet the 
debt, the question persists as to whether the creditor remains in a different, protected 
position compared with other creditors that must submit to the restructuring process.47 
As observed by Snowden,48 the opening of a main insolvency proceeding, which will include a 
restructuring process if it is included in Annex A, essentially ‘has no effects upon the right in 
rem’. This means that ‘security rights in other Member States can be asserted and enforced 
in spite of the opening of insolvency proceedings as if no such proceedings existed’.49 
3.5.2 Constitutional issues – public hearings 
As argued by Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs, it would seem to be incompatible with procedural 
rights and principles if courts were to communicate with each other without the presence of 
legal parties or their advisors.50 It seems to us that this might be the view of members of the 
judiciary (and commentators and practitioners) in a number of Member States, including 
Ireland, for example, which has a constitutional guarantee that justice would be administered 
 
time to time, which are situated within the territory of another Member State at the time of the opening proceedings.’ Art 8(2) goes on to 
provide examples of such rights.  
45 See Michael Dahl and Justus Kortleben, ‘Chapter 1: General Provisions: Article 8, Third Parties’ Rights in Rem in Mortiz Brinkmann (ed) 
European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck and Hart, 2019), 131. 
46 See further ibid., and references therein to Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher and Stuart Isaacs, The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (3rd 
edn, OUP 2016). 
47 For our contributors’ perspective on rights in rem in relation to their protection under the EIR Recast and the potential conflict created in 
the PRD, see JCOERE Report 1, Chapter 8, section 8.4, available here: <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/ 
report1chapter/report1chapter8/> 
48 Kristin van Zwieten, Georg Ringe, Richard Snowden, Francisco Javier Garcimartin and Miguel Virgos, ‘Chapter 1: General Provisions (Art. 1-
18)’ in Reinhard Bork and Kirstin Van Zwieten (eds) Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
49 Supra n. 44, at para 25. See in addition reference to the opinion of the Advocate General Szpunar therein in the CJEU Case C-557/13 
Hermann Lutz v Elke Bäuerle [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2404. 





in public insofar as possible. However, other commentators take a different view.51 In our 
view, the nature of the co-ordination would be determinative of whether a procedural or 
indeed constitutional principle is breached. It could be that limited co-ordination such as 
setting a date might be finally decided upon without the parties present, but on the other 
hand, we would not agree that courts co-ordinating actions regarding the appointment of an 
insolvency practitioner could be done without informing the parties and ensuring their 
presence.52 In addition, the requirement that a court hearing should be heard in public is not, 
in terms of constitutional jurisprudence, limited to the requirement that only the parties are 
heard. There is an understanding that the constitutional requirement extends to the interests 
of the public in general including journalists, reporters, other interested stakeholders, who 
may not be party to the action, per se. In the case of Ireland, this understanding can be said 
to stem from two articles of the Irish Constitution; first, Article 34.1 and second, Article 40.6.1.  
Article 34.1 states that justice shall be administered in public and was considered in detail in 
The Irish Times v Ireland, wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that it was both ‘a 
fundamental right in a democratic state and a fundamental principle of the administration of 
justice (…) for people to have access to the courts to hear and see justice being done’ save in 
limited exceptions.53 The exceptions to this are few and far between as demonstrated by Doe 
v Revenue Commissioners, wherein a potential exception to the requirement was 
considered.54 At a preliminary hearing, the plaintiffs sought permission to bring the main 
proceedings anonymously and an in camera hearing for (part of) those proceedings. The case 
concerned the identification of the plaintiffs in Iris Oifigiúil (Government Official Gazette), 
effectively as ‘tax defaulters’.55 The plaintiffs argued for anonymity on two grounds: first, an 
entitlement to privacy in taxation matters and second, an entitlement of access to the courts, 
which would be lost in their case if anonymity was not permitted. The Court rejected both 
arguments and held that the constitutional rights to privacy or to a good name are insufficient 
to displace the constitutional imperative to administer justice in public and are distinguishable 
from the right to a fair trial, which may necessitate some proportionate restriction of that 
imperative.56 Article 40.6.1 protects the right of citizens to express freely their convictions and 
 
51Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger, ‘Chapter III Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: Article 42. Co-operation and communication 
between courts in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019), p. 352 
where it is argued that because co-operation is between two representatives of the courts and that the focus is on co-ordination this cannot 
be ‘compared to a hearing or the court’s examination of the evidence.’ However, the following sentence contemplates courts coordinating 
about the ‘appointment of the same insolvency practitioner’ without informing the parties or inviting them to take part in the deliberations. 
52 This appears to be borne out in many of the guidelines considered in Chapter 6. 
53 [1998] 1 IR 359, 361. The court also expressed that the trial judge in this case, who prohibited contemporaneous reporting, could have 
dealt with the matter under contempt of court rules and by giving adequate directions to the jury, arguably further emphasising that any 
prohibition on the media from reporting on court cases should be exceptional. This case also considered the right of the media to report in 
the context of Article 40.6.1. See also Cullen v Toibín [1984] I.L.R.M 577 and In re R [1989] I.R. 196, in which Walsh J stated: ‘The actual 
presence of the public is never necessary but the administration of justice in public does require that the doors of the courts must be open 
so that members of the general public may come and see for themselves that justice is done’ [p.134]. 
54 [2008] 3 IR 328 
55 The publication in Iris Oifigiúil would be of the settlement reached between the plaintiffs and the Revenue Commissioners under the 
‘Disclosure of Undeclared Liabilities by Holders of Off-Shore Assets’ scheme. There was a disagreement between the parties as to the legal 
requirement for such a publication.  






opinions subject to certain limitations;57 it acknowledges inter alia the ‘grave import to the 
common good’ of the education of public opinion. Naturally this right is not absolute and must 
cede to other constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to a fair trial or ‘trial in due 
course of law’.58 In Kelly v O’Neill the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of 
expression of the press was expressly acknowledged by the Supreme Court;59 while it viewed 
this right as ‘a value of critical importance in a democratic society’, the Court held that it was 
not an absolute right and could be superseded by other concerns, such as the administration 
of justice and the right to a fair trial.60  
Rules of this kind and their interaction with obligations to co-operate depend on the domestic 
legal framework. The nature of the constitutional guarantee that justice will be administered 
in public and how it is understood will no doubt affect the willingness of members of the 
judiciary to communicate with members of the judiciary in other Member States and it will 
certainly affect the manner in which that communication takes place. 
It is noted, however, that not all jurisdictions will take the same approach as the Irish example. 
In contrast to the assumptions made in Ireland, contributors to the JCOERE Questionnaire 
from other countries with written constitutions (all apart from the UK) such as Denmark 
expressed the view that it is not generally considered that the process of communication 
raised significant challenges.  
3.5.3 Co-operation: Statute, judge-made protocol or guideline? 
From country to country, different approaches are taken to the issue of co-operation. In 
France, for example, the law that implements or adds to the EIR Recast and the co-operation 
provisions emphasise the need for security and privacy. The law states that communication 
may take place by any suitable means that enable security, confidentiality and the privacy of 
the information exchange to be guaranteed.61 The court may also appoint a judge or authorise 
the supervising judge and / or the office-holder to carry out any necessary co-operation and 
communication.62 The office-holder is also required to submit for the approval of the 
supervising judge, any proposed agreement or protocol agreed by virtue of the same 
provisions of the Recast EIR in respect of the same debtor or another entity that is a member 
of the same group as the debtor.63 In some countries, such as the French example cited here, 
 
57 Article 40.6.1 identifies these limitations as ‘public order and morality’ and ‘the authority of the State’, however it does not extend to 
‘criticism of Government policy’, which is expressly protected.  
58 Articles 38.1 and 40.3. 
59 [2000] 1 ILRM 507. 
60 [2000] 1 ILRM 507, 509. Although this was a criminal matter, critically the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “an article published 
after the jury have returned a verdict of guilty, but before sentence is imposed, which simply summarises the facts of the case … and includes 
innocuous background material” and the media having “an unrestricted licence, subject only to the law of defamation, to comment freely 
and publish material, however untrue and damaging, concerning a trial at a stage when it was still in progress”.  
61 See JCOERE Consortium, Emilie Ghio and Paul Omar, ‘Country Report: France’ (JCOERE Website 2020), 
<https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1jurisdiction/report1jurisdictionfrance/>. See also Article 2, Ordinance no. 2017-
1519 of 2 November 2017, introducing Article L695-4 of the Commercial Code. 
62 ibid, introducing new Article L695-3 of the Commercial Code. 





the manner in which judges might co-operate with other courts is regulated by statute. In 
other countries, there is no expectation of such regulation and so the matter may be 
addressed through the operation of protocols, such as those considered in Chapter 6.64 When 
questioned, judges often expressed the view that they themselves would adopt and devise a 
protocol if necessary and often expressed scepticism about the need for a common standard 
protocol. Certainly, it became apparent that there was little awareness of developed 
principles and guidelines amongst some judges, which is discussed further in Chapter 8 of this 
Report, with the principles and guidelines themselves being explored in Chapter 6.  
According to the Polish Constitution, everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing 
of his case, without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and independent court. 
Similar to Ireland, exceptions to the public nature of hearings may be made for reasons of 
morality, State security, public order or protection of the private life of a party, or other 
important private interest. Judgments shall be announced publicly (article 45 of the Polish 
Constitution).65 
The Italian Constitution does not include any express parameter delimiting the freedom of 
judges to communicate, in general; however, pursuant to art 111 of the Italian Constitution, 
all proceedings must be conducted on an equal footing in a fair and impartial third-party 
hearing between the parties. This provision introduces the so-called adversarial principle in 
the Italian jurisdiction.  
In light of the above, direct communications between Courts, although permitted, needs to 
occur in a way that is compliant with domestic constitutional principles provided here simply 
as examples of issues that might occur in all Member States. In particular, compliance with 
constitutional provisions prohibits that judicial decisions be taken without protecting the 
interested parties right to be heard (orally or in writing) on an equal footing.  
While there is a focus on the rights of parties to the proceedings in the answers to our 
questions about constitutional issues, it is important to note that in some jurisdictions the 
constitutional issues regarding the hearing of judicial proceedings in public (as with Ireland) 
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3.5.4 Court or administrative authority? 
Other difficulties that may arise have been illustrated by a consideration of case law in Chapter 
5 of this Report. One of these includes the equation of a court with what is described as an 
‘administrative authority’ in the PRD. In this case, even though the recitals to the PRD and the 
definition in article 2 refer to ‘a court’, in subsequent articles, reference is repeatedly made 
to ‘a judicial or administrative authority’ as is the case in article 5(2), article 6 relating to the 
imposition of a stay and so on.66 A similar approach is taken in the EIR Recast where the 
definition in article 2(6)(i) states that court means ‘the judicial body of a Member State’ in 
relation to specific provisions67 but goes on to provide in article 2(6)(ii) that, in all other 
articles, ‘court’ means ‘the judicial body or any other competent body of a Member State 
empowered to open insolvency proceedings, to confirm such opening or to take decisions in 
the course of such proceedings’. This means that, for the purposes of articles 42-44 and 
articles 57 and 58, an equivalence is drawn between a judicial body and an administrative 
authority. Recital 20 of the EIR Recast states:  
Insolvency proceedings do not necessarily involve the intervention of a judicial 
authority. Therefore, the term ‘court’ in this Regulation should, in certain provisions, be 
given a broad meaning and include a person or body empowered by national law to 
open insolvency proceedings. In order for this Regulation to apply, proceedings 
(comprising acts and formalities set down in law) should not only have to comply with 
the provisions of this Regulation, but they should also be officially recognised and legally 
effective in the Member State in which the insolvency proceedings are opened. 
Many of the articles in the PRD refer to judicial or administrative authorities exercising power 
or authority in various ways. However, there can be a significant difference in the 
characteristics of judicial and administrative authorities, whether within a single jurisdiction 
or in a cross-border situation.  
3.5.5. Court or administrative authority: Case law 
From the very beginning the equivalence drawn between a court and an administrative 
authority was bound to present problems between the common law and civil law systems, 
where the perception of the latter type of arbiter is much more mixed than in civil law 
countries. However, the difficulties caused by this asserted equivalence between a court and 
an administrative authority will not be limited to simply a civil-common law divide, as is 
evidenced by some of our responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire. As expected, this issue 
presented problems in the Eurofood case.68 Under article 2(d) of the 2000 EIR it is stated that 
‘court’ shall mean the judicial body or any other competent body of a Member State 
 
66 The same phraseology is used in Article 10 in relation to confirmation of a restructuring plan and in Article 11 regarding the operation of 
cram-down provisions. 
67 These specific provisions are listed in PRD, Article 2(6)(i). None are of particular relevance to restructuring other than points (b) and (c) of 
Article 1(1) which refer to a stay. 





empowered to open insolvency proceedings or to take decisions in the course of such 
proceedings’ and went on in art 2(e) to state that ‘“judgment” in relation to the opening of 
insolvency proceedings or the appointment of a liquidator shall include the decisions of any 
court empowered to open such proceedings or to appoint a liquidator’. Article 2(f) provided 
that the time of opening of proceedings shall mean ‘the date of the judgment which renders 
the commencement effective’. However, Recital 10 of the EIR explicitly stated as follows: 
Insolvency proceedings do not necessarily involve the intervention of a judicial 
authority; the expression ‘court’ in this Regulation should be given a broad meaning and 
include a person or body empowered by national law to open insolvency proceedings. 
In his opinion in Eurofood, Advocate General Jacobs explained that ‘in various jurisdictions 
there are different ways in which insolvency proceedings may be commenced’, usually a 
decision of a court, on the one hand, and the appointment of a liquidator, on the other hand. 
The EIR ‘confers automatic recognition on insolvency proceedings opened in both ways’.69  
The Parmalat/Eurofood case illustrates the potential for enormous difficulty in the application 
of these principles. Here, the first decision in Italy to commence the insolvency process was 
made by the Italian Minister for Production Activities on 9 February 2004. It is worth bearing 
in mind, however, that Parmalat SpA had been admitted to extraordinary administration 
proceedings and an extraordinary administrator appointed on 24 December 2003. In Ireland, 
the petition for the winding-up of the company had been presented to the High Court and a 
provisional liquidator appointed to Eurofood on 27 January 2004. Subsequently, the winding-
up order was made, and an official liquidator appointed on 23 March 2004. The most 
important question, namely which proceedings would prevail in relation to Eurofood IFSC, 
turned on which step constituted the ‘opening of proceedings’. The ECJ held that it was the 
appointment of the provisional liquidator by the Irish High Court on 27 January 2004, which 
constituted the opening of main insolvency proceedings. This issue was vigorously contested 
on behalf of the Italian authorities, which characterised a provisional liquidator as a 
‘temporary administrator’ with ‘limited powers’ and therefore not a ‘liquidator’ for the 
purpose of the EIR. In contrast, it was contended that, as an administrative act, the Italian 
commencement did not amount to the commencement of proceedings as such. The ECJ 
concluded that under Irish law a provisional liquidator has ‘extensive powers’, including to 
take possession of the assets of a company, and his role is therefore much wider than a 
‘temporary administrator’. 
On the continuing question of court-to-court co-operation and staying with the Italian 
situation, as suggested earlier in this Chapter, various restructuring processes in Italy involve 
an administrative authority rather than a court. The procedimento di composizione assistita 
della crisi involves an administrative authority. In other processes, the board (collegio, art 17 
CCI) is composed of three members chosen among those included in a public register of 
 




experts. One of them is designated by the court and the other two by the Chamber of 
Commerce and by the trade association of the debtors’ industry. While it is important to note 
that in Italy the court, not the board, has the power to grant a stay on enforcement actions, 
nevertheless, it is clear that in some cases courts could potentially be asked to co-operate 
with administrative authorities. As with Parmalat, this may cause difficulties in and of itself.  
3.6 Workers 
In introducing a restructuring framework under the Preventive Restructuring Directive, article 
13 provides:  
 
Members States shall ensure that individual and collective workers' rights, under 
Union and national labour law, such as the following, are not affected by the 
preventive restructuring framework.  
As indicated in the text, the article then goes on to list some provisions but also notes that all 
rights of workers available in domestic legislation are protected under the article. The 
question then arises as to whether a restructuring, which includes a cram-down of workers’ 
claims within a class or includes a cross -class cram-down of an entire class of creditors’ claims 
of which workers form a part, can be achieved under these provisions?  
The answer would seem to lie in the practical terms of a restructuring process, in other words 
the actual restructuring agreement. Usually workers will be kept in employment during a 
restructuring as preservation of jobs is indeed one of the aims of restructuring. However, 
some workers may be made redundant or there may be a reorganisation of working roles. In 
these cases, workers will have a claim against state insurance funds or will benefit from the 
provisions of Directives 98/59/EC,70 2001/23/EC,71 and 2008/94/EC72 and the PRD seeks to 
preserve this situation.  
However, the PRD goes on to state in article 13(2):  
 
Where the restructuring plan includes measures leading to changes in the work 
organisation or in contractual relations with workers, those measures shall be 
approved by those workers, if national law or collective agreements provide for such 
approval in such cases.73 
 
70 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies 
[1998] OJ L225/16. 
71 Council Directive (EC) 2001/23 of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L 82/16.  
72 Council Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the 
event of the insolvency of their employer [2008] OJ L 283/36. 





This seems to imply that where a domestic restructuring framework allows for workers to be 
part of a restructuring claim, where workers could in fact waive rights to claims for payment 
or other rights that might arise, this is permissible under the PRD. 
The EIR Recast also includes the proviso that in all cases, ‘[t]he effects of insolvency 
proceedings on employment contracts and relationships shall be governed solely by the law 
of the Member State applicable to the contract of employment.’74 Effectively, as with the 
provisions of the EIR Recast in relation to rights in rem discussed above, the EIR Recast itself 
places a limitation on universal recognition of any particular insolvency process, including any 
rescue framework implementing the PRD, which is covered by the EIR Recast. Where the 
process is not covered by the EIR Recast, article 13 of the PRD provides that workers are 
protected by domestic law. However, article 13.2 implies or envisages that Member States 
may introduce particular restructuring frameworks under the PRD, which may not insist that 
workers rights are absolute. 
3.7 Further Obstacles  
3.7.1 Liability for non-co-operation 
In the commentary on the EIR Recast edited by Brinkmann75 and specifically the commentary 
on article 42, which obliges courts to co-operate, Skauradszun and Spahlinger observe that 
this obligation was not present in the EIR 2000.76 The authors note that this obligation stems 
from article 81 of the TEFU regarding judicial co-operation in civil matters with cross-border 
implications but note that despite this European aspiration, co-operation with foreign courts 
‘will be an entirely new experience for many judges’ though some jurisdictions already have 
an obligation embedded in legislation.77  
The authors continue to address the very important issue that this provision does in fact 
impose an obligation on the court and raise the issue of what happens when there is non- 
compliance. The first point is that article 2(6)(ii) of the EIR states that ‘court’ includes in its 
definition ‘the judicial body or another competent body of a Member State empower to open 
insolvency proceedings, to confirm such opening or to take decisions in the course of such 
proceedings’. Most importantly the authors go on to assert that, under German law, this 
definition comprises judges as well as officers of justice as individuals.78 This is further 
considered in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
 
74 EIR Recast, art 13. 
75 Mortiz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos 2019). 
76 See also, Chapter 2 of this Report. 
77 The authors quote Renato Mangano, Bob Wessels, Reinhard Dammann, ‘Secondary Insolvency Proceedings (Art 34-52), in Reinhard Bork 
and Kristin van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016) and also refer to the 
experience of English courts under the UK Cross-border Insolvency Regulation 2006 which implements the UNCITRAL Model Law in the UK.  
78 See above full reference at 46, para 4. Full reference, Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger, ‘Chapter III Secondary Insolvency 
Proceedings: Article 42. Co-operation and communication between courts in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article 




3.7.2 Effect of non-co-operation 
Perhaps of more significance is the consequence of non-compliance with co-operation 
obligations for the validity of a procedure and its outcome. So, for example where an 
insolvency practitioner operating a preventive restructuring process recognised under the EIR 
Recast (for example the Irish Examinership) notifies a second court that an examiner has been 
appointed and that a stay is in place, is the second court obliged to recognise this stay? The 
answer seems to be an unequivocal yes. A further question then arises; if the court decided 
to ignore the stay to give a creditor a remedy in the second court, would this decision and any 
consequent orders be invalid? The issues concerning recognition and ongoing assistance or 
co-operation are considered in detail in light of existing case law in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
3.7.3 Practitioner resistance 
An additional obstacle to real co-operation in restructuring processes lies in the dynamics of 
legal practice. In large restructuring cases involving a range of corporate entities, in groups of 
companies for example, practitioners will be anxious to protect their own role, or practice 
interest.79 This will have two effects: 
• First, it may be the case that a particular restructuring processes will not be included 
within the remit of the EIR Recast thus avoiding the COMI issue and allowing the 
Member State to attract restructuring business from across Europe, much as the 
English Scheme of Arrangement has done in recent years. Alternatively, some states, 
but not all, will adopt ‘robust restructuring processes’ such as those adopted in Ireland 
and the Netherlands and perhaps attract business from Europe through operation of 
a COMI shift. 
• Second, arguments may be made that particular actions are not centrally part of the 
insolvency process. In our case, reference to ‘an insolvency process’ includes a 
restructuring process created to implement the PRD and included in the EIR Recast, 
which will be subject to jurisdictional rules generated by the determination of COMI. 
If actions which impact on a particular creditor’s position such as an actio pauliana are 
not a part of the restructuring process included in the EIR Recast, then they will also 
not be subject to any terms of the EIR Recast. It is possible that practitioners will 
identify particular types of action which allow for a removal of their client’s action from 
the insolvency process, thus removing the action from the shadow of the EIR Recast 
and the obligation to co-operate. We have already seen this phenomenon in a number 
of cases that are considered in Chapter 5 of this Report.80 In other words the strategies 
of practitioners may serve to dilute the effect of the co-operation obligations in the 
EIR Recast. 
 
79 See Chapter 2 where a similar point is made in relation opt out of co-ordinated proceedings contained in the EIR Recast. 
80 See, for example Case C-337/17 Feniks Sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:805, and Case C-535/17 NK v BNP 




During our discussions and attendance at conferences with practitioners and other insolvency 
specialists, we have definitely seen this effect, where practitioners are actively promoting 
their jurisdiction as supporting rescue or where practitioners are concerned regarding loss of 
business. This is discussed further in Chapter 7 of this Report in the US context. 
3.8 Observations from the European Judiciary  
Interestingly, further obstacles to co-operation have been identified by members of the 
European Judiciary themselves at events attended by the JCOERE Project. This section 
describes observations made by members at the Judicial Wing meeting of INSOL Europe, 
which took place at the annual conferences held in Athens in 2018 and in Copenhagen in 2019. 
In Athens Greece, the JCOERE Project gave a simple introduction to the Project. Even at that 
point, there was a great deal of interest and a number of significant points arose, even in 
those initial stages. First, there was a concern amongst the judiciary regarding a lack of 
knowledge of legal systems of different Member States. This was considered to be an obstacle 
to effective co-operation. Methods for ascertaining knowledge of Member States’ legal 
systems varied from availing of informal networks to a formal request for information from a 
home ministry of justice or similar government entity.81 It is clear that the EU can contribute 
further to judicial training in this regard. Some consistency of approach in terms of the 
provision of information is important. A second key point that emerged even at that point was 
the varied methods of appointment of members of the judiciary, who may have to deal with 
cross-border cases. These differing standards regarding training and experience requirements 
were identified as a possible obstacle to co-operation; this discussion is furthered in Chapter 
4 of this Report, where it is analysed in the context of mutual trust. Chapter 4 also explores 
the judicial education and training requirements of our eleven contributing jurisdictions in the 
JCOERE Questionnaire, which is set out in section 4.6 of this Report. 
In Copenhagen, the members of the Judicial Wing were presented with a case study 
concerning the application of the co-operation provisions in the context of the opening of 
restructuring proceedings in Ireland (the Examinership process) and the enforcement of a 
compromise in those proceedings against a debtor of the group located in a second Member 
State.82 The outcome of this discussion is described in the following section. The purpose of 
this case study was to identify potential obstacles to court-to-court co-operation and to 
discern any differences in understanding held by the judges.  
3.8.1 The nature of insolvency 
A generally acknowledged view from members of the judiciary at the INSOL Europe Judicial 
Wing Meeting in Copenhagen was the desirability of one forum, particularly as regards 
 
81 As is described in Chapter 2 in instances of cross-border judicial co-operation in other trading blocs, ‘information that courts will want…will 
often revolve around the governing law of another court.’ See further, Jay Lawrence Westbrook ‘International Judicial Negotiation’ (2003) 
38 Tex Int’s L J 567, 579. 




bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. This is derived from the particular nature of insolvency 
proceedings, which is based on the fundamental concept of the collective distribution of the 
insolvent estate to all creditors. 
3.8.2 Procedures and protocol83 
Many judges expressed concern regarding the nature of the obligations and their own role in 
facilitating co-operation. Several senior judges were uncomfortable with the idea that they or 
their court would engage in a high level of communication. Instead, it was considered 
preferable that this communication, as part of a formal process, would take place via a court 
clerk or other individual. As discussed previously, the EIR Recast does envisage the 
appointment of an independent person or body.84 The insolvency practitioner was also seen 
as a possible support in terms of co-operation. There would be considerable resistance to any 
perception that a judge would or would be perceived as communicating behind the scenes. 
The following key principles were proposed by the Judicial Panel held at the main INSOL 
Europe conference in Athens:85  
i. Open Court is a key idea.86 
ii. Transnational transparency is also important. There must be directions given to 
notify all parties. 
iii. Protection of confidential information of course also important. 
iv. Fair Procedures. 
These procedural rules are relevant to all processes but are relevant to preventive 
restructuring when such a process is court-based. However, the differences in approach in 
legal systems was noteworthy. Whereas in common law countries, the judges were in a 
position to exercise discretion as to the type and method of co-operation, other jurisdictions, 
including Italy as a sample civil law country, were subject to more specific rules or guidance. 
For example, the following rules applied in Italy according to Judge Panzani: 
i. Italian laws state that the rules of the Regulation must be applied by the court 
regarding proceedings opened in the EU, but also elsewhere. 
ii. There should be a general approach in all cases of cross-border insolvency. 
 
83 Again, these observations from members of the judiciary at INSOL Europe Judicial Wing in Copenhagen, reflect observations described in 
Chapter 2 of this Report. ‘There are also gaps in knowledge of foreign insolvency frameworks that could lead to distrust, inhibiting 
cooperation as trust requires knowledge of how such a framework functions.’ Again this is reflective of observations made by Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook: ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum (1991) 65 Am Bankr L J 457. 
84 See further EIR Recast, Article 42(1) and 57(1). 
85 This was discussed by the Judicial Wing Panel: ‘Cooperation and Communication between Judges in Cross-Border Insolvencies under the 
EIR Recast’ (INSOL Europe Annual Congress, Athens, 5th October 2018). The Judicial Wing Panel was composed of Judge Caroline Costello, 
Judge Luciano Panzani, and Emil Szczepanik, Ministry of Justice, Poland. 
86 Although the judges did acknowledge that there would be limited possibilities for private hearings in the context of insolvency proceedings, 
for example the hearing of an ex parte application for an injunction or stay. In Ireland the initial appointment of an examiner can be based 




iii. The language of co-operation will be Italian and if this is not possible, it should be 
English. The Court is allowed to use English, but provision should be made for 
translation. 
iv. The costs of co-operation will be considered an expense of the courts system and 
would not be considered to be part of the professional costs of the insolvency 
practitioner.  
v. Co-operation would ideally be facilitated by IP for the same sorts of reasons 
regarding procedural safeguards as applied in Ireland. 
vi. Italian judges / courts are not permitted to engage in side bar phone calls. At the 
very least such calls should be recorded. 
vii. The IP appointed in Italy cannot be the same as the IP in second jurisdiction. This 
also indicates that the IP cannot be from the same firm or practise.  
In contrast, in former Eastern bloc countries, the idea of co-operation between courts seemed 
more ‘normal’ and acceptable. 
In France, the procedure for the recognition of a foreign judgment follows the ordinary rules 
of civil procedure and involves an application to the court by any interested party, including 
the foreign office-holder and the debtor, even if the foreign judgment was obtained ex parte. 
The court hearing the application must content itself with an examination of the regularity of 
the foreign judgment and that the public interest and legal system in France would not be 
offended by the recognition of the judgment. The elements a court would look at in its 
examination include whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction; whether the proper 
law was applied; compliance with due process and public policy rules, including whether the 
procedure was adversarial; and the absence of fraud. This examination of compliance 
conditioned the ability of French judges to extend assistance to foreign proceedings.  
It is suggested by the JCOERE Project that the markedly different attitudes and existing legal 
frameworks may constitute barriers to court-to-court co-operation. A judge or administrator87 
operating in a jurisdiction where it is commonplace to have a telephone conversation as a 
means of communicating and co-operating, may be met with clear resistance to such a 
suggestion in another jurisdiction. As articulated, certain jurisdictions have clear rules on co-
operation and information sharing, however, it appears that others do not. If there is an 
unawareness of the extent to which the obligation to co-operate is permissible within a 
jurisdiction or procedure, then it may act as a barrier to it. In this context, the importance of 
the applicability of the obligation to co-operate to administrative authorities cannot be 
overlooked.  
 




3.9 Conclusion and Transition 
The JCOERE Project research revealed certain categories of Member State approaches to 
preventive restructuring, which we applied to our contributors in the analysis of their 
approach to preventive restructuring. Also discussed was the likely divergence that will arise 
in implementation of the PRD due to certain policy differences, which may well present 
obstacles to co-operation. We also presented an analysis of our findings in relation to 
questions relating to procedure queried in the JCOERE Questionnaire, along with additional 
observations around how procedural differences may also inhibit effective co-operation in 
cross-border preventive restructuring cases. This Chapter has connected this issue with the 
broader issue related to EU integration and harmonisation and how this affects mutual trust 
and, by extension, effective co-operation.  
The next chapter will examine additional issues that may challenge mutual trust and co-
operation, namely different aspects of legal and judicial culture. As the characteristics of a 
jurisdiction’s legal culture are deeply imbedded features that underpin the development and 
application of commonly held legal principles, these are particularly difficult to dislodge or 
otherwise harmonise. They influence the approach of a jurisdiction to fundamental legal 
principles, such as the rule of law, which underpin many other important characteristics of a 
legal system, including the role of the courts and judicial independence. The EU has taken a 
proactive approach to harmonising or Europeanising Member State judiciaries with a view to 
increasing mutual trust and effective co-operation. The next Chapter will explore issues of 
harmonisation as they relate to legal and judicial culture and how differences in this area may 
impact court-to-court co-operation. 
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IV. Chapter 4: Influences of Judicial and Legal Culture in Europe 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 1 and 3 of this Report described the connections that have been made by the EU 
between the harmonisation of laws and judicial co-operation, in turn leading to ever closer 
integration of the European Union. The obstacles to harmonisation of substantive laws on 
preventive restructuring measures, which have been described in the JCOERE Report 1 and 
summarised in Chapter 3 of this Report, are connected to similar, if not identical, issues that 
also present obstacles to jurisdictional co-operation between courts and practitioners 
generally. These include differences in legal culture, and for the purpose of this Chapter, 
judicial culture. While differences in legal and judicial culture are not the sole reasons why 
harmonisation and co-operation continue to be challenging within the EU, the differences 
underpin many of the conflicts that do arise.    
Effective cross-border court-to-court co-operation is predicated on the principle of sincere co-
operation and mutual trust, as set out in the EIR Recast: 
This Regulation should provide for the immediate recognition of judgments 
concerning the opening, conduct and closure of insolvency proceedings which fall 
within its scope, and of judgments handed down in direct connection with such 
insolvency proceedings. Automatic recognition should therefore mean that the effects 
attributed to the proceedings by the law of the Member State in which the 
proceedings were opened extend to all other Member States. The recognition of 
judgments delivered by the courts of the Member States should be based on the 
principle of mutual trust. To that end, grounds for non-recognition should be reduced 
to the minimum necessary. This is also the basis on which any dispute should be 
resolved where the courts of two Member States both claim competence to open the 
main insolvency proceedings. The decision of the first court to open proceedings 
should be recognised in the other Member States without those Member States 
having the power to scrutinise that court's decision.1 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this Report, while the EIR Recast increased the duties of co-
operation and communication between practitioners and between courts, this is not always 
easy to achieve in practice, particularly between courts. The objective of this Chapter is to 
 
1 Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L141/19 




explore aspects of legal and judicial culture and how these can impact on harmonisation of 
substantive laws. Lack of close harmonisation can cause difficulties in achieving mutual trust 
between jurisdictions and courts, which by extension presents obstacles to effective co-
operation and co-ordination of cross-border matters generally and in particular, cross-border 
insolvency and restructuring cases. Challenges to harmonisation, mutual trust and co-
operation connect closely with the issues surrounding European integration and an ever-
closer union, which were outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 of this Report.  
It must be emphasised that within the European Union there is an agreed backdrop to these 
differences including a strong European commitment to and acknowledgement of what can 
be broadly described as rule of law issues. The ever-closer integration of the European Union 
underpins the issues that are the focus of the JCOERE Project. Of particular relevance are the 
foundational principles concerning adherence or respect for the rule of law discussed in 
section 4.2 of this Chapter, under which falls liberal democratic ideals such as judicial 
independence and impartiality, certainty and predictability, as well as aspects of justice and 
fairness. One of the issues that seems to be central to preventive restructuring particularly is 
the role of the courts in ‘robust restructuring frameworks’, as explained in Chapter 3. In our 
discussions at conferences and other forums, the recognition of the importance of the role of 
the court is perceived as problematic amongst some academics and policymakers. A 
difference has also been detected between common law and civil law systems in this context. 
This is considered in Section 4.3. 
In addition to setting ‘ground rules,’ on rule of law issues, as it were, the EU has also taken a 
proactive role in trying to harmonise the functioning of the European judiciary in all Member 
States, which is described in section 4.4 of this Chapter. Nevertheless, differences persist that 
continue to challenge mutual trust, such as issues, albeit in a small number of Member States, 
concerning judicial independence, discussed in section 4.5, and differing approaches to 
training, experience, competence, and specialism or expertise, described in section 4.6 and in 
Chapter 8 of this Report. Section 4.7 will conclude with the challenge of harmonising legal and 
judicial cultures in light of the discussion of the preceding sections, with some thoughts as to 
how this may impact co-operation when it comes to coordinating preventive restructuring 
procedures under the PRD.  
4.2 Mutual Trust and the Rule of Law in the EU 
The EU has actively adopted and promoted the rule of law principle through the legal orders 
of its Member States, requiring as it does that any acceding Member State has stable 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities.2 The Treaty on European Union states unequivocally that ‘[t]he 
 
2 The EU’s minimum standards regarding the principle of the ‘rule of law’ is derived from the Copenhagen criteria on the accession of new 





Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and 
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, principles that are common to the Member States.’3 
Along with a number of Communications that have presented frameworks and policy 
initiatives for protecting and promoting the rule of law among the Member States, which will 
be discussed below, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides 
specific protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the infringement of which 
on an institutional level could also lead to sanctions by the EU.4 
As described in Chapter 1 of this Report, Article 7 of the TEU provides a formal mechanism to 
address such matters in relation to Member States. In addition, it has been noted by the 
Commission that the rule of law ‘makes sure that all public powers act within the constraints 
set out by law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and under 
the control of independent and impartial courts’.5 A coherent and consistent approach to rule 
of law principles is a key factor in ensuring the independence and impartiality of all Member 
State courts, which is why there has been a focus placed on a common approach to the rule 
of law among the Member States in the last decade in particular. 
In 2014, the European Commission issued a Communication on a new framework to 
strengthen the rule of law in the EU. This Framework also acknowledged that the way in which 
the rule of law is implemented among the Member States plays a key role in the foundation 
of mutual trust upon which the functioning of the EU is built.6 However, it also acknowledged 
that the content and even standards associated with the rule of law may vary at a national 
level, depending on each Member State’s constitutional framework, offering some reason, if 
not justification, for the differences in approach to rule of law issues. The Commission listed 
a number of key principles defining the core common meaning and perhaps expectation that 
Member States should strive to protect:  
Those principles include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic 
and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of 
the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review 
including respect for fundamental rights; and equality before the law.7 
The 2014 Communication introduced a mechanism that could be utilised if a legal system at 
a national level were unable to cope with a threat to the rule of law, which in turn could 
present a potential systemic threat to the rule of law and the stability of the EU.8 The 
 
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, [Hereinafter TEU] art 6(1). 
4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 26 October 2012 OJ C 326/02 < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT> accessed 14 September 2020. 
5 European Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) COM (2014) 0158 final 4 [hereinafter 
referred to as the Framework].  
6 Framework 2.  
7 Framework 4. 





Framework suggested a fairly strong assessment and action protocol9 that aimed at 
preventing the need to issue proceedings under article 7(1) TEU.10 The original strong 
mechanism recommended in the Framework was watered down by the Council, who claimed 
that such a strong approach would be unlawful.11 It was decided instead to have a ‘dialogue’ 
on an annual basis to discuss rule of law issues, but these dialogues did little to confront 
Member States with their rule of law shortcomings. The Framework was used twice between 
2014 and 2019: once by the Commission in respect of Poland in December 201712 and by the 
European Parliament in September 2018 in respect of Hungary.13 It was observed in the first 
rule of law related Communication in 201914 that ‘progress by the Council in these two cases 
could have been more meaningful.’15 
Another Communication focused on the rule of law was issued on 3rd April 2019. It repeats 
much of the positioning of the 2014 Framework with the added aim of enriching the debate 
on further strengthening the rule of law in the EU and inviting reflection and comment by 
stakeholders.16 In July 2019, another Communication was issued by the Commission that 
offered a ‘blueprint for action’ in relation to strengthening the rule of law in the EU.17 The two 
2019 Communications were based on certain core principles, including Member State 
accountability to ensure adherence to the rule of law; treating Member States equally; and 
finding solutions rather than imposing sanctions ‘with co-operation and mutual support at the 
core.’18 The Commission identified three pillars to reinforce its approach: ‘promoting the rule 
of law culture, preventing rule of law problems from emerging and deepening, and how best 
to mount an effective common response when a significant problem has been identified’.19 In 
addition, a consultation on the rule of law and the creation of a mechanism to protect it was 
issued in March 2020, which resulted in the first annual Rule of Law Report published 30 
September 2020.20  
 
9 A three-stage process based on four principles were suggested that began with a dialogue and ended with ‘swift and concrete actions to 
address the systemic threat’ followed by recommendations by the Commission. See Framework 7.  
10 TEU - Protocols - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed 
on 13 December 2007 OJ C326/1 (‘TEU’) art 7(1), which can be invoked if there is ‘a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2.’  
11 Peter Oliver and Justine Stefanelli, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The Council’s Inaction’ (2016) 54(5) JCMS 1075, 1076.  
12 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland 
of the rule of law’ (Communication) COM (2017) 835 final. 
13 European Parliament, ‘resolution of 12 September 2018 calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(2017/2131 (INL))’ 
[2019] OJ C 433/66. 
14 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council on 
Further Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and next possible steps’ COM (2019) 163 final (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘2019 Communication 163’) 
15 2019 Communication 163, 3. 
16 2019 Communication 163, 2.  
17 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions on Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – a 
Blueprint for Action’ COM (2019) 343 final. (Hereinafter ‘2019 Communication 343’). 
18 2019 Communication 163, 7.  
19 2019 Communication 343, 5.  
20 European Commission, 2020 Rule of Law Report (European Commission 23 March 2020) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-





There is little doubt that the rule of law is an elementary principle forming the foundation of 
the European Union, as well as the process of integration that can cause difficulties in mutual 
trust and effective co-operation where differences in adherence to it persist among the 
Member States. The differences in approach to the rule of law can often be influenced by 
differences in legal or judicial culture. The next section will look at the unique aspects of legal 
culture from a theoretical perspective to lend context to a discussion surrounding the 
difficulties of co-operating across borders when individual jurisdictions may differ on key legal 
principles, such as those associated with the rule of law. 
4.3 The Influence of Legal Culture on Rule of Law Principles: Common Law 
and Civil Law Traditions 
As noted above, co-operation between courts relies on mutual trust and confidence as set out 
in recital 65 of the EIR Recast. Where there are variances in legal principles underpinning 
mutual trust, then courts/judges may be less likely to respect decisions of other jurisdictions 
and to co-operate effectively. For judges, it is important to have at least some kind of 
consensual idea of the legal culture21 within which their decision-making takes place so that 
they are operating within the same regulative ideal, particularly if they are co-operating within 
a cross-border context.22  
A legal culture can be characterised by a number of factors, such as the nature of institutions, 
the way that judges are appointed, the role of lawyers, and even public attitudes as they relate 
to litigation and incarceration. The legal culture of a jurisdiction also extends to more 
nebulous concepts, such as ideas, values, aspirations, and mentalities that underpin the 
respect for legal principles, such as the rule of law.23 The differences in legal culture are also 
connected to the influence of a jurisdiction’s historical evolution,24 which go beyond simple 
design aspects of government and institutions.25  
The key characterises of legal culture in individual Member States tend to be deeply rooted 
and path dependent in nature.26 Much of the groundwork for modern legal culture was laid 
at earlier stages in history prior to the creation of the European Union, with small jurisdiction-
specific differences that have been retained and that are sometimes at odds with other 
 
21 For a discussion around the concept of legal culture, see Sally Engle Merry, ‘What is Legal Culture? An Anthropological Perspective’ (2010) 
5 J Comp L 40, 41; M Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage Foundation 1975) 193-194 as cited in Roger 
Cotterell, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’ in David Nelkin (ed), Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth Publishing 1997) 13-31, 15 
22 David Nelkin, ‘Thinking about Legal Culture’ (2014) 1 Asian J L & Soc’y 255, 257 
23 See David Nelkin, ‘Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29 Austl J Leg Phil 1; Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction’ 
(1995) 4 Soc & Leg Stud 435; ‘Thinking about Legal Culture’ (2014) 1 Asian Journal of Law and Society 255, 255; and Roger Cotterell, ‘The 
Concept of Legal Culture’ in David Nelkin (ed), Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth Publishing 1997) 13-31. . 
24 For a discussion of the historical underpinnings of European legal culture, see Franz Wieacker and Edgar Bodenheimer, ‘Foundations of 
European Legal Culture’ (1990) 38(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
25 Lawrence M Friedman, ‘Legal Culture and Social Development’ (1969) 4(1) Law & Society Review 29, 35. 
26 Path dependence describes the theory that a social or legal system is limited by the decisions made in the past or by the events 
experienced, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. For in-depth discussions of path dependency and the law, see, for 
example, Oona A Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’ (2000-2001) 
86 Iowa L Rev 601; John Bell, ‘Path Dependence and Legal Development’ (2012-2013) 87 Tul L Rev 787; and Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark 
J Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stan L Rev 127, who provide an application of legal 




jurisdictions. It is these deeply rooted, path dependent characteristics and norms that are 
particularly difficult to dislodge or change in order to harmonise the nature and function of 
EU Member State judiciaries. The complexities of even understanding the nature of a 
jurisdiction’s legal culture is one of the reasons why it continues to be so difficult to ensure an 
equal understanding and approach to legal principles generally among the Member States, 
which the Commission admits it needs in order to implement its Blueprint for enhancing the 
rule of law. 
4.3.1 Judicial culture and legal origins 
The legal origins27 of a jurisdiction can sometimes explain why differences in approach to legal 
regulation and court co-operation persist, despite the influence of globalisation and the 
relative benefit that more homogenous legal systems could provide in terms of efficient cross-
border solutions. The legal origins hypothesis claims that national judicial and regulatory 
styles are influenced by the origins of that legal system from specific legal families. However, 
this often appears to focus on the common law / civil law divide, which has been criticised as 
being too limited and dualistic.28 Although the EU is comprised of legal systems derived from 
several different legal families, a discussion of general differences between the common and 
civil law judiciaries is a good place to begin for the purpose of this Report, as the comparison 
does reveal key differences upon which other cultural differences are layered.29 
The clearest example of the difference between common law and civil law legal systems is the 
codification of law in civil law countries, as opposed to the heavier reliance on judicial 
interpretation and jurisprudence in common law systems.30 Under civil law systems, legal 
codes describe which specific actions are prohibited, restricting the actions of participants in 
a legal system, making it possible to apply the law strictly, and to at least some extent, 
circumscribing judicial discretion by the content of legal codes.31 In contrast, codes in common 
law countries often serve to summarise previous judicial decisions. In addition, a common law 
judge has the discretion to disregard the provisions of a code when it conflicts with the basic 
principles of common law, though this discretion is not used capriciously in any sense. In 
relation to civil law systems, Glaeser and Shleifer note: 
 
27 For a detailed discussion of the legal origins hypothesis, it originated in Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and 
Robert W Vishny, ‘The Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52(3) The Journal of Finance 1131 and ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) 
Journal of Finance 1113 and was developed further by Juan C Botero, Simeon Dhankov, Rafael La Porta, Florecio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Schleifer, ‘The Regulation of Labour’ (2004) 119(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1339.  
28 See John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems, and Ajit Singh, ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: 
An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis’ (2008) 6(2) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 343 for criticism of the legal origins hypothesis 
and John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele, and Mathias Siems, ‘How do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of 
Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 579 for a discussion of the literature around legal origins as well as an 
application of the hypothesis. 
29 Franz Wieacker and Edgar Bodenheimer, ‘Foundations of European Legal Culture’ (1990) 38(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 
1, 6. 
30 Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193, 1194.  





In civil law countries, in contrast, judges are not even supposed to interpret the codes 
very much, and in principle must seek not to differentiate a specific situation, but to 
fit it into the existing provisions of a code. As a restraint on the judge, codes are much 
more powerful in civil than in common law countries.32 
The differences associated with legal origins have made harmonisation in the EU difficult due 
to the diverse characteristics of legal systems among the Member States. In the context of 
restructuring, particularly where court decisions seem to be central to robust restructuring 
processes, it is difficult to reconcile the common law perspective of law-making and judging 
with the perspective of a civil lawyer.33 A civil law practitioner may consider the common law 
as being overly traditional, uncertain, and peculiar in the interconnected quality of law and 
equity, while the same characteristics seem to a common lawyer as practical, flexible, rooted 
in national culture, and natural and productive.34  
As will be shown in Chapter 5 of this Report, the civil law perspective makes it difficult 
sometimes to grasp fully how common law procedures such as the Irish Examinership, English 
Scheme of Arrangement, and American Chapter 11 operate, given the need for judicial 
application of the various tests of fairness throughout the operation of the process and in final 
approval of the restructuring plan. In civil law jurisdictions, the function of a code or statute 
is to seen as giving a judge clear instructions on how to come to a clear decision, whereas the 
ambiguities and vagaries of the common law allow a judge to make a decision that can take 
into account a wider set of circumstances than might be available to a civil lawyer, although 
this also opens the door for legal uncertainty. These differences do go some way to explaining 
why common law and civil law judges often approach co-operation in cross-border cases 
differently.  
4.3.2 Legal culture and the judicial role  
Clearly, judiciaries in common law and civil law jurisdictions have sometimes starkly different 
roles. While this can often be traced to the fundamental difference between institutional 
structures, there are enough differences between civil law jurisdictions alone to indicate that 
the underlying conflicts go beyond a simple binary comparison. The EU Member States are 
influenced by a number of legal systemic characteristics due to the variety of civil law systems 
present, whether they are based on French or Austro-Germanic civil law, the cooperative 
Scandinavian/Nordic system, the transitioning Eastern European economies that have been 
influenced by the Soviet era, and those systems that have adopted a hybrid or mixed 
approach. Therefore, there are many factors that might challenge the ease of mutual trust 
between courts and practitioners among the variety of legal systems present within the EU.  
 
32 Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193, 1212.  
33 Pierre Legrand, Fragments of Law as Culture (WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 1999) 11.  






Mangano describes two particular issues that may affect the willingness of practitioners in 
particular to co-operate: lack of certainty and foreseeability of legal frameworks leading to a 
reluctance to defer to another jurisdiction, despite the practical benefit that such co-
operation would create.35 This may have an impact on court co-operation as it is generally 
through practitioners that such co-operation takes place, usually in a negotiation phase, 
according to practitioners engaged by the Project at various events. When faced with a lack 
of certainty or familiarity due to the differences in law and language, Mangano notes that if 
given the choice, a court or an IP would tend to choose the law with which they are 
comfortable and familiar rather than accede to another jurisdiction’s procedural primacy, 
despite appearing that it would be in the interests of all parties to co-operate.36 These 
potential choices demonstrate an impulse to protect local interests over the benefit of the 
collective of cross-border creditors as well as a certain understandable discomfort with the 
unknown, whether due to language differences or lack of available and easily accessible 
information about legal systems and process in other jurisdictions. Fundamentally, this means 
that if legal frameworks lack certainty and foreseeability (or are perceived in such a way), then 
courts and practitioners dealing with the same case in different jurisdictions may not opt to 
co-operate because, regardless of what the other courts and practitioners do, in the short 
term not co-operating is viewed as being in the best interests of their local creditors as 
outcomes appear more predictable.37 
The difference between civil law and common law approaches as well as the more nuanced 
differences between legal families among the civil law systems of Europe (which it must be 
acknowledged is replicated in the wider common law world) may be a key issue in the 
willingness and ability to co-operate in cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. 
Common law jurisdictions tend to be more at ease with interpreting their obligation to co-
operate and making private arrangements to do so, such as bespoke co-operation protocols, 
which will be described in Chapter 7 section 7.3. Mangano observes, however, that civil law 
jurisdictions sometimes remain attached to a more public interest approach to insolvency law, 
which is often incompatible with an effective conclusion to such private arrangements or 
protocols.38 Although the EIR Recast has set an enhanced obligation to co-operate and 
communicate in cross-border insolvency cases,39 it is still not entirely clear how this is 
intended to occur. There is still scope to interpret the enhanced obligations to co-operate 
because they leave mode and method up to the cooperating parties themselves. In other 
 
35 Renato Mangano, ‘From “Prisoner’s Dilemma” to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Co-operation in European Cross-
Border Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314. 
36 The Eurofood case is an example of this dilemma occurring in reality. See Chapter 2 section 2.3.1, Chapter 3 section 3.6.1, and Chapter 5 
section 5.2.  
37 Renato Mangano, ‘From “Prisoner’s Dilemma” to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Co-operation in European Cross-
Border Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 314, 319-321. 
38 Renato Mangano, ‘Path Dependence and Paradox in Harmonising Out-of-Court Procedures across Europe: The Evidence from Italy’ 
(Lecture at the 7th International Symposiom on Out-of-court Restructuring Proceedings in Europe, Cologne 26 August 2016 as cited in ‘From 
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Co-operation in European Cross-Border Cases’ (2017) 26 IIR 
314, 329.  
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words, there is no specified framework or protocol judges can refer to that unequivocally 
explains how co-operation should materialise. While there are a number of guidelines 
available for judges to rely upon as will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report, it seems that 
these are rarely used in practice, which became apparent in the analysis of the Judicial Survey 
in Chapter 8 of this Report.  
The challenge of ambiguous, open-textured obligations under the EIR Recast combined with 
different approaches to the judicial role mean that approaches to co-operation can differ with 
some significance. Combine that with the weight and importance of judicial interpretation in 
decision-making and deeply ingrained differences between European legal systems creates a 
web of potential conceptual conflicts to co-operation in cross-border insolvency cases. 
Considering the scope of implementation possibilities and the controversial provisions in the 
PRD, for example, these issues may indeed create conflicts that could be more difficult to 
surmount in negotiation to achieve co-operation in a cross-border restructuring. Despite the 
efforts by the EU to Europeanise the judiciaries of the Member States, which will be discussed 
in the next section, differences in practical judicial independence and aspects of the judicial 
profession persist, making mutual trust an elusive pursuit at times. 
4.4 Creating a European Judicial Culture – Networks and Training 
4.4.1 Harmonising judiciaries through training and the European Judicial Training 
Network 
Within the last two decades, there has been a lot of focus and discussion on the need to 
harmonise the judiciaries of EU Member States through training as a means of ensuring that 
the rule of law and its associated principles are equally applied throughout the EU,40 thereby 
ensuring mutual trust and effective co-operation. Training and networking organisations have 
been key promoters of harmonisation and the development of a European judicial culture, 
such as the European Judicial Training Network,41 the European Law Academy,42 the INSOL 
Europe Judicial Forum,43 and various other organisations created by the EU institutions.44 This 
 
40 For a discussion about judicial harmonisation, see for example, Wolfgang Heusel (ed), ‘The Future of Legal Europe: An emerging judicial 
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move commenced as an aim of the EU institutions with the Hague Programme in 2005, which 
emphasised that: 
Judicial co-operation…could be further enhanced by strengthening mutual trust and by 
progressive development of a European judicial culture based on diversity of the legal 
systems of the Member States and unity through European law.45 
Since that time, a number of other Communications and Resolutions on this matter have been 
released, which have further promoted the ideals of networking and training to promote 
mutual trust and respect for the rule of law.46 Fundamentally, the aim has been to take a 
practical approach to judicial training, making it relevant to every day work, encompassing 
both initial and continuous training, and enabling Member States to view it as an investment 
in the quality of justice. These goals were set as objectives to be achieved by 2020 in a 
Communication in 201147 and would be achieved by relying upon existing training structures 
in Member States while maintaining respect to their subsidiarity and judicial independence.  
The European Judicial Training Network has been instrumental as a hub for the 
implementation of EU policy with regard to the judicial profession as it connects national and 
European institutions to help define training policies and standards, as well as coordinate 
judicial academies.48 The EJTN, funded by the EU, adopts a decentralised approach, relying on 
a strong commitment from Member States and their individual training institutions.49 The EU 
has absorbed these networks in the framework of EU governance under the EJTN and exerts 
some influence over their activities and objectives. These networks generally engage in four 
main areas of activity: co-operation in the field of training; cultural exchange and socialisation 
for a better knowledge of other legal systems or for the sharing of practical experiences; 
standard setting and exchange of best practices; and lobbying and representation of the 
interests of network members. The various networks relied upon or set up by the EU 
institutions help to facilitate and enhance judicial co-operation, improve the functioning of 
the EU judicial system, and increase mutual trust.50 It is likely that these networks also play an 
 
45 European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union OJ C 53 (3.3.2005) 11-12. 
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important role in encouraging convergence in national judicial practices, gathering European 
judiciaries into a closer judicial culture.51  
4.4.2 Judicial training and mutual trust  
In June 2014, the European Commission issued a press release, the cornerstone of which was 
judicial training and the aim of fostering mutual trust among the Member States’ judiciaries.52 
Viviane Reding, the EU’s Justice Commissioner at the time, stated that:  
Mutual trust is the bedrock upon which EU justice policy is built, and high-quality 
training of legal practitioners is paramount in fostering this trust. As heads of state and 
government are meeting today and tomorrow to define the future strategic priorities 
for Europe’s justice area, my call to leaders is to put mutual trust high on the future 
justice agenda. Trust is not made by decree. It grows with knowledge. 
Reding emphasised the importance of training in EU law as the most effective way of ensuring 
that the single market area can deliver the most for citizens and businesses. Training ensures 
that legal practitioners are equipped to implement EU law and to foster a sense of a common 
European judicial culture based on mutual trust. Training does not necessarily fix all of the 
problems that are associated with mutual trust when considering the obligation to co-
operate. Rather, the respect a system and its judiciary have for legal principles and norms is 
also an important aspect that engenders respect as well as trust between judiciaries of 
different jurisdictions. Without mutual respect, there can be no mutual trust.  
The 2019 Communication 343 also acknowledged the importance of judicial networks as 
playing an important role in exchanging ideas and best practices and suggested that the 
existing networks should be supported to further promote the rule of law.53 It was noted that 
national judiciaries themselves have an important role to play in promoting the rule of law 
standards and that participation in councils and national debates on judicial reforms are an 
important part of national checks and balances.54 
4.4.3 Protecting the rule of law through shared knowledge and values 
The Commission’s Communications on the rule of law in 2019 identified that some of the 
political developments in several Member States that have led to the undermining of the rule 
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of law could be attributed to a lack of information and limited public knowledge about the 
it.55 This came through clearly in a special Eurobarometer Survey in 2019.56 In order to rectify 
this, the Commission has proposed taking action to embed the rule of law in national and 
European political discourse by:  
…disseminating knowledge about EU law requirements and standards and the 
importance of the rule of law for citizens and business, and by empowering 
stakeholders with an interest in in promoting rule of law themes. For citizens and 
businesses to appreciate the role and importance of justice systems, these need to be 
modern and accessible. Of key importance is the mutual trust in each other’s judicial 
systems, which is a pre-condition for a truly functioning Single Market.57 
The activities of the European Commission in this area and the multitude of judicial, social and 
training networks have helped to create a greater understanding of differences in legal and 
judicial cultures, while also drawing judiciaries closer together. This accompanied by checks 
such as the Judicial Scorecard, along with the Rule of Law framework and inter-institutional 
and related Member State dialogues, have continued to help on the march towards judicial 
Europeanisation. In addition to these supranational and EU level activities, Member State 
professional guidelines and efforts to harmonise these have also helped to draw judiciaries 
closer together, at least in terms of understanding each other, although this is also dependent 
on the engagement of Member State judiciaries in these activities, which can be inhibited by 
heavy case loads and limited time for additional training. 
While on paper there is a set of shared values regarding independence, impartiality, integrity 
and professionalism, current guidelines and ethical codes developed on the basis of these 
values are still diverse among the Member States.58 For example and as summarised by Mak, 
Graaf, and Jackson, judges in ‘old’ Member States tend to be critical towards centralised 
judicial management and approach the value of individual judicial autonomy differently than 
do those in ‘new’ Member States, who, depending on their individual history, are still 
adjusting to a greater degree of self-governance in many cases.59 The next section will explore 
aspects of the challenges in this area, specifically focusing on problems of judicial 
independence. 
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4.5 Challenges to Judicial Independence in the EU 
The Judiciary sits at the heart of the rule of law and judicial independence is a key element to 
ensuring its protection. Without independence, courts may be influenced by politics and 
special interest lobbies, potentially leading to systematic bias and arbitrary decision making.60 
While judicial independence is clearly an important value ascribed to by all EU Member States, 
the relative independence of Member State judiciaries can still differ along a fairly broad 
spectrum in reality, ranging from fully independent, to judicial systems less protected by 
constitutional checks on political and governmental influence. These differences can be 
attributed, at least in part, to legal culture and tradition as it influences the judicial function 
and profession in individual Member States.  
Countries wishing to join the EU are required to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, as noted in 
section 1.3 of Chapter 1. Of particular importance to this discussion around legal culture and 
its influence on mutual trust and co-operation is the requirement that institutions are stable 
enough to guarantee democracy and the rule of law.61 These two aspects are also some of the 
most deeply embedded in terms of the way in which a country has developed over time and 
sometimes difficult to change without deep structural adjustments. Coman notes that while 
the Western European judiciaries are perceived as having good systems in place to protect 
judicial independence and impartiality (apart from a few notable exceptions), many newer 
Member States are still developing in line with EU expected criteria.62 The challenges faced by 
newer Member States have been particularly acute, though that is not to say that there are 
not challenges to judicial independence and the rule of law elsewhere in the EU. Where there 
has been a long history of a politicised or an otherwise non-independent judiciary, it is difficult 
to create new habits and protocols to assure judicial independence if constitutional 
mechanisms are not also in place to protect it. 
Judicial reforms were required of most of the newer Member States prior to joining the EU as 
many of them had to adjust to a post-communism approach to justice and administration in 
order to meet the EU’s requirements on judicial and administrative capacity. Coman observes 
that these attributes are difficult to change in the short term.63 In some Member States, 
existing law still tends to be insufficient to ensure real judicial independence. Batory attributes 
this in part to the layers of legislation and controls introduced that have often been added to 
existing rules, indicating a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to compliance, which can lead to policy design 
 
60 For a discussion on the nature and importance of judicial independence, see for example, Pablo Jose Castillo Ortiz, ‘Councils of the Judiciary 
and Judges’ Perceptions of Respect to Their Independence in Europe’ (2017) 9 Hague J Rule Law 315 and John Frerejohn, ‘Independent 
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence’ (1999) 72 S Cal L Rev 353.  
61 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, 21 and 22 June 1993’ (1993) SN180/1/93 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>, para 7(A)(iii). 
62 Ramona Coman, ‘Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2014) 66(6) Europe-
Asia Studies 892, 892-893.  
63 Ramona Coman, ‘Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2014) 66(6) Europe-





being out of step with effective implementation.64 As observed by Fleck, the quick reformative 
reactions appeared at times to have merely moved power and undue influence from one 
bureaucratic institution to another with some radical reforms having an opposite effect to 
increasing mutual trust, introducing lack of efficiency, decline in trust in the judiciary, 
corruption and ideological bias.65  
The EU has tried to help in the area of judicial reform in issues of judicial independence, in 
particular for new Member States. For example, a Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
was created as a transitional measure for Romania and Bulgaria to assist them in addressing 
several judicial reform shortcomings, corruption, and organised crime. The Mechanism 
established a set of criteria for the Commission to assess on an annual basis;66 although it has 
been viewed as efficient, recent reports show some setbacks, which has raised the question 
as to whether the demand for progress is stringent enough and whether changes should be 
more concrete in the system before the Mechanism is terminated.67 While Romania and 
Bulgaria continued to follow these benchmarks, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic saw 
increased tensions as political parties tested their autonomy against EU judicial governance 
to empower elected branches of government over the judiciary. It is interesting to note that 
if some of these governments were exhibiting the same characteristics at the time that they 
joined the EU, they would not have been permitted to do so.68 
In conclusion, it is not the intention of this Chapter or this Report to detail the problems that 
have been encountered since the accession of some of the newer Member States, which risk 
the rule of law and judicial independence. It is sufficient to note that the issues confronting 
newer Member States are closely connected to cultural trends that have informed their legal 
systems for decades, as are the difficulties that continue to be encountered by older Member 
States in this area. These paths are hard to break and require more than just legislative 
changes, rather entire paradigm shifts in the values and principles that underpin a 
jurisdiction’s existential foundation.69 If judicial harmonisation is to be achieved, these 
paradigm shifts will continue to require a close working relationship between EU institutions 
and Member States to ensure developing principles are aligned. A commonly held view and 
approach to the rule of law and judicial independence are essential to establishing and 
maintaining mutual trust in order to ensure effective co-operation between the courts of 
 
64 Agnes Batory, ‘Why do Anti-Corruption Laws Fail in Central Eastern Europe? A Target Compliance Perspective’ (2012) 6 Regulation & 
Governance 66, 67. 
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Member States. Differences in education and training, for example, may colour perspectives 
on the relative respect to such principles, making mutual trust more difficult to achieve in 
practice. 
4.6 European Judicial Education and Qualification 
As noted in section 4.3 of this Chapter, there are fairly significant differences between the 
common law and civil law judicial roles, with the former including an interpretative duty that 
tends to be avoided in the latter. There are also a number of differences between the 
education, experience, and training requirements to be appointed as a judge among the 
Member States generally, with some fairly substantial differences between common and civil 
law countries due to the difference in the judicial role. Question 14 of the JCOERE 
Questionnaire targeted this area of interest, as has the Judicial Survey, which will be discussed 
in Chapter 8 of this Report. This section will draw primarily from the responses to the JCOERE 
Questionnaire to the following question: ‘In your jurisdiction, what are the training and 
competency requirements for insolvency judges?’ 
 Italy 
In Italy, judges may qualify through a number of avenues. Either a candidate must already 
have a PhD or other post graduate law degree, have attended a stage or training course in 
Court, worked as an honorary judge for at least six years, attained a lawyers licence, worked 
as a regular university law professor, occupied certain managerial roles in Public 
Administration, or been appointed as a judge of the administrative and accounting courts. 
There is also a compulsory initial induction and training period over 18 months including 
internships.70 Training sessions are also required every four years.71 Judges are selected 
through a public competitive exam published by the Minister of Justice, with some exceptions. 
For example, university law professors of at least 15 years’ standing enrolled in a specific 
register can also be appointed Counsellors of the Supreme Court of Cassation by the Superior 
Council of the Judiciary.72  
France 
Commercial court judges, who hear insolvency cases in France, are a special category of 
unpaid judge, elected by their peers from a constituency formed of persons registered as 
running a business for at least five years.73 They are generally elected for a period of generally 
two years in the first instance, but can be re-elected for an additional four years.74 Newly 
 
70 Legislative Decree 30 January 2006, art 25 as amended by Law 30 July 2007. 
71 European Commission, ‘Judicial Training Structures: Italy’ (European Commission 2012)  
<https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_national_training_structures_for_the_judiciary-406-en.do> [Last accessed 16 June 2020]. 
72 Marco Gubitosi, ‘Legal Systems in Italy: Overview’ (Reuters 2019) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-007-
7826?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)> [Last accessed 16 June 2020]. 
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elected judges are required to undertake training composed of six modules of one or two days 
each within the first 20 months of their election to the bench.75 There is now a specific 
obligation to acquire relevant professional skills and education with a continuing requirement 
for further professional development. Failure to complete the requisite courses following 
election will deem the judge to have resigned from office.76 This differs from judges in the 
ordinary and civil courts, which require that an individual has completed a bachelor’s degree 
in law, requiring three years of legal studies; and a master’s degree in law for two years; and 
the completion of a competitive examination generally preceded by preparatory classes. 
Successful candidates can then be appointed as judges’ assistants, at which time they receive 
the same training given by the École Nationale de la Magistrature,77 which lasts for 31 months 
and is comprised of 27 months general training followed by a phase to prepare the judicial 
candidates for the positions they will undertake.78  
Spain 
Admission to careers in the Spanish judiciary is based on the principles of merit and ability. 
The selection process is objective and transparent, guaranteeing equal opportunity for 
everyone who meets the criteria and who has the necessary skills, professional competence 
and qualifications to serve as a judge.79 There are three ways to become a judge in Spain. First 
and probably most traditional, upon completion of a law degree, the candidate can pass a free 
public competitive examination followed by a theoretical and practical selection course at a 
judiciary school. The average preparation time for the examination tends to be around 3 to 
5 years. Then the candidate is required to spend a year at the Spanish Judicial School in 
Barcelona followed by a one-year internship in the jurisdiction in which they wish to practice. 
One can also come to judgeship if they are a legal professional with ‘renowned competence’ 
and 10 years of practice experience. The candidate would still have to complete a training 
course at the judicial school, after which they can apply for a merit-based appointment. 
Finally, a candidate can be a renowned legal professional with more than 15 years of legal 
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Austrian judges are required to complete a degree programme of at least 4 years in Austrian 
law, which is followed by practical experience as an intern in the courts. Internships last for 
four years and in principle can take place in a variety of legal environments, including of course 
district and regional courts. The practical experience concludes with a judicial office 
examination. After passing the exam, candidate judges can then apply for vacant permanent 
positions as judges. Appointments are made by the Federal President who delegates this task 
to the Federal Minister for Justice for most positions. Only Austrian nationals can be 
appointed judges.81 There are only 35-40 insolvency judges in Austria and these are usually 
drawn from experienced judges of the higher courts, such as Landesgerichte and 
Handelsgericht Wien. Once appointed, an insolvency judge usually stays in this position until 
retirement. There is no specific training for insolvency judges, but there is an annual seminar 
organised by the informal association of insolvency judges.82  
Germany  
Judges are required to undertake the same general legal education as all other regulated legal 
professions. The legal qualification, uniform for all legal professions, is acquired by passing 
two examinations with the first examination taking place after undergraduate university 
studies and the second exam after a state-organised practical training. The general criteria for 
judicial appointment are set out in the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). Professional 
competence is assessed with an emphasis on the examination results, while personal and 
social competences are assessed in interviews with appointment commissions or staff 
managers of the ministries of justice.83 New judges begin their career on probation, then after 
three to five years they become judicial officials for life.84 Insolvency judges are required to 
have special competences in insolvency, company and trade law and sufficient basic 
knowledge in labour, social and tax law, as well as in accounting.85 In practice, however, the 
huge number of about 185 insolvency courts in Germany results in many judges lacking such 
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competences. There are no specific continuing training rules for insolvency judges and in 
general, judges are not obliged to prove training.86 
The Netherlands 
To qualify as a judge in the Netherlands, a candidate must have both an undergraduate and 
master’s degree in Dutch law and at least two years of working experience outside of the 
judiciary. In addition, a candidate must be of irreproachable standing, have met the selection 
criteria of the National Selection Committee for Judges (Landelijke Selectiecommissie 
Rechters, LSR),87 and complete the initial training programme for trainee judges.88 The 
duration of the initial training program depends on the duration of the experience that the 
trainee judge has.89 For those with at least two and up to five years working experience, the 
training will take four years. For trainee judges with more experience, there is a shortened 
training period from 15 months to three years. In addition to the initial training program,90 
optional training is also available.91 This is particularly relevant since within the Dutch judiciary 
judges will usually switch to a different section of the court system about every 3-6 years. As 
such, there are no specialised insolvency judges in the Netherlands.92 However, with respect 
to the WHOA (the new Dutch restructuring process),93 a so-called ‘WHOA pool’ will be formed 
with eleven judges and eleven legal supporters (one for each district court) for building up 
‘knowhow’ and expertise on the operation and application of the WHOA within the Dutch 
judiciary. To this end, these judges and legal supporters will receive specific training. 
Furthermore, whereas professional standards provide a quality check for several areas of law, 
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In order to qualify to become a judge in Denmark, an LLM in law is a prerequisite, preceded 
by an undergraduate degree in law. In addition, a three-year internship as an attorney or 
within the courts is required. Judges must undertake an initial training programme of 11 
courses. Continuous training following appointment is available, but is not required.95 There 
are no specific training requirements for insolvency judges but all judges, including insolvency 
judges, are required to do a training programme,96 which includes a module on procedural 
insolvency law.97 
Romania 
In Romania, a judicial candidate must first hold an undergraduate and masters degree in law. 
They must then undertake a two-year National Institute of Magistracy Course and pass a final 
examination. It is also possible to apply directly for a judicial position, which is open to lawyers 
with five years of experience and who have passed the required exam. It has been observed 
that the experience qualification tends to be exceptional, with most appointments 
undertaking the 2-year magistracy course. This means that a majority of newly appointed 
judges in Romania do not have practical experience. The 2-year course is also comprised of a 
a 2-week internship in first instance courts, the prosecutor’s office, and the probation office. 
At the end of the first year, candidates must then undertake a 1-month internship at a lawyer’s 
office with additional hands-on experience during the second year.98  
Poland  
Judges in Poland must first have been admitted to a legal profession, which can be done in a 
number of ways. A candidate to the bar must have a master’s degree followed by bar training 
and a bar exam; have a master’s degree in law followed by five years professional experience 
and a bar exam; have a PhD in law followed by either the bar exam or three years of 
professional experience; or they must possess a high academic qualification in the legal 
sciences.99 Judicial training is managed by the National School of Judiciary and Prosecution in 
Krakow.100 A three year training course is required to become a judge, which includes 
attendance at lectures and working within the courts. After undergoing one year of training, 
the candidates then proceed to specialised training as a judge or public prosecutor for an 
additional 30 months. Finally, trainee judges serve internships as law clerks for 12 months. 
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There is also the possibility of switching from another legal profession; at present, however, 
this is strongly limited.101 There is no additional competency requirements for insolvency 
judges.102  
Ireland 
In Ireland, which along with Cyprus will be the only common law jurisdiction remaining in the 
EU post Brexit,103 judges are appointed to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court by the President of Ireland on the advice of the Government.104 A Judicial 
Appointments Advisory Board,105 established pursuant to the Courts and Court Officers Act 
1995 (as amended) and comprised of senior judges, the Attorney General, legal professionals 
and nominees from the Minister for Justice has the function of identifying ‘persons and 
informing the Government of the suitability of those persons for appointment to judicial 
office.’ To be appointed to the Circuit and District court benches, a candidate must be a 
practising barrister or solicitor with at least ten years’ experience whereas to be appointed to 
the High Court, the Court of Appeal, or the Supreme Court, a candidate must have at least 12 
years’ standing and have been practising continuously 2 years before the appointment.106  The 
reality is that judges in the Commercial Courts tend to have considerably more experience 
than that. The individual must be a qualified legal practitioner in order to obtain the practice 
experience necessary, which usually requires an undergraduate law degree and a professional 
qualification as either a solicitor qualified with the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland or a 
barrister qualified with the Honourable Society of the Kings Inns. In addition, the candidate 
must possess a sufficient ‘degree of competence and probity’ and must be ‘suitable on 
grounds of character and temperament.’107  
England and Wales 
Judges in the normal courts of England and Wales must be qualified legal practitioners, which 
requires an undergraduate law degree and qualification with the Law Society of England and 
Wales or qualification as a barrister. Following training, a candidate must have had at least 5 
or 7 years of post-qualification experience to be a judge.108 In terms of continuing training, 
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the Judicial College is directly responsible for training full (salaried) and part-time (fee-paid) 
judges in the courts in England and Wales, and for training judges and members of tribunals 
within the scope of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. An essential element of 
the philosophy of the Judicial College is that the training of judges, tribunals members, and 
magistrates is under judicial control and direction.109 
Conclusion 
Out of the examples from our contributing jurisdictions, there appears to be a wide range of 
requirements for post education training and apprenticeships to qualify as a judge. There is 
no specific training requirement to gain a judgeship in the Irish or English jurisdictions, 
however, given the interpretative role of the judiciary and the need for barristers and 
solicitors to understand, interpret and apply case law in their advisory and advocacy roles, the 
experience requirements mitigate this. With minimum ten-years-experience Irish 
practitioners will have been steeped in judicial interpretation and decision-making to a much 
higher degree than their civil law counterparts, though it is perhaps less satisfying that the 
English experience requirement is less than the Irish. Interpretation and experience is an 
important legal cultural aspect of the common law system that does not align with the judicial 
role in civil law systems.  
The differences among the civil law systems also seem significant, though there are a number 
of parallels. Most of the judgeships require education in law of either undergraduate or 
master’s level, though this depends on the legal education requirements generally in each 
jurisdiction. The length of training in terms of courses and internships vary from 8 days in 
France to 4 years court internship in Austria with a variety of course requirements and on the 
job training in between. French commercial judges are a particular anomaly, drawn from the 
business community and elected for fairly short periods of time. Though there is some logic 
in asking businesspeople to hear commercial cases, by comparison the training seems 
relatively limited. It is also interesting to note that it is among the newer Member States that 
some of the most stringent training and education requirements arise.  
Apart from France, all of the other civil jurisdictions interrogated provide a much higher level 
of training on the surface than either Ireland or the UK. While the difference in training is 
clearly connected to the differences in civil and common law and the fact that the 
interpretation and understanding of judicial decision-making is a part of the job of a common 
lawyer, without an understanding of that key legal culture difference, it would be easy to view 
the Irish and English judicial training as inadequate. In the JCOERE team’s experience, there is 
certainly some dissonance between many civil lawyers’ understanding of the common law 
system that has given them pause, particularly with regard to the interpretative obligation 
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that clarifies ambiguities in legislation and creates precedents that can be used habitually to 
determine things like fairness; this can be seen in the unfair prejudice test in Ireland, for 
example. 
4.7 Towards Resolving Challenges to Judicial Co-operation 
Political powers shift and, as has been evident over the last several years, this shift can be in 
a direction away from balancing political power and toward more authoritarian impulses. 
Where internal structures of a Member State are not developed or strong enough to resist 
such movements, the EU has tried to provide early warning systems and mechanisms to assist 
and recalibrate legal structures as noted in section 4.2 of this Chapter. The Commission needs 
a deep knowledge of Member State legal culture and systemic characteristics to be able to 
provide oversight on rule of law problems among the Member States and to identify warning 
signs that a problem is coming. Country-specific knowledge is essential to respond effectively 
to rule of law risks as these may arise in different guises in different countries due to the 
inherent differences among the 27 Member State legal cultures. Thus, a dialogue with 
Member State authorities and stakeholders is also essential.110 
A number of mechanisms have been developed to assist the EU in monitoring issues arising 
from rule of law and judicial independence problems. The Council of Europe has also 
developed The Rule of Law Checklist, intended to be a tool for assessing the Rule of Law from 
the viewpoint of its constitutional and legal structure, legislation in force, and existing case 
law. It aims at enabling objective, thorough, equal, and transparent assessment of the legal 
safeguards in place to protect the rule of law in a given jurisdiction.111 In addition, the 
European Judicial Training Network produced a publication in 2019 about perspectives on the 
rule of law from both practitioners and academics in the EU. Its objective is to increase 
knowledge and awareness of professional standards within the rule of law framework and 
strengthen the rule of law culture in the EU.112  
The European Semester and the Judicial Scoreboard have also been created to help develop 
country-specific knowledge relating to the rule of law, highlighting positive and negative 
trends in the judiciaries of the Member States.113 The Judicial Scoreboard offers Member 
States the opportunity to reflect on their own strengths and weaknesses with indicators on 
efficiency, quality, and independence of judiciaries.114 It also feeds into the Semester by 
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providing elements for assessing the quality independence and efficiency of national justice 
systems. The aim of the European Semester is to provide a framework within which economic 
policies can be coordinated across the EU, also covering the fight against corruption, effective 
justice systems, and reform of public administration.115 It provides country specific 
assessments carried out through a bilateral dialogue with national authorities and the 
stakeholders involved.116 However, it has been criticised for not being inclusive enough of 
social partners and that recommendations are not being implemented in a satisfactory 
manner in the Member States tasked with them.117 These tools could be further developed in 
order to explore how the challenges to harmonisation in this area can be further resolved.118  
In 2019, the Judicial Scoreboard assessed a number of qualities of Member State justice 
systems, including efficiency, quality standards, independence and training. Given the focus 
on independence and training in the foregoing sections, it is interesting to consider what the 
2019 Scoreboard showed. In terms of training, the 2019 Scoreboard demonstrated that most 
Member States provide continuous training in EU Law, the law of other Member States, and 
judgecraft, though most Member States continue to devote less time to judicial ethics overall. 
Notably and in contrast, Romania provides continuous training in judicial ethics to 80% of its 
judges, by far the highest proportion in that area among all of the other Member States.119 
While judgecraft is clearly important, as indicated by the high proportion of judges who 
receive continuous training in this area, for newer Member States that may have suffered 
from systemic corruption in the past, judicial ethics should likely form a reasonably high 
proportion of judicial training practices. Other newer Member States dealing with the 
challenges of governmental corruption do not devote near as much time to judicial ethics, as 
Romania in this context.  
A whole section of the Scoreboard is devoted to judicial independence. The findings in 2019 
show that judicial independence perceived among the general public is skewed in the negative 
toward newer Member States, with two notable exceptions in the bottom five (Spain and 
Italy). Most of the negative perceptions are based on interference or pressure from 
governments and politicians.120 Where perceptions were positive, this was usually noted as 
being due to the guarantees provided by the status and position of judges. There has been 
little change in the perception of either businesses or individuals in the independence of the 
 
115 EESC Opinion para 4.4.1. 
116European Commission, ‘The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard’ (Communication) COM (2019) 198/2 final. Retrieved from: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en> [Last accessed 13 June 
2020, 3.  
117 EESC Opinion para 4.4.2. 
118 2019 Communication 9 
119 European Commission, ‘The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard’ (Communication) COM (2019) 198/2 final. Retrieved from: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en> 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en> [Last accessed 13 June 
2020], 42 and figure 37.  
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judiciary among the Member States in terms of the ranking; however, there is a trend in a 
perception that independence has improved among the Member States that had been 
experiencing challenges over a four year period. Compared with the 2018 Scoreboard, 
however, the perception of judicial independence has decreased overall.121  
While the Scoreboard presents only the perceptions of individuals and businesses in relation 
to the relative success of their own Member States, it does give some indication as to how the 
main recipients of a justice systems’ services feel about the services they are receiving: the 
public. The perceived improvement among the Member States, which were facing challenges 
in the last four years, may show that the EU’s efforts to enhance the rule of law principles 
throughout all of the Member States, the mechanisms it has created, and the frameworks it 
has put in place have begun to make some impact on improving mutual trust, thereby creating 
an environment in which co-operation can occur more effectively. However, and as noted 
previously, legal and judicial culture will be difficult to change without serious structural 
adjustments where the differences are far from expectations within the EU legal framework. 
‘Knee-jerk’ legislative reactions often just transfer responsibility and power to a different 
institution. That said, the goal of judicial Europeanisation as part of the integration project of 
the EU is essential for its success if true mutual trust is to be established within the framework 
of the rule of law, allowing for effective co-operation between the courts of different Member 
States.  
4.8 Conclusion and Transition 
The EU, its institutions and associated organisations have clearly been busy implementing the 
2019 Communications’ frameworks and recommendations in the latter half of 2019. The 
efforts to gather knowledge and increase understanding are a step in the right direction in 
trying to create a true European judicial culture by challenging the deeply rooted 
presumptions within Member State legal cultures from which differences stem, making 
mutual trust more difficult to achieve, and thereby pushing effective co-operation in cross-
border matters further out of reach. 
This chapter has explored the rule of law within the framework of the EU and how it has been 
a focus of policy discussion and initiatives towards change, particularly in the last decade. 
These policies have promoted support for existing judicial training networks and for the 
introduction of training at national levels through organisations such as the European Judicial 
Training Network. While there has certainly been a move towards a closer relationship 
between EU judiciaries and a rise in the level of awareness of foundational principles, such as 
the rule of law, and associated principles such as judicial independence, this has not prevented 
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actions that have risked the integrity of the rule of law in the EU by some Member State 
governments.122 Legal culture, coupled with political forces, influence diverse approaches to 
similar problems. This is one important reason why enhancing harmonisation and co-
operation is vital to ensure the strength of the EU. The JCOERE Project is focussed on the 
integration of a particular aspect of market behaviour, namely the rescue of failing businesses 
and economic recovery in Europe, but nevertheless our findings and observations can be 
applied in other spheres. 
The next Chapter will discuss and analyse cases arising in the context of co-operation in cross-
border insolvency and rescue. The cases discussed in Chapter 5 will demonstrate the different 
approaches taken by practitioners and courts and how these will influence developments 





122 As noted in section 4.2 of this Chapter, both Poland and Hungary have been subject to notifications under the Rule of Law Framework. In 
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V. Chapter 5: Judicial Co-Operation in Restructuring Processes 
5.1 Judicial Co-Operation in Cross-Border Restructuring 
This Chapter follows on from the discussion in Chapter 3 summarising differences in approach 
to preventive restructuring in European Member States and on procedural obstacles to co-
operation, in addition to the discussion in Chapter 4 on different legal and judicial cultures in 
Europe. It will focus specifically on case law arising, either domestically in an EU Member State 
or in the CJEU, on co-operation in the context of insolvency, and on the emerging context of 
European corporate restructuring, in particular. The starting point, therefore, will be the EIR 
Recast Regulation,1 which imposes specific obligations on insolvency practitioners and courts 
to co-operate as described in section 2 of this Chapter, building on the detailed discussion 
conducted in Chapter 2. The Chapter will then move on to a consideration of recognition and 
co-operation in the context of restructuring in section 3. Section 4 considers what co-
operation might look like as application of these obligations increases together following the 
implementation of the PRD.2 Examples are derived from cross-border cases in other contexts, 
where instances of judicial co-operation and communication occurred, or where such an 
approach was proposed and where it did not occur. Case law will demonstrate different 
approaches by practitioners and courts, which will influence developments in the European 
Union over time. Finally, section 5 will consider some exceptional cases, which may cause 
difficulties for co-operation. 
5.2 Foundation of the European Approach: Recognition of Proceedings 
under the European Insolvency Regulation 2000 and the EIR Recast 2015 
The EIR Recast Regulation on Insolvency and its predecessor, the Insolvency Regulation,3 set 
out important rules regarding recognition of insolvency proceedings across the EU Member 
States and the enforcement of consequent judgements.  
 
1 Council Regulation (EU) 848/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) [2015] 
OJ L 141/19. [Hereinafter EIR Recast]. 
2 Council Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of 26 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and 
on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive 
(EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18. [Hereinafter “PRD”]. 





For many years following the enactment of the original Insolvency Regulation, the case law 
focussed on the important question of centre of main interest or COMI. COMI is determinative 
of the jurisdiction in which the main insolvency proceedings will begin and the litigation 
surrounding the issue has been well documented. The important point in the context of co-
operation, however, is that once COMI and seizure of proceedings is established, the opening 
of secondary or territorial proceedings (as local proceedings are described under the 
Regulation) is constrained.4 Despite somewhat rocky beginnings in cases such as Eurofood,5 
which will be discussed below, the principles on which COMI is determined are fairly well 
settled in subsequent decisions of the CJEU such as Interedil6 and followed in other cases such 
as Daisytek.7 For our purposes, the smooth operation of the recognition process is a 
cornerstone of further enhanced court and judicial co-operation as anticipated following the 
passing of the EIR Recast.8 As described below, there is, however, more to co-operation than 
simple recognition and the extent of the new co-operation obligations has yet to be explored. 
The Eurofood9 case, which was discussed in a different context in Chapter 3 of this Report, is 
relevant once again, albeit for a different reason. A further question had been referred to the 
ECJ by the Supreme Court of Ireland, namely whether there could be recognition for the 
principle of Irish law that the liquidation commences from the date of presentation of a 
petition to wind up a company where that petition is successful, as provided for in section 220 
of the Companies Act 1963.10 This question was considered by Advocate General Jacobs in his 
opinion, where he expressed the view that under the Regulation it is national law, which 
determines when a ‘judgment’ becomes effective. This matter was not considered by the ECJ 
in this case. However, subsequent cases have considered the issue. The lodgement of a 
request for the opening of insolvency proceedings, such as the presentation of a petition in 
the Central Office of the High Court, should have some consequence, even if this does not 
constitute the ‘opening of proceedings’. The ECJ has held that the lodging of a request for the 
opening of proceedings in a Member State has, at least, the effect of restricting the debtor’s 
freedom to move its centre of main interests; thus, the Member State where the request is 
lodged retains jurisdiction to determine the issue of COMI and whether to open main 
insolvency proceedings.11 Applying to a preventive restructuring process such as the Irish 
 
4 Regulation 1346/2000, Recitals 12, 17 and articles 3 and 27. EIR Recast, Recitals 23, 33, 38 and articles 3 and 34 – 40. 
5 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813. 
6 Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidation v Fallimento Interedil Srl and Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] ECR I-09915. 
7 Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd. [2004] BPIR 30. 
8 Council Regulation (EU) 848/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) [2015] 
OJ L 141/19. [Hereinafter EIR Recast] 
9 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813. 
10 Companies Act 1963, s 220 provides that once a winding-up order is made the liquidation shall be deemed to commence from the date 
the petition was presented. This concept of ‘relation back’ was later referred to as ‘heresy’ by the Italian authorities in the Supreme Court 
(Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd (No 2) [2006] IESC 41, [2006] 4 IR 307). 
11See also the decision of the Court of Justice in Case C-1/04 Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber [2006] ECR I-00701, where it was held that under 
art 3(1) the court of the Member State in which the centre of the debtor’s main interests was situated at the time when the debtor lodged 
the request to open insolvency proceedings retained jurisdiction to open those proceedings when the debtor moved the centre of his main 
interests to another Member State after lodging the request but before the proceedings were opened. See also, in the context of the 
presentation of a bankruptcy petition, Stojevic v Komercni Banka AS [2006] EWHC 3447 (Ch) [2007] BPIR 141 and Official Receiver v Eichler 
[2007] BPIR 1636. See also Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidation v Fallimento Interedil Srl and Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] ECR I-





Examinership, this would mean that the commencement of the stay, which is linked to the 
presentation of the petition, would receive pan-European recognition under the terms of the 
Regulation and that co-operation obligations would apply. 
In fact, the Eurofood12 case is a classic example of non-co-operation. Similarly, in recent times 
Irish courts have been inclined to support the repatriation of individual insolvent debtors, 
rather than allow the administration of the bankruptcy to take place in a neighbouring 
jurisdiction. In an academic context, this is described as a desire on the part of creditors to 
maintain ‘jurisdictional reach’ with the debtor.13 There is anecdotal evidence of informal co-
operation between practitioners in the UK and Republic of Ireland and there are provisions in 
the Irish Companies Act 2014, which allow a government Minister to make an order allowing 
for particular co-operation between Ireland and another state. There are similar provisions in 
the UK Insolvency Act 1986. These provisions were activated between Ireland and the UK until 
both countries’ accession to the EU. It is expected that post Brexit these provisions will be re-
activated.14 
5.2.1 Foundations of the European approach: The co-operation obligations 
The co-operation obligations contained in the EIR Recast were dealt with in detail in Chapter 
2, however, a brief restatement is useful for this Chapter. In short, the more recent iteration 
of the EU Insolvency Regulation in the EIR Recast introduces an enhanced co-operation 
regime.15 Articles 41-44 address co-operation obligations imposed on insolvency practitioners 
and courts respectively regarding a single insolvency proceeding concerning one company and 
articles 56-59 address similar co-operation obligations in the context of groups of companies. 
It is worth pointing out that the emphasis in the JCOERE Project is on the role of courts and 
the co-operation obligations imposed on them, rather than the obligations imposed on 
insolvency practitioners. For clarity though, it must be emphasised that article 41 imposes the 
obligation on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with each other in a single company 
situation and article 57 imposes a similar obligation in the context of corporate group 
proceedings. 16 
 
insolvency proceedings was lodged that is relevant for the purpose of determining the court having jurisdiction’ (para 55) (emphasis added). 
In that case, it was held that a debtor could change the place of its registered office before a request to open insolvency proceedings was 
lodged, and the presumption in art 3(1) would apply, but may not be determinative on the question of the location of the debtor’s centre of 
main interests.  
12 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-03813. 
13 ACC v McCann and Griffin [2012] IEHC 236; Irish Bank Resolution Corp Ltd v Quinn [2012] NICh. 1, [2012] B.C.C. 608; O’Donnell and Anor. v 
Bank of Ireland [2012] EWHC 3749. See Irene Lynch Fannon, ‘Bankruptcy Tourism in the UK: Why and How?' (2013) 26(6) Insolvency 
Intelligence 85 for a discussion of these cases. 
14 Chris Umfreville, Paul Omar, Heike Lücke, Irene Lynch Fannon, Michael Veder and Laura Carballo Piñeiro, ‘Recognition of UK Insolvency 
Proceedings Post-Brexit: The Impact of a ‘No Deal’ Scenario’’, (2018) 27 International Insolvency Review 422. 
15 See generally, Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2019). 
16 For a general commentary on these obligations see Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger in Moritz Brinkmann((ed), European 





The language of the relevant articles is important to note from the outset. The obligation to 
co-operate is addressed to the court and not to the judiciary, as such.17 The JCOERE Project, 
which reflects the policy of the EU Commission Justice Directorate General,18 focuses on the 
question of judicial co-operation. It remains to be seen whether the different language 
employed is significant. In other words, is the fact that the obligation is addressed to the court 
rather than to the judiciary potentially important? It would seem to be of considerable 
importance in relation to the legal consequences for non-compliance. As described in Chapter 
3 of this Report, questions of liability, for example, will pivot on the precise nature of the 
obligation. 
Article 42 makes it clear that the explicit co-operation provisions are linked to the question of 
recognition of proceedings as it states that the co-operation obligation is imposed ‘[i]n order 
to facilitate the co-ordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings 
concerning the same debtor (…)’. The article goes on to provide that any court dealing with a 
request to open proceedings or that has opened such proceedings, ‘shall co-operate with any 
other court’, which is similarly dealing with a request to open proceedings or which has 
opened proceedings. The article envisages that the co-operation obligation is subject to the 
compatibility with the ‘rules applicable to each of the proceedings.’ 19 
As we have stated, we expect that in the new European era of restructuring, some rules may 
be problematic for different courts as discussed in Chapter 3 of this Report. In some 
commentary, a wider view is taken of what is meant by ‘rules applicable to each of the 
proceedings’. The proposition is that ‘applicable rules’ will include a range of laws, including 
for example, the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 or the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC.20 It seems surprising that these two specific legal frameworks would be 
singled out, as naturally, there will be other relevant legal rules that are applicable. It is our 
view, of course, that the general legal framework will be applicable, but nevertheless our 
interpretation of the specific provision is that it is intended to apply to rules applicable to each 
of the insolvency proceedings covered by the EIR Recast. On the face of it, the obligation to 
co-operate is most likely to be interpreted with reference to specific rules applying to 
particular proceedings covered by the EIR Recast.21  
Article 42 goes on to provide some guidance as to how such co-operation might take place, 
including a provision that ‘an independent person or body’ acting on the court’s instructions 
 
17 PRD, art 42(1): ‘In order to facilitate the co-ordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings concerning the same 
debtor, a court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, shall cooperate 
with any other court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, to the extent 
that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings’ 
18 The JCOERE Project is funded under a call from DG Justice for projects concerning Judicial Co-Operation. It is not envisaged that the use of 
the term court as distinct from judge is significant but nevertheless the difference should be noted. 
19 See below for a discussion of what this might mean. 
20 Both of these provisions are specifically mentioned by Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European 
Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos 2019) 342. 





may be appointed, who may ‘communicate directly with, or request information or assistance 
directly’ from their counterpart in the second Member State.22 As outlined in Chapter 2 of this 
Report, article 42(3) instances particular examples of co-operation that might occur.23 Article 
43 then goes on to impose an obligation on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with courts. 
Interestingly, however, the language of article 43 focuses on the practitioners’ obligation in 
this regard and does not impose a correlated obligation on the court. 
Article 57 imposes a similarly worded obligation on courts to co-operate with each other in 
situations where ‘insolvency proceedings relate to two or more members of a group of 
companies’. Article 58 imposes an obligation, which is similarly worded to that in article 43, 
on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with courts in the same group context. In both 
contexts, articles 44 and 59 address costs but interestingly, somewhat different statements 
are made. Article 4424 states that costs will not be charged by courts against each other for 
such co-operation whereas in the group context, article 5925 states that costs of co-operation 
will apply to the respective proceedings. In short, the co-operation obligations are imposed 
on courts and practitioners insofar as such obligations to co-operate are not incompatible 
with substantive or procedural rules. The key questions posed by the JCOERE Project are how 
such co-operation obligations will operate in practice, particularly in the context of 
restructuring, and to what extent the substantive rules considered in Report 1 and the 
procedural rules considered in Chapter 3 of this Report will prevent co-operation. 
5.2.2 Foundations of the European approach: Some issues surrounding co-operation 
Our enquiry does not end there, rather there are additional questions of interest. We already 
know that there is more to co-operation than simple recognition of judgements. As the 
JCOERE Project progressed, a question has been raised in relation to the borderline between 
simple recognition issues, which have been played out in many cases, and the broader 
obligation now imposed under the EIR Recast regarding co-operation, both in relation to 
single debtor cases and group cases. This question is returned to in Section 5.4 of this Chapter.  
As the co-operation obligations are actually addressed to courts in the Member States, the 
question arises as to whether judges are personally obliged under the terms of the articles. 
According to Skauradszun, Spahinger and other commentators, under German law ‘a prompt 
rejection or non-response to a request of another court for cooperation…is now a breach of 
 
22 EIR Recast, Article 42(2). This communication must respect the procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality 
of information. The reference to ’an independent body or person’ reflects the UNCITRAL Model Law provisions described in Chapter 6. 
23 These are: (a) co-ordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners; (b) communication of information by any means considered 
appropriate by the court; (c) co-ordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; (d) co-ordination of the 
conduct of hearings; (e) co-ordination in the approval of protocols. 
24 EIR Recast, Article 44: ‘The requirements laid down in Articles 42 and 43 shall not result in courts charging costs to each other for 
cooperation and communication.’ 
25 EIR Recast, Article 59: ‘The costs of the cooperation and communication provided for in Articles 56 to 60 incurred by an insolvency 





duty.’26 These authors conclude that the imposition of liability for breach of this obligation 
will rely on the terms of national law. However, the idea that an obligation imposed on a court 
could result in personal liability for a judge or other officer of the court would certainly raise 
some complex issues in some domestic legal frameworks. It is clear that one cannot presume 
that the reference to a court explicitly refers to a particular judge, or other officer of the court. 
Furthermore, it cannot be presumed that an obligation imposed on a body, such as a court, 
imposes a specific obligation, which gives rise to liability on a judge or officer. 
A second interesting question in terms of legal consequences, as identified in Chapter 3 of this 
Report, is whether an alleged failure to co-operate can affect the validity of any claim, 
proceeding or other outcome in relation to insolvency proceedings generally. In other words 
what are the consequences if a party to an insolvency proceeding claims that either a court 
or an insolvency practitioner failed to comply with the co-operation obligations imposed in 
the EIR Recast? Is it even possible for a party to allege a failure to co-operate? 
Finally, as described, it is contemplated in the EIR Recast that a court may decide that 
particular rules, substantive or procedural, render the co-operation required or requested 
‘incompatible with the rules applicable to them’. In addition, the court may find that co-
operation may lead to a ‘conflict of interest.’ The question here is whether this decision by a 
court can be contested by a party to the proceedings. In other words, are the co-operation 
articles justiciable and if so, what is the proposed outcome? 
5.3 The European Approach: Developing an Obligation to Co-operate in 
Restructuring 
As described here and in Chapter 2 of this Report, the specific obligations imposed on courts 
to co-operate are newly introduced in articles 42 and article 57 (in a group context) and only 
applicable since 2017. Therefore, the fact that there are few cases arising in relation to these 
obligations may not be as significant as was thought at the outset. Instead, it may be simply a 
matter of time before issues come to the fore. Furthermore, restructuring is an even more 
recent concept in many European Member States following the passing of the PRD in June 
2019. That said, we have some examples of a broader duty to co-operate being considered by 
courts in a European context prior to the enactment of the EIR Recast. The idea of an 
obligation imposed on courts to co-operate, as being inherent in the obligations already 
imposed on practitioners to co-operate in the original EIR 2000, was mooted by some 
commentators and certainly raised in case law.27 
 
26 Dominik Skauradszun and Andreas Spahlinger in Moritz Brinkmann (ed), European Insolvency Regulation: Article by Article Commentary 
(Beck, Hart, Nomos 2019) 353. Reference is also made to Zipperer in Festscrhift fur Vallendar to support this view. However, it is not entirely 
clear to whom this duty is owed and by whom. It is clear that one cannot presume that the reference to a court explicitly implies reference 
to a particular judge, or other officer of the court. Even more so one cannot presume that an obligation imposed on a body such as a court 
imposes a specific obligation giving rise to liability on a judge or officer. 





In Nortel Networks SA,28 for example, the court had been asked to send letters to courts in 
other EU jurisdictions seeking assistance for the Joint Administrators of various companies in 
the Nortel group. Patten J observed that even though the obligation in the EIR 2000 was 
addressed to practitioners only, ‘the duty has been treated by the courts of Member States 
as incorporating or reflecting a wider obligation which extends to the courts which exercise 
control of insolvency procedures in their respective jurisdictions’.29 In so finding, he referred 
to Re Stojevic30 and cited the following passage from that decision, which states: 
Although the wording of Art 31 of the EU Insolvency Regulation only obliges the 
trustees in bankruptcy to cooperate, this also applies to the court according to the 
prevailing opinion and under the UNCITRAL model law.31 
Nevertheless, the obligation to co-operate was not as clearly described as it is now.  
5.3.1 Combining the EIR Recast and the new focus on restructuring 
In June 2019, the Preventive Restructuring Directive was passed. The terms of the PRD, insofar 
as it describes rules that are potentially problematic to co-operation, are described in detail 
in the first JCOERE Report. Chapters 6-8 of JCOERE Report 1 also describe plans for its 
implementation by a number of Member States. The responses by various Member States to 
the issues we have raised in relation to the PRD and restructuring generally is summarised in 
Chapter 3 of this Report. Zorzi and Stanghellini have made some observations regarding the 
interface, or indeed lack of complementarity, between the PRD and the EIR Recast.32 A key 
question that arises is whether the new restructuring processes adopted by Member States 
will be included in Annex A of the EIR Recast. The PRD provides Member States with the option 
of registering the processes under Annex A or not. This possibility is mentioned in Recital 1333 
and in Article 6 of the PRD, which concerns the imposition of a stay of enforcement 
proceedings.34 For example, statements in the final paragraph of article 6 are designed to limit 
the available stay under the PRD to 4 months where the rescue process is not notifiable under 
Annex A and where there has been a COMI shift in the preceding 3 months. If a Member State 
 
28 Re Nortel Networks SA & Ors [2009] EWHC 206 (Ch). 
29 ibid para 11. 
30 Stojevic v Komercni Banka AS [2006] EWHC 3447 (Ch) [2007] BPIR 141, quoting a decision of the Vienna Higher Regional Court (9 November 
2004, 28 R 225/04w). 
31 Patten J. also referred in Para 13 of his judgement to a similar observation made in the decision of the court in Graz in Re Collins & Aikman, 
Higher Regional Court of Graz, 20 October 2005, 3 R 149/05, reported in NZI 2006 vol 11 p.660. 
32 Lorenzo Stanghellini and Andrea Zorzi, ‘Coordinating the Prevent Restructuring Directive and the Recast European Insolvency Regulation’ 
(2019) Autumn Eurofenix 22. 
33 PRD, Recital 13: ‘This Directive should be without prejudice to the scope of Regulation (EU) 2015/848. It aims to be fully compatible with, 
and complementary to, that Regulation, by requiring Member States to put in place preventive restructuring procedures which comply with 
certain minimum principles of effectiveness. It does not change the approach taken in that Regulation of allowing Member States to maintain 
or introduce procedures which do not fulfil the condition of publicity for notification under Annex A to that Regulation. Although this 
Directive does not require that procedures within its scope fulfil all the conditions for notification under that Annex, it aims to facilitate the 
cross-border recognition of those procedures and the recognition and enforceability of judgments. 
34 PRD, Article 6: ‘Where Member States choose to implement this Directive by means of one or more procedures or measures which do not 
fulfil the conditions for notification under Annex A to Regulation (EU) 2015/848, the total duration of the stay under such procedures shall 
be limited to no more than four months if the centre of main interests of the debtor has been transferred from another Member State within 





chooses to implement the PRD by introducing a rescue or restructuring process that is not 
registered under Annex A of the EIR Recast, the obligations to co-operate quite simply do not 
arise. If, on the other hand the process is listed in Annex A, the obligations apply and then, 
and only then, do the questions around compatibility raised by the JCOERE Project arise. 
The significance of the fact that the PRD gives the choice of Annex A inclusion to Member 
States can be illustrated by comparing two existing restructuring processes. The first process, 
which has been already implemented by Ireland as a Member State is the Examinership 
procedure and the second restructuring process, which was used effectively in the UK both 
before and after the financial crisis and which was particularly popular during the Great 
Recession, is the Scheme of Arrangement. The former is listed in Annex A35 and therefore once 
an Examinership proceeding is opened in an Irish court, the recognition obligations, and the 
co-operation obligations under the EIR Recast will arise. In the gathering of the Judicial Wing 
at Copenhagen in September 2019, some members of the group regarded these facts as 
leading to an open and shut case of recognition.36 This would unquestionably guide the court 
in the second Member State when considering a request from another party to open 
secondary proceedings in that Member State. Such a party could be a local creditor wishing 
to commence an enforcement proceeding in a local court, which would be contrary to the 
stay that accompanies the opening of an Examinership in all cases under Irish law. These rules 
effectively give the Irish stay a pan-European effect. In addition, requests for co-operation will 
be similarly governed by the EIR Recast. 
A precursor to this situation is exemplified in the decision of the CJEU in MG Probud Gydnia37 
in which main insolvency proceedings had been opened in Poland. The company had a branch 
in Germany, carried on construction activities there and had assets situated there. On the 
application of the German customs office, a German court ordered the attachment of the 
company’s assets. Even though the attachment had been ordered under German law, under 
Polish law it was not possible to order attachment of assets in this way. The CJEU confirmed 
that the main proceedings opened in Poland had universal effect and encompassed all of the 
company’s assets including those situated in Germany. As a result, Polish law governed the 
treatment of assets, even though they were situated in another Member State. Thus, the 
German courts were precluded from ordering enforcement measures against the company’s 
assets situated in Germany, subject to the exceptions to Article 4 provided for in the EIR 
Recast, which did not apply in this case. On the other hand, if secondary proceedings had been 
 
35 As is the French sauvegarde procedure, the Italian procedure and the Spanish procedure which feature in our Reports. See JCOERE 
Consortium, Report 1: Identifying substantive and procedural rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including the Preventive 
Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations (JCOERE Project, 2019) 
<https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/>.  
36 Discussion at the INSOL Judicial Wing, INSOL European Annual Congress, held in Copenhagen, September 26th, 2019. 





opened in Germany, then German law would have applied and there would have been no 
difficulty in ordering attachment in respect of the assets situated in Germany.38 
In contrast, if the same situation arose under a UK Scheme of Arrangement, the EIR Recast 
would not apply, so debtors in a second Member State could proceed to open a second set of 
proceedings to counteract or disrupt the rescue being proposed under the Scheme of 
Arrangement. It is also worth noting that rescue processes like the UK Scheme of 
Arrangement, which are based in company law, are specifically excluded from the application 
of the EIR Recast under Recital 16,39 which states:  
This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to 
insolvency. However, proceedings that are based on general company law not 
designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on 
laws relating to insolvency. [emphasis added] 
This statement raises an interesting question as to whether restructuring processes designed 
by Member States, which comply with the terms of the PRD, may in fact be excluded from 
being registered in Annex A, regardless of the views of the Member State. The lack of clarity 
or complementarity between the EIR Recast and the PRD presents difficulties of classification 
of restructuring processes with consequent advantages and disadvantages, which will take 
some time to work out once the PRD has been implemented. For our purposes, the most 
important consequence would be that the court (or judicial) co-operation obligations found 
in the EIR Recast would not apply to these restructuring processes at all.  
Strangely, the EIR Recast itself addresses the question of restructuring in the provisions that 
are addressed to insolvency practitioners. Thus, Article 41(2)(b) states that in implementing 
the co-operation described in the first paragraph of the article insolvency practitioners should 
‘explore the possibility of restructuring of the debtor and, where such a probability exists, 
coordinate the elaboration and implementation of a restructuring plan’. A similar obligation 
is repeated in relation to the obligation imposed on insolvency practitioners in article 56 in 
the context of groups.40 
 
38 Note that article 46 of the EIR Recast provides that the court which opens secondary proceedings may itself order a stay on the process of 
realisation of assets in whole or in part ‘on receipt of a request from the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings’ but the 
Regulation goes on to provide that the court may require the insolvency practitioner in the main proceedings to take ‘suitable measures to 
guarantee the interests of the creditors in the secondary insolvency proceedings’. This does not smoothly interface with existing domestic 
law implementing the Directive such as the Irish Examinership process which allows for a general stay of realisation of all claims, without any 
guarantee or other protective obligations. This contradiction is part of the Regulation because it recognises the Examinership as a procedure 
in Annex A. 
39 EIR Recast, recital 16: ‘This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to insolvency. However, proceedings 
that are based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on laws 
relating to insolvency. Similarly, the purpose of adjustment of debt should not include specific proceedings in which debts of a natural person 
of very low income and very low asset value are written off, provided that this type of proceedings never makes provision for payment to 
creditors.’ 





In contrast, restructuring is not mentioned in relation to the obligation to co-operate imposed 
on courts in either Article 42 or 57. 
5.3.2 The classification of rescue as an insolvency proceeding  
The EIR Recast applies specifically to insolvency proceedings. However, the PRD, which refers 
to preventive restructuring processes, implies that the procedures must be processes where 
there has been no adjudication of insolvency. Nevertheless, the PRD does envisage that a 
company may be technically insolvent, simply not adjudicated to be insolvent. As discussed in 
the previous section, we are aware of preventive restructuring mechanisms, such as the Irish 
Examinership process and the French sauvegarde processes, which are already covered by the 
EIR Recast.41 We also know that certain kinds of restructuring proceedings, such as Schemes 
of Arrangement, are not included in Annex A of the EIR Recast. As discussed, such proceedings 
cannot, in fact, be included under the EIR Recast because they are derived from company law 
and therefore excluded per Recital 16.42 It is also possible that that some Member States may 
decide not to include restructuring processes implementing the PRD in Annex A. This means 
that the recognition and co-operation obligations included in the EIR Recast may or may not 
apply to restructuring processes introduced by Member States to implement the PRD. What 
is interesting and somewhat surprising is that this issue is left to the discretion of the Member 
States.43 
5.3.3 Rescue proceedings that are not included in the EIR Recast  
In the same vein, similar considerations apply to particular kinds of actions that may be 
utilised in domestic insolvency practise, but that do not fit neatly into the categorisation 
provided by the EIR Recast or the PRD. As described above, schemes of arrangement, which 
are found in English and Irish law, are examples of rescue processes based in company law, 
that cannot be included under the EIR Recast. Common law receiverships and similar 
enforcement actions arising from the enforcement of rights in rem are another. In some 
jurisdictions – but not in all – that possess receivership-type arrangements, whether these are 
limited to rights derived from securities on real property or otherwise,44 are viewed by 
practitioners as being part of the insolvency turnaround tool kit. This is the case in Ireland.45 
However, a common law receivership occurs without a formal adjudication of bankruptcy. All 
that happens is that the debtor decides a security or loan is in jeopardy and the receiver is 
 
41EIR Recast, Annex A, France. 
42 EIR Recast, Recital 1 states: ‘This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to insolvency. However, 
proceedings that are based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based 
on laws relating to insolvency.’ 
43 At some point during the last financial crisis the issue of whether UK Schemes of Arrangement ought to be included in the EIR Recast was 
considered as a debatable point by some academics in the UK See ILA Conference, London, 2015. However, the provisions of the EIR Recast 
2015 renders this debate a moot point as Schemes of Arrangement are considered to be derived from Company Law provisions. 
44 English Insolvency Act 1986 Part III (though the use of this procedure has been significantly limited since the passage of the Enterprise Act 
2002). See also, Irish Companies Act 2014, Part 8.  





appointed to protect the security or loan. The question as to the nature of a receivership arose 
in Re Stanford International Bank Ltd 46 in the context of the UNCITRAL Model Law in a similar 
set of circumstances that may occur under the EIR Recast.  
In Stanford International it was held that ‘the powers and duties conferred or imposed on the 
Receiver’ did not amount to a ‘foreign proceeding’ for the purposes of the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulations (implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law).47 Receiverships are not 
covered in these Regulation and will not be. In that sense there will be types of turnaround 
mechanisms that will not come within the remit of the EIR Recast or indeed be mechanisms 
implementing the PRD as such and will thus, be outside the European framework entirely. 
Again, these provisions underline the lack of complementarity between the PRD and the EIR 
Recast and indeed some inherent lack of coherence in the provisions of the Recast itself. 
5.4 Beyond Recognition to a Broader Understanding of Co-operation 48 
As described in the introduction to this Chapter, one of the distinctions at which the JCOERE 
Project has already arrived, is between recognition simpliciter of a decision to open 
proceedings or recognition of a judgement at the close of proceedings, on the one hand, and 
co-operation, which is ongoing throughout a process, in our case a restructuring process. 
Bearing in mind the difficult caveat generated by the lack of complementarity between the 
PRD and the EIR Recast, we will assume for these purposes that a number of restructuring 
processes will be included in the scope of the EIR Recast so that questions not only of 
recognition, but of ongoing further co-operation will arise. Omar have referred to examples 
of cases involving non-EU cross-border matters as exemplars of court-to-court co-operation 
relevant to the new provisions in the EIR Recast. However, on closer consideration of these 
cases, not all deal with questions of co-operation as distinct from questions regarding 
recognition. Our focus on co-operation in the EIR Recast goes further than mere recognition 
in reflection of the intended goals of the EIR Recast.  
To illustrate this distinction, the Irish Supreme Court decision in Re Flightlease49 concerns the 
question of whether a proceeding in a Swiss court will be recognised in the sense of 
enforcement of the decision in an Irish court. In answering this question, the court focussed 
on the nature of the proceedings and the question of whether this concerned the 
enforcement of a right in rem or a right in personam. This followed arguments made based on 
 
46 [2010] EWCA Civ 137. 
47 The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 no 1030 (UK) [hereinafter the ‘CBIR’]. 
48 Bob Wessels, ‘A Glimpse into the Future: Cross-Border Judicial Co-Operation in Insolvency Cases in the European Union’ (2015) 24(1) IIR 
97; Ian Fletcher, ‘Spreading the Gospel: The Mission of Insolvency Law and Insolvency Practitioners in the Early 21st Century’ in Stefania 
Barriati and Paul J Omar (eds), The Grand Project: Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation (INSOL Europe 2014) 193; Reinhard Bork 
and Renato Mangano, European Cross-Border Insolvency Law (OUP 2016). 





a decision of the Privy Council in in Cambridge Gas,50 which raised similar facts and where the 
court held that the particular enforcement action was an action in personam.  
In addition, the common law conflict of law principles recognising such judgements were also 
considered, as were the statements of the Privy Council in Cambridge Gas, which concerned 
further and additional observations regarding co-operation. In Flightlease, a resolution of this 
final discussion regarding the development of common law principles was not necessary for 
the court to decide, rather it confined itself to the more limited question of recognition, which 
it was decided was not required in relation to the Swiss decision.51 
The Cambridge Gas covered similar but broader territory with the decision addressing 
questions of recognition, but also questions of assistance, which for our purposes can be 
equated to the new European obligations to co-operate. As Lord Hoffman observed in his 
judgement, the entire circumstances in which Cambridge Gas sought to dispute the 
implementation of certain aspects of the Chapter 11 restructuring plan of the principle 
company Navigator Holdings plc (‘Navigator’) were peculiar in that no particular financial 
consequences arose for Cambridge Gas. Nevertheless, the Privy Council took the opportunity 
to deliver an important judgement regarding the common law and the principles that might 
be relevant to the courts of England and Wales in deciding whether to provide assistance to 
foreign bankruptcy proceedings. The focus is, therefore, on the provision of assistance to the 
ongoing conduct of an overseas insolvency proceeding (again similar to an obligation to co-
operate in the European framework). Lord Hoffman, citing Professor Fletcher, agreed that the 
common law on cross-border insolvency has for some time been ‘in a state of arrested 
development’,52 referring to both Regulation 1346/2000 and the fact that the UK gave effect 
to the UNCITRAL Model Law through a statutory instrument.53 Consequently, the principles 
at common law could be further developed.  
The court recognised that there was and is a distinction between questions of recognition by 
courts and the decisions of those courts, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the exercise 
by the Court of its ‘discretion to assist the foreign trustee by enabling him to obtain title to or 
otherwise deal with the property’. The latter question of assistance seems to be a more fluid 
concept. 
In describing these distinctions, the Privy Council then went on to discuss the effect of existing 
common law principles in the following terms: 
 
50 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26 [Hereinafter 
‘Cambridge Gas’]. 
51 Re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd (in Voluntary Liquidation) [2012] IESC 12. 
52 Ian Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999) 93. See also the observation of Jay Westbrook in 
‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum (1991) 65 Am Bankr L J 457, at p 457, that US courts and 
academic theorists have ‘failed utterly’ in addressing the needs of cross-border corporations facing insolvency and cross-border defaults. 




the underlying principle of universality is of equal application and this is given effect 
by recognising the person who is empowered under the foreign bankruptcy law to 
act on behalf of the insolvent company as entitled to do so in England. In addition, as 
Innes CJ said in the Transvaal case of Re African Farms 1906 TS 373, 377, in which an 
English company with assets in the Transvaal had been voluntarily wound up in 
England, ‘recognition carries with it the active assistance of the court’. 54 
Following further consideration of the current principles at common law, the Privy Council 
concluded in Cambridge Gas that the relevant court in the Isle of Man, which had originally 
been asked for assistance in implementing some aspects of a previously agreed restructuring 
plan under a Chapter 11 proceedings, had the discretion to assist the trustee in the Chapter 
11 proceedings in New York. This obligation was separate from the issue of recognition per 
se. 
In the decision of the Privy Council in the Singularis55 litigation, the common law powers to 
assist the operation of a foreign court were further considered in the context of a liquidation, 
which occurred in the Cayman Islands. The appointed liquidators had made a request to the 
court in the Cayman Islands ordering the auditors of the company (PwC) to disclose 
information and in the course of this litigation sought similar orders from the court in 
Bermuda, again with a view to assisting the liquidators in tracing assets that they felt at the 
time existed. The order was eventually denied by the Bermuda Supreme Court and this was 
appealed to the Privy Council, which summarised the questions to be considered as follows: 
The first is whether the Bermuda court has a common law power to assist a foreign 
liquidation by ordering the production of information (in oral or documentary form), 
in circumstances where (i) the Bermuda court has no power to wind up an overseas 
company such as Singularis and (ii) its statutory power to order the production of 
information is limited to cases where the company has been wound up in Bermuda. 
The second issue is whether, if such a power exists, it is exercisable in circumstances 
where an equivalent order could not have been made by the court in which the foreign 
liquidation is proceeding.56 
The Privy Council had this to say in relation to the earlier decision in Cambridge Gas: 
It has proved to be a controversial decision. So far as it held that the domestic court 
had jurisdiction over the parties simply by virtue of its power to assist, [emphasis 
added] it was subjected to fierce academic criticism and held by a majority of the 
Supreme Court to be wrong in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236. So far as it held 
that the domestic court had a common law power to assist the foreign court by doing 
whatever it could have done in a domestic insolvency, its authority is weakened by the 
absence of any explanation of whence this common law power came and by the direct 
rejection of that proposition by the Judicial Committee in Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA 
 
54 Cambridge Gas [20] (Hoffman LJ). 
55 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda) [2015] AC 1675, [2014] UKPC 36 [Hereinafter Singularis]. 





[2005] 2 AC 333, a case cited in argument in Cambridge Gas but not in the advice of 
the Board.57  
In making these distinctions, which lead to the conclusion that the question of assistance in 
a particular proceeding is separate from the question of recognition and enforcement of an 
actual judgement, the question then becomes one of whether recognition is a precondition 
to assistance. In European terms, can the co-operation obligations (analogous to assistance) 
be treated separately from recognition issues? Is it possible that assistance may be given to a 
particular process without involving the question of recognition of a final judgement? 
If this is the case, it might lead us to suppose that in relation to restructuring in particular, 
assistance in the ongoing process of preventive restructuring might allow for a court to assist 
in the imposition of a stay imposed at the outset of a process, without the question of 
recognition of the process in the fullest sense of the word being assumed, particularly if the 
second Member State has implemented the PRD in an entirely different manner from that in 
the first Member State. If this second Member State implements the PRD through the 
adoption of a process that varies considerably from the process in the first Member State, 
would the enforcement of a pan-European stay simply amount to co-operation (assistance at 
common law), without obliging the second Member State to enforce a court order or 
judgement arising from the restructuring, which may include a cram-down on the interests of 
creditors in the second Member State? 
5.4.1 The nature of the action: Enforcing rights or a collective bankruptcy 
proceeding? 
In Cambridge Gas, as with Flightlease, the significance of whether the creditors’ claim was a 
right in rem or a right in personam were also at issue. In the former decision, the distinction 
was considered important in terms of recognition of the creditors’ claim against the insolvent 
estate. Key points regarding this development are that both corporate and personal 
insolvency proceedings involve a set of legal principles, which are not encompassed by the 
question of whether a particular action involves the enforcement of rights in rem or rights in 
personam. The distinction rests on the fact that: 
Judgments in rem and in personam are judicial determinations of the existence of 
rights: in the one case, rights over property and in the other, rights against a person. 
When a judgment in rem or in personam is recognised by a foreign court, it is accepted 
as establishing the right which it purports to have determined, without further inquiry 
into the grounds upon which it did so. The judgment itself is treated as the source of 
the right. 
 
57 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda) [2015] AC 1675, [2014] UKPC 36 [18-20]; Re HIH Casualty and General 
Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, and by Lord Collins (with whom Lord Walker and Lord Sumption agreed) in Rubin v Eurofinance SA and others 





The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, is not to determine or 
establish the existence of rights, but to provide a mechanism of collective execution 
against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or 
established. That mechanism may vary in its details.58 
This distinction is important; recognition of a court order in a bankruptcy proceeding relates 
to the proceeding itself. In contrast, recognition of other claims, whether these are claims in 
rem or in personam, involves a recognition of a right. The court in Cambridge Gas emphasises 
that there is a difference in the effect of recognition from the second court. This distinction is 
expressed further in case law such as Feniks and BNP Paribas referred to below, which also 
distinguishes particular causes of action arising in national laws from an insolvency 
proceeding, even where these causes of action were pursued in the context of insolvency 
proceedings. 
Finally, the Privy Council refers constantly to the provision of information as a form of 
assistance, which can be correlated to the statements in Article 42(3) described above. Noting 
that the obligation to assist may be more fluid in some ways, but stops short of recognition of 
a court order, the question remains as to whether this power of assistance is actually limited 
to the provision of information? It is also noteworthy that the Privy Council did not think the 
court was under a common law duty to assist in this particular case. 
In this vein of distinguishing a particular cause of action from the recognition of and assistance 
with an insolvency proceeding as such, in another decision made at around the same time, 
the court in Re Phoenix59 considered issues surrounding the enforcement of applications in 
the UK by office holders in a second jurisdiction. In this case a German administrator was 
recognised in the UK as having the capacity to act with the powers of an insolvency office 
holder under the Insolvency Act 198660 in the UK. The German administrator then applied 
under the Insolvency Act 1986 to have certain transactions set aside as being fraudulent 
against creditors and to claw back sums invested and fictitious profits under what had been 
deemed a Ponzi scheme. The facts rested upon the common law principles used to determine 
whether the court had an inherent jurisdiction to permit the statutory power under section 
423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to allow a foreign administrator to use those powers.61 This 
decision rests upon the issue of assistance rather than the recognition of a particular process.  
The elements of what might be involved are nicely summarised in the judgement of the Privy 
Council in Singularis by Lord Collins with reference to previous case law in this area. The 
elements are as follows: 62  
 
58 Cambridge Gas [13-14] (Hoffman LJ).  
59 Re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH, Schmitt v Deichmann [2012] EWHC 62 (Ch), [2013] Ch 61. [Hereinafter ‘Re Phoenix’]. 
60 Insolvency Act 1986, s 423. 
61 Re Phoenix.  




First, there is a principle of the common law that the court has the power to 
recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings.  
Second, that power is primarily exercised through the existing powers of the court.  
Third, those powers can be extended or developed from existing powers through the 
traditional judicial law-making techniques of the common law.  
Fourth, the very limited application of legislation by analogy does not allow the 
judiciary to extend the scope of insolvency legislation to cases where it does not 
apply. 63 
Fifth, in consequence, those powers do not extend to the application, by analogy ‘as 
if’ the foreign insolvency were a domestic insolvency, of statutory powers which do 
not actually apply in the instant case.64 
5.4.2 Specific actions, rules and exceptions to co-operation in an insolvency and 
restructuring context 
In the case law of the European Union and decisions of the CJEU, the issue of what amounts 
to a proceeding for the purposes of recognition and the purposes of the co-operation 
obligations has been litigated recently. In the following two cases, the CJEU held that the 
relevant proceedings, although connected to the main insolvency proceedings in terms of 
settlement of certain issues, were separate from the insolvency as such and therefore could 
proceed without incurring the recognition obligations under the regulation. A fortiori these 
sorts of proceedings would also not therefore attract the obligations to co-operate under the 
Regulation. 
In NK (liquidator) v BNP Paribas Fortis NV,65 money had been transferred to Fortis bank prior 
to insolvency proceedings concerning Gerechtsdeurwaarderskantoor BV. This was a company 
governed by Dutch law, of which PI (‘PI.BV’) was the sole shareholder who had subsequently 
been declared bankrupt. It was found that this particular transfer amounted to an act of 
embezzlement, which had resulted in the imprisonment of the individual involved. During the 
insolvency proceedings conducted in the Netherlands, proceedings were brought against the 
bank. Under Dutch law, the liquidator can bring an action in tort against a bank to repay 
money where the money has been paid at a disadvantage to other creditors: - ‘Peeters- 
Gatzen-vordering (PGV).66 In Dutch law, this is an action in tort, which can be brought by an 
individual creditor, liquidator, and/or anyone affected. The defendant bank, Paribas Fortis, 
 
63 This is a particularly important observation for common law countries in terms of how the EIR Recast is applied. Similar principles may 
apply in civil law systems. It is important to note that in France and Italy as examples, the implementation of the EIR Recast also includes 
rules regarding the conduct of recognition and co-operation obligations. 
64 This would mean that where there are differences in domestic legislation between the common law jurisdiction in which the application 
for assistance is made and the primary jurisdiction, the existence of an ongoing process in the primary jurisdiction would not in and of itself 
allow for the application of principles existing in that legal framework in the secondary common law court. In this case the transactional 
avoidance provisions are a case in point.  
65 Case C-535/17 NK v BNP Paribas Fortis NV [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:96. 




said it was a tort claim and therefore should be brought in Belgium against the defendant. In 
contrast, the Dutch liquidator argued that this was a claim normally brought by a liquidator 
and therefore the Dutch court had jurisdiction over all of the insolvency related matters. CJEU 
found to the contrary. It decided that just because the liquidator brings the particular claim, 
it does not mean it is an insolvency procedure. It is still a tort and because individual creditors 
can bring the claim, the Belgian court could have jurisdiction. The PGV is covered by the 
concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of article 1(1) Judgement 
Regulation:67 
The Court has held that only actions which derive directly from insolvency proceedings 
or which are closely connected with them are excluded from the scope of the Brussels 
Convention and, subsequently, Regulation No 44/2001…68  
The court went on to state that:  
the same criterion, as stated in the Court’s case-law on the interpretation of the 
Brussels Convention, was set out in recital 6 of Regulation No 1346/2000 in order to 
delimit the subject matter of that regulation, and was confirmed by Regulation (EU) 
2015/848 on insolvency proceedings…69 
An important statement in the judgement is that: 
[the decisive criterion adopted by the Court to identify the area within which an action 
falls is not the procedural context [author’s emphasis] of which that action is part, but 
the legal basis of the action. According to that approach, it must be determined 
whether the right or obligation which forms…the action has its source in the ordinary 
rules of civil and commercial law or in derogating rules specific to insolvency 
proceedings.70 
More significantly, the decision in Feniks sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL71 also 
addresses this issue in relation to an important transactional avoidance action. In this case, 
Feniks was a creditor of Coliseum, which was a general contractor with whom Feniks had an 
investment agreement regarding a construction project in Poland. Coliseum was technically 
insolvent, in that it was unable to pay subcontractors, but proceedings had not yet been 
 
67 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L 351/1. 
68 The court referred to the following judgments at paragraph 26: Case C-133/78 Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:49, 
paragraph 4, and Case C‑213/10 F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’ [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:215, paragraphs 22 and 24, and 
Case C-641/16 Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau GmbH v Expert France [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:847, paragraph 19 and the case-law 
cited therein. 
69 NK v BNP Paribas Fortis NV [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:96, para 27. 
70 Case C‑157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v ‘Kintra’ UAB [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2145, Paragraph 27 and 28; Case C-641/16 Tünkers 
France and Tünkers Maschinenbau GmbH v Expert France [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:847, paragraph 22; Case C-649/16 Peter Valach and Others 
v Waldviertler Sparkasse Bank AG and Others [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:986, paragraph 29. 
71 Case C-337/17 Feniks Sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:805. I wish to acknowledge the lecture provided by 
Lucas Kortmann RESOR at the EIRC Conference, hosted by hosted by German Arbeitsgemeinschaft Insolvenzrecht und Sanierung with INSOL 
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opened. Coliseum sold property in Poland to Azteca (Spain) in partial fulfilment of prior claims 
by Azteca. This transaction would normally be subject to some sort of clawback action. Under 
Polish law any creditor – not just an insolvency practitioner or appointed liquidator – can bring 
a claw back action. Feniks, as a creditor of Coliseum, brought a claw back action against Azteca 
before the Polish court to clawback the value of the transaction on the basis of article 7(1)(a) 
of the Judgments Regulation. Azteca argued that the correct forum was the Spanish court. 
The question for the CJEU was whether an actio pauliana is covered by the rule of 
international jurisdiction provided for in article 7(1)(a) Judgments Regulation.72 The response 
from the CJEU was that an actio pauliana, which is based on the creditor’s rights created upon 
the conclusion of a contract, falls within ‘matters relating to a contract’ of article 7(1)(a) 
Judgments Regulation. Therefore, the action is separate from the insolvency per se and is not 
subject to the recognition or co-operation obligations in the EIR Recast. In terms of the 
interface between the EIR Recast and these provisions of the Judgements Regulation, there is 
a lack of certainty and clarity as to the borderline between insolvency matters and other 
causes of actions.73  It is also important to recognise that these cases were argued under the 
original European Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 and so the addition of the provisions of 
Article 6 to the EIR Recast may have an effect on possible outcomes of similar arguments 
made in cases after 2015. This provision states in Article 6(1) that  ” The courts of the Member 
State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened in accordance 
with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from the insolvency 
proceedings and is closely linked with them, such as avoidance actions.” and goes on to 
amplify this issue in further sub sections. There has been no case law to date on this issue 
under the EIR Recast. However, commentary on a later decision of the CJEU in Wiemer & 
Trachte GmBH vZhan Oved Tadzher asserts a liquidator’s right to choose between different 
jurisdictions ’when it comes to bringing actions to protect the interests of the creditors’ and 
it is further argued that this situation should be maintained despite the provisions of Article 6 
of the EIR Recast. The argument is made the view that Article 6 of the EIR Recast leads to a 
’conclusion of exclusive jurisdiction’ shoulde be rejected as limiting the ’options of the 
insolvency practitioner unduly’.74 
5.4.3 The invocation of exceptional rules  
Some interesting cases have illustrated that it might be possible for particular rules to be 
invoked to prevent full co-operation. The rule in Gibbs seems to be one such example; this 
states that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a ‘foreign’ 
 
72 Such an action is where a person entitled to a debt repayment (ie a creditor) requests that an act, whereby his debtor has transferred an 
asset to a third party, which is detrimental to his rights, be declared ineffective, also described as an avoidance action. 
73 Case C-337/17 Feniks Sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:805 [44]. 
74 See Case C-296/17 Wiemer &Trachte GmbH v Zhan Oved Tadzher and the commentary on this case from Ganeve et al in Eurofenix Spring 





insolvency proceeding.75 The rule has been heavily criticised, with  commentators76 arguing 
that it is not relevant in modern day cross-border insolvency proceedings following the 
continuing trend towards recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings (and their effects). 
However, in a recent English decision77 the court considered an application by a foreign 
representative to the English court on behalf of a debtor, International Bank of Azerbaijan, for 
a permanent stay on a creditors' enforcement of claims in England under a contract governed 
by English law, contrary to the terms of the foreign insolvency proceeding. The foreign 
proceedings were conducted in Azerbaijan and had been recognised in England under the 
CBIR. The English High Court found that the rule in Gibbs did apply to prevent the court 
granting a permanent (or indefinite) stay on the enforcement of creditors' English law 
governed contractual claims. Any stay granted by the court would be more than simply 
procedural and would go to the substance of creditors' claims. The court would, in effect, be 
ordering the discharge of the creditor's claim and was prohibited from doing this, following 
the rule in Gibbs.  
In a European context, by analogy, leaving aside the issue of the UK specifically, the question 
would quite simply be whether the rule in Gibbs, or a rule of this kind, would be a rule 
incompatible with the recognition of, and co-operation with, a restructuring process 
introduced in another Member State, where this process is registered in Annex A. Following 
the decision in BakishiyevaI, there was a view that the recognition and co-operation 
obligations under the EIR Recast would supersede the invocation of a rule such as the rule in 
Gibbs. In fact, in Bank of Baroda v Maniar78 it has been held by the English courts (in a case 
concerning an Irish Examinership) that the EIR effectively bypasses the Gibbs rule in cases 
where there is recognition of insolvency proceedings under the EIR. However, it is not entirely 
clear how different treatment of different proceedings in different jurisdictions could 
justifiably lead to different outcomes. The relatively recently created Model Law on Insolvency 
Related Judgments (2018), not as yet implemented in the UK, would similarly supersede the 
Gibbs rule.  
5.4.4 The public policy exception in the EIR Recast 
The EIR Recast does provide for the court to decide that an insolvency process in another 
jurisdiction may not be recognised for public policy reasons, specifically if recognition of such 
proceedings are contrary to public policy. In the European context, a decision of this kind was 
made by the Irish High Court in ACC Bank plc v McCann in which a set of proceedings were 
brought by the ACC Bank against Sean McCann. Mr McCann had also been involved in 
property development in Ireland. The case in hand concerned his application for a personal 
 
75 Antony Gibbs and sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399. [Hereinafter Gibbs]. 
76 K Ramesh, ‘The Gibbs Principle: A Tether on the Feet of Good Forum Shopping’ (2017) 29 SAcLJ 42, 54, Judge Martin Glenn of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court: Southern District of New York in the Agrokar Decision was also critical. See in contrast Madaus S: ’The Rule in Gibbs 
or How to Protect a Local Debt from Foreign Discharge Oxford Law Blog 18 December 2018. Rule in Gibbs, or How to Protect Local Debt  
77 Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC 59 (Ch) [Hereinafter Bakishiyeva].  




bankruptcy order in Northern Ireland and the efforts of his main creditor to have that order 
annulled. In a decision in the Irish High Court, Dunne J upheld the creditor’s argument based 
on article 26 of the EIR Recast, which provides for the annulment of proceedings on public 
policy grounds. In upholding the creditor’s challenge, which focussed on the fact that the 
nature and timing of the application to Northern Ireland had negated the creditor’s right to 
be heard and could potentially prejudice the particular creditor’s rights in significant ways 
regarding priority of payment, the proposed recognition of the bankruptcy adjudication in 
Northern Ireland was declined as being contrary to public policy within the terms of article 
26. In the circumstances of the case and in granting the order not to recognise the personal 
bankruptcy proceedings in Northern Ireland, Dunne J stated:  
Suffice it to say I think that this is one of the exceptional and rare cases in which the 
court should, for the reason I have already outlined, namely the fact that ACC did not 
have an opportunity to be heard in Northern Ireland on the question of COMI bearing 
in mind that they will be significantly prejudiced by that fact it is my view appropriate 
in this case to make an adjudication. 79 
This case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, but the appeal has been withdrawn.80  
5.5 Conclusion and Transition 
The foregoing Chapter has focused on cases that have centred on an issue of cross-border 
cooperation within the EU in the area of cross-border restructuring and insolvency. Although 
the EIR Recast has only been applicable for the last three years at the time of writing, the 
cases discussed in this Chapter have shown what could occur in the EU when restructuring 
procedures falling under the EIR Recast begin to come before Member State courts and the 
CJEU and how these issues may develop in the EU over time, including where difficulties may 
arise. The discussion in this Chapter also provides an insight into the eventuality that there 
may be competing procedures under the PRD and what this could mean for court-to-court co-
operation generally or under the EIR Recast.  
The next Chapter will present a thematic discussion of the various guidelines and 
recommendations that provide direction in relation to co-operation and co-ordination of 
cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. Chapter 6 will discuss a number of different 
sets of guidelines and recommendations, focusing on their approaches to the sharing or 
obtaining of information and disclosure requirements; asset co-ordination; the mechanism of 
co-operation and communication methodology; and the notification and service of official 
documents. Chapter 6 will therefore extract issues that are relevant to court-to-court co-
 
79 Please note these statements are from the transcript of the proceedings in the High Court. There is no approved judgement to date. See 
further reports at RTE Business, ‘Judge puts stay on Sean McCann bankruptcy case’ RTE News (Dublin, 21 August 2012) < 
https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2012/0821/334442-judge-puts-stay-on-sean-mccann-bankruptcy-case/> [Accessed July 11, 2013]. 
80 See also Re Zetta Jet Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 16. Under article 6 of the Singapore Model Law, to which article 17 is subject, a Singapore court 
may refuse recognition if such recognition would be ‘contrary’ to the public policy of Singapore. Article 6 of the Model Law on the other 




operation, focusing on how these issues may arise in the context of restructuring (preventive 
or otherwise), and explain what tools are already available to assist judges in the fulfilment of 






The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  
Copyright © 2020 
 
 
The content of this document represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility.  
The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 
This project (no. 800807) is funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020). 
 
 
VI. Chapter 6: Survey of Frameworks and Best-Practice Guidelines for 
Judicial Cooperation 
6.1 Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, there have been a number of initiatives aimed at enhancing cross 
border insolvency law with the aim of enhancing the performance of economic and financial 
systems. These include formal frameworks such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border 
Insolvency and less formal guidelines and principles covering both substantive and procedural 
matters, including aspects of cooperation between courts and insolvency professionals. Some 
of these initiatives have been led by international organisations such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the American Law Institute (2000 and subsequent 
publication in 2012).   
Against the backdrop of the relatively newly imposed obligations created by the EIR Recast, 
described in Chapter 2 of this Report, this Chapter explores some of these reports and 
guidelines, which have either focused solely on judicial cooperation in matters of cross-border 
insolvency or, which have included this matter in a broader context.1 The purpose of this 
Chapter is to extract the issues identified in these principles, guidelines, and 
recommendations that are relevant to court-to-court cooperation in cases of cross-border 
preventive restructuring. It will be divided into four areas addressing the following aspects of 
judicial cooperation in the cross-border insolvency context: a) the sharing or obtaining of 
information and disclosure requirements (section 6.2); b) asset coordination (section 6.3); c) 
cooperation and communication methodology (section 6.4) and, finally, d) the mechanism of 
notification or service of official documents (section 6.5). 
The ‘principles’, ‘standards of good practice’ and ‘recommendations’ that will be analysed in 
this Chapter will be abbreviated as follows: 
- The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (‘Model Law’);2 
- The ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases (‘ALI-III 
 
1 Thanks to Paul Omar, Technical Research Officer of INSOL Europe for preliminary work on collating these documents.  
2 ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’ (United Nations 2014) (hereinafter referred 






- The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes 
(‘World Bank Principles’);4 
- The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles and Guidelines 
(‘JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’);5 
- The European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border 
Insolvency (‘CoCo Guidelines’);6 
- The European Law Institute Project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (‘ELI 
Report’).7 
 
While projects such as CODIRE8 and ACURIA9 undoubtedly have recommendations or aspects 
that are relevant to cross-border cooperation, that relevance is perhaps less direct than the 
other guidelines or mechanisms, which are clearly aimed at encouraging, improving or 
facilitating cooperation in cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases. In a similar vein, 
although the Asian Development Bank Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law may affect 
an EU Member State involved in a cross-border matter, those standards are not applicable if 
the states involved in the matter are within the EU. Consequently, it was felt that such 
guidelines and projects should be dealt with in an annex, rather than as a part of this 
Chapter.10  
6.2 The Sharing or Obtaining of Information and Disclosure Requirements 
As highlighted in JCOERE Report 1 and in this Report, the availability of complete information 
is vital in the context of cross-border insolvency coordination and cooperation – both between 
courts and between courts and insolvency practitioners. Information relevant to such cases 
includes the status of the procedure opened in a foreign country, the number and quality of 
the debtor’s assets, its liabilities and, in general, data that may help foreign  creditors and 
their representatives to interact effectively with each other and with the courts of the main 
and secondary proceedings.11 To this end, various international institutions have developed 
principles and best practices that offer guidance to legislators, judges, insolvency 
 
3 ‘ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases’ (International Insolvency Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred to 
as the ALI-III Global Principles). publications of principles and recommendations from a variety of global or territorial organisations between 
2000 and 2006.  
4 ‘Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’ (World Bank 2011) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘World Bank Principles’). 
5 ‘EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles’ (Tri Leiden, University of Leiden, and Nottingham Law School 2014) 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’). 
6 Bob Wessels and Miguel Virgos, ‘European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency’ (INSOL Europe 
Academic Wing 2007) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CoCo Guidelines’). 
7 Bob Wessels, Stephan Madaus, and Gert-Jan Boon, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (European Law Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘ELI Report’). 
8 ‘Contractualised distress resolution in the shadow of the law: Effective judicial review and oversight of insolvency and pre-insolvency 
proceedings’ 
9 ‘Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best practices, blockages and ways of improvement’. 
10 See ‘Annex III: Chapter 6 - Additional Guidelines’. 
11 Antonio Leandro ‘Amending the European insolvency regulation to strengthen main proceedings’ (2014) 2 Rivista di diritto internazionale 





practitioners, and parties involved in cross-border cases, in order to create a common ground 
- primarily stemming from shared information - on which they can build effective cooperation. 
6.2.1 The Model Law: The sharing of information between courts and cooperation 
Internationally, perhaps the most important instrument in the context of cross-border 
insolvency regulation is the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1997.12 It is distinct from other 
documents discussed in this Chapter in the sense that it is not a series of guidelines, but 
instead a ‘soft law’ legal instrument, the purpose of which is to supply a model of ‘effective 
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency’ designed with a view to 
implementation into domestic law by signatory states. The Preamble describes the purposes 
of the Model law as ensuring: 
(a) cooperation between the courts and other authorities involved in cases of cross-
border insolvency; 
(b) greater legal certainty both for trade and investment; 
(c) efficient and fair management of cross-border insolvencies, which should protect 
the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor; 
(d) protection and value maximization of the debtor’s assets; and finally,  
(e) support to the rescue of financially troubled businesses.13 
In this sense, the UNCITRAL Model Law can be understood as an instrument of harmonisation 
of national insolvency legislation.14 In the European context, each individual Member State 
may be a signatory to the Model law. At present, however, there are only a handful of 
Member State signatories, including Poland, Slovenia, Greece, and Romania. Although the 
United Kingdom signed a number of years before Brexit, it may have done so with a move 
towards ‘a global Britain’ in mind given that other signatories include the United States, 
Australia, and Japan.15 There are questions over the relevance of the Model Law if both or all 
states involved in the cross-border insolvency are members of the EU, as in such 
circumstances, the EIR Recast would be the applicable instrument. In reality, the main 
relevance of the Model Law is to a situation where one of the parties is based outside the EU 
and both are signatories. Nevertheless, the Model Law has informed European developments 
as many of the concepts are similar. 
 
12 Alberto Mazzoni ‘Procedure concorsuali e standards internazionali: norme e principi di fonte Uncitral e Banca Mondiale’, (2018) 45(1) Giur. 
Comm 43. 
13 See UNCITRAL Model Law, Preamble 3. 
14 See Reinhard Bork and Renato Mangano, European Cross-Border Insolvency Law (OUP 2016)10. see also United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (UK 2014) 9-13. 
15 Interestingly Ireland has also considered enacting the Model Law. See further Company Law Review Group, Report on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross Border Insolvency (Company Law Review Group, November 2018). Available from: <http://www.clrg.org/publications/ > [Last 





Amongst other aims, the UNCITRAL Model Law addresses the ability of courts to grant foreign 
stakeholders access to documents and information on the same basis of domestic 
stakeholders, as well as to permit another jurisdiction to take principal charge in the 
administration of an insolvency process, including reorganisation.16 
The main features of UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency relevant to the 
provision of information are: 
a) Article 9 which provides for a right of direct access to the courts of an enacting State, 
to be granted to foreign representatives. This feature reduces, by a considerable 
amount, the time and costs necessary to communicate between foreign jurisdictions. 
b) Article 15 providing for simplified procedures to recognise foreign proceedings, 
complementing the presumption that the documents submitted for recognition are 
authentic (see Article 16):  
c) Article 25 which includes a requirement of cooperation and direct communication 
between courts and insolvency practitioners.  This feature - above all - aims to reduce 
the obstacles to court-to-court cooperation (see below section 6.4.1), providing that 
the court ‘shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or 
foreign representatives’, either directly or through a delegate. It must be noted that 
cooperation is not linked to recognition of the foreign proceeding, and can occur at 
an early stage and before the recognition takes place.17 This mirrors the discussion 
regarding distinctions between assistance and recognition in Chapter 3 of this Report. 
Another fundamental document related to the provision of information under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law is the UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, which 
was adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 1 July 2009.18 
Its purpose is to ‘provide information for practitioners and judges on practical aspects of 
cooperation and communication in cross-border insolvency cases’ with a focus on cases that 
involve insolvency proceedings in multiple countries.19 
The main obstacles to cooperation and coordination between courts is identified by the 
UNCITRAL Practice Guide as twofold: 
- the absence of a relevant legislative framework, and 
 
16 See UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Co-operation, p. 10. 
17 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (UN, 2014), p. 30-31; Carlo Vellani, L’approccio giurisdizionale all’insolvenza transfrontaliera, (Milano, Dott A Giuffre' 
Editore, 2006), at 61. 
18 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation (UN, 2009). [Hereinafter 
‘UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation’]. 





-  uncertainty with regard to the scope of the legislative authorisation to pursue 
cooperation with foreign judges.20 
While the Practice Guide acknowledges that the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for such a 
framework, it also points out that the Model Law does not specify how cooperation and 
communication can be achieved. 
However, the second part of Article 25 provides that ‘the court is entitled to communicate 
directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign 
representatives’. The wording of this provision, which imposes a broad duty on the cross-
border insolvency actors to cooperate (and that will be examined in more detail below), shows 
how a consistent and complete stream of information between courts (and their 
representatives) is fundamental in order to ensure an effective coordination and cooperation 
and maximise efficiency in cross-border insolvency cases.21 
The JCOERE Report has questioned the willingness of courts to communicate directly with 
each other without intermediary intervention. 
An interesting example is provided in Article 18 of the Model Law which regulates  
‘subsequent’ information that must be provided after the filing of the application for 
recognition of the foreign proceeding. Article 18 provides that the foreign representative must 
inform the court without any delay of: 
(…) any substantial change with regard to the status of the recognised foreign 
proceeding, the status of the foreign representative’s appointment and (...) any other 
foreign proceeding regarding the same debtor that becomes known to the foreign 
representative.  
6.2.2 The ALI-III Global Principles: Disclosure duties and sharing of information 
The ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases of 2012 
(hereinafter, also, ‘Global Principles’) is the result of a study commissioned by the American 
Law Institute (ALI) and the International Insolvency Institute (III). It includes some relevant 
principles that aim to drive the cooperation and the sharing of information between 
insolvency practitioners and between courts and insolvency practitioners. 
• Principle 9, Point 1, of the Global Principles requires full disclosure in cross-border 
insolvency matters, by providing that the cooperation between the courts and 
insolvency practitioners ‘should include prompt and full disclosure regarding all 
 
20 UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Co-operation, p. 15. 
21 Felicity Deane and Rosalind Mason, ‘The UNCITRAL model law on cross-border insolvency and the rule of law’ (2016) 25(2) International 
Insolvency Review 138-159.; Stefania Bariatti and Giorgio Conso, ‘Il Regolamento (UE) 2015/848 del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio del 




relevant information, including assets and claims (…)’. Such disclosure should also 
help, pursuant to Principle 9, to promote transparency and reduce fraud. 
• Principle 9 also specifically refers to cooperation amongst insolvency practitioners, by 
providing that they should give all the other insolvency practitioners involved in the 
case ‘prompt and full disclosure about the existence and status of the insolvency 
proceedings in which they have been appointed’. The required disclosure covers all 
the relevant aspects of the proceeding. 
• Finally, the last point of Principle 9 provides that the insolvency practitioners should 
also share and communicate non-public information, in other words information that 
is not freely available on public fora,22 to the other insolvency practitioners, while also 
respecting the applicable law and potential confidentiality arrangements. 
• Principle 33 of the Global Principles further explores the duty of insolvency 
practitioners with respect to information exchange; it provides that insolvency 
practitioners in parallel proceedings ‘should make prompt and full disclosure to each 
other on a continuing basis of all relevant information they have’ and that, such 
information, should include - as a minimum - a list of all claims and claimants, with 
detail of their ranking and status. 
6.2.3 The World Bank Principles: Access to information about the Debtor 
In 2011, the World Bank drafted its own Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor/Debtor Regimes. This document, which does not directly address cooperation duties 
in a cross-border insolvency, stresses the importance of the access of all the relevant parties 
to information concerning insolvency proceedings. For this reason, Point D4 provides that an 
insolvency framework should be based on both transparency and accountability.  
To this end, the World Banks provides that the rules of the relevant framework ‘should ensure 
ready access to relevant court records, court hearings, debtor and financial data, and other 
public information’.23 Interestingly, in contrast to the ALI-III Global Principles, the World Bank 
Principles do not include non-public information in the list of suggested data to be shared. In 
terms of communication, Principle C17.2 provides that the law should allow domestic courts 
to communicate directly with foreign courts and their representatives and, in particular, to 
request information from them.24 Such a provision should contribute to reducing the delays 




22 This understanding of non-public information has been derived from Guideline 7.5 of the CoCo Guidelines, 51. 
23 It is worth noting that the same approach was adopted by the Principles of European Insolvency Law of 2003 that requires, pursuant to 
Point 1.4, to attribute appropriate publicity to the insolvency proceeding. 




6.2.4 The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: Disclosure and harmonisation of the 
proceedings 
The communication of information, as described by the EU JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines 
(2014), produced by the Leiden Law School and the Nottingham Law School, refers to the 
exchange of information, mainly by electronic means, between actors in different jurisdictions 
as the basis for coordination and cooperation in parallel proceedings. With regard to court-
to-court communication, Guideline n. 3 of the EU JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines provides 
that a court may communicate with another court about matters related to the proceedings 
‘for the purposes of coordinating and harmonising proceedings before it with those in the 
other jurisdiction’. This Guideline also specifies that, before disclosing the information, the 
court should obtain the consent of all the affected parties. Additionally, JudgeCo Guideline n. 
4 allows the courts involved to communicate with the insolvency practitioners of another 
jurisdiction for the same purpose, provided that the court obtained the consent of the parties 
involved in advance, as specified in Guideline n. 3. 
As can be seen from these provisions, the guidelines regulating the sharing of information pay 
particular attention to the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding. The acknowledged 
need for protective measures when courts and insolvency practitioners communicate will be 
explained in more detail below. This need led to the development, within the guidelines and 
best practices analysed in this Chapter, of precautions that aim to reduce the procedural steps 
– and therefore association costs – required to disclose information and, more generally, to 
communicate, while protecting the rights of those participating to the insolvency 
proceeding.25 
6.2.5 The CoCo Guidelines: The right to obtain information in a cross-border 
insolvency scenario  
Another fundamental source of guidance with regards to court-to-court co-operation are the 
European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency (CoCo 
Guidelines) of 2007. In the words of one of its authors, its aim was:  
[T]o provide some substantial and procedural guidance to those practitioners, struggling 
to communicate and coordinate main and secondary insolvency proceedings in the 
context of the EU Insolvency Regulation.26  
As a result, strictly speaking, it is not overtly addressed to courts. 
Guideline n. 7 refers to the information that the insolvency practitioners (liquidators) are 
required to disclose to all the other insolvency practitioners involved, ‘including all relevant 
 
25 See below, section 6.4.3. 
26 Bob Wessels, ‘Full Text CoCo Guidelines’ (2 August 2016) < https://bobwessels.nl/blog/2016-08-doc2-full-text-coco-guidelines/>. [Last 




information about the existence and status of the insolvency proceedings in which they have 
been appointed’. This requirement, which imposes a duty on insolvency practitioners to also 
inform the courts involved, is periodical. The same Guideline provides that a foreign 
insolvency practitioner should be allowed ‘to use all legal methods to obtain information that 
would be available to a creditor or to a liquidator in any national insolvency proceedings’ to 
enhance, as far as possible, the right to obtain information in a cross-border insolvency 
scenario. Finally, similar to the ALI-III Global Principles, non-public information is included; 
Guideline n. 7 provides that such information should be shared by the other insolvency 
practitioners ‘subject to appropriate confidentiality arrangements to the extent that this is 
commercially and practically sensible’.27 The key concept seems to be that commercially 
sensitive information is not shared unnecessarily. 
6.3 Asset Coordination 
In order to ensure effective coordination in a cross-border insolvency case, it is necessary to 
regulate the treatment of the debtor’s assets in all jurisdictions, so that the actions of one 
creditor or group of creditors against the debtor’s estate do not frustrate the efforts to 
restructure the debtor’s business or maximise its value in a liquidation.28 In this respect, 
coordination is also required to allow the courts and insolvency practitioners of the parallel 
proceedings to act in concert and, therefore, to avoid adopting measures or plans that are 
incompatible with the main or other proceedings.29 For this reason, the relevant international 
institutions address this issue and provide guidelines and best practices that deal with the 
rules concerning the treatment of debtor’s assets in situations that involve foreign, parallel 
proceedings. 
Given that the focus of the JCOERE project is on the operation of a stay amongst the crucial 
elements of a restructuring process, how the obligations regarding asset coordination 
compliment the operation of what would in fact be a pan-European stay, if co-operation 
occurred, is of interest. 
6.3.1 The Model Law: Stay on individual actions and relief 
Article 29 of the Model Law provides that in cases where one or more foreign proceedings 
concerning the same debtor are taking place concurrently, the court must seek cooperation 
and coordination. This express duty to coordinate imposed on courts by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law is primarily aimed at protecting the debtor’s assets during the proceeding. In fact, 
pursuant to Article 20 – which regulates the effects of the recognition of the foreign main 
proceeding – after the recognition of the main proceeding, ‘the commencement or 
 
27 See the European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency (CoCo Guidelines), Section 1, 9. 
28 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Andrew T Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies’ (1999) 42 J L & Econ 775; Luciano 
Panzani, ‘La disciplina della crisi di gruppo tra proposte di riforma e modelli internazionali’ (2016) 38(10) Il fallimento e le altre procedure 
concorsuali 1153. 
29 Stefania Bariatti and Giorgio Conso, ‘Il Regolamento (UE) 2015/848 del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio del 20 maggio 2015 relativo 




continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, 
rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed’. In addition, pursuant to Article 20(a)(b), the 
enforcement against the debtor’s assets must be stayed while the right to dispose of the 
assets of the debtor must be suspended. As stated above, this is of particular relevance to 
restructuring proceedings in view of the importance of the stay to their success.  
Article 21 of the Model Law provides that the court can grant relief, upon recognition of a 
foreign proceeding (whether main or secondary), if it is ‘necessary to protect the assets of the 
debtor or the interests of the creditors’. This last provision responds to the need for flexibility 
of the rules regarding the treatment of debtor’s assets; it requires that the courts and their 
representatives coordinate their actions, in order to avoid granting relief on assets that are 
necessary for the ‘global’ reorganisation or liquidation of the debtor’s business.  
6.3.2 The ALI-III Global Principles: Coordination and value maximisation 
Principle 8 Global Principles of 2012, which regulates the stay of individual enforcement 
actions in cross-border insolvency cases, provides that effective cooperation in this field might 
require ‘a stay or moratorium at the earliest possible time in each state where the debtor has 
assets or where litigation is pending’. Tempering this, Principle 8 also requires that the 
moratorium imposes ‘reasonable restraints’ both on the debtor and creditors and the other 
parties involved. 
In line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, the second paragraph of Principle 8 provides the 
following rule on relief: ‘if the local law does not provide an effective procedure for obtaining 
relief from the stay or moratorium, then a court should exercise its discretion to provide such 
relief where appropriate.’ The Global Principles recognise the problem of too wide a discretion 
in this regard that, as articulated above, might frustrate the reorganisation/liquidation efforts. 
Therefore, this requires that the exceptions to the stay must be limited and clearly defined. 
Principle 17 pertains to the stay and moratorium in a subsequent stage of the cross-border 
insolvency scenario and provides that, when a court recognises a foreign insolvency 
proceeding as main proceeding, it should ‘promptly grant a stay or moratorium prohibiting 
the unauthorised disposition of the debtor’s assets and restraining actions by creditors’. With 
respect to reorganisation cases, Principle 17 provides that the stay should allow the 
continuation of the debtor’s business. To this end, a protective approach towards the activity 
of the business is incorporated in one of the crucial points of the insolvency law: the stay on 
creditors’ actions. Principle 18 regulates the harmonisation of the stays and moratorium in 
parallel proceedings by providing that ‘each court should minimise conflicts between the 
applicable stays or moratoriums’ and, therefore, such courts should actively coordinate their 
actions. 
It must be emphasised, however, that as described in Chapter 5 of this Report, where a 
process such as the Irish Examinership or the Dutch WHOA is registered under Annex A of the 




relevance of soft law guidance is limited. The remaining questions will concern the 
cooperation on administration of assets against the backdrop of a stay on enforcement 
actions. 
The Global Principles also consider coordination between insolvency practitioners; Principle 
27 provides that when there are parallel proceedings – if that were to occur under the EIR as 
secondary or territorial proceedings – ‘each insolvency administrator should obtain court 
approval of an action affecting assets or operations in that forum if required by local law’. The 
second paragraph of Principle 27 expands such coordination duties, by requiring the 
insolvency practitioners involved to pursue ‘prior agreement from any other insolvency 
administrator as to matters that concern proceedings or assets in that administrator’s 
jurisdiction’, with the sole exception of emergency circumstances that would make it 
unreasonable to do so. 
Finally, Principle 29 of the Global Principles provides, in relation to cross-border sales, that 
when assets are to be sold in a situation where there are parallel proceedings ‘courts, 
insolvency administrators, the debtor and other parties should cooperate in order to obtain 
the maximum aggregate value for the assets of the debtor as a whole, across national 
borders’. Principle 29 also provides that the courts involved should approve sales that will 
maximise the value obtainable from the debtor’s assets. 
6.3.3 The World Bank Principles: Stay of actions to ensure higher recovery 
Arguably, the World Bank Principles also broadly align with the international standards and 
best practices in this area; Point C5.1 provides that during the period that goes from the filing 
of the application to the rendering of the court’s decision, ‘provisional relief or measures 
should be granted when necessary to protect the debtor’s assets and the interests of 
stakeholders’ and that the relevant parties must be notified. Point C5.2 pertains to the 
unauthorised disposition of the debtor’s assets; this should be prohibited after the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings, while actions by creditors to enforce their rights 
against the debtor’s assets should be suspended. On the scope of the stay, the World Bank 
Principles provide that it should be ‘as wide and all-encompassing as possible extending to an 
interest in assets used, occupied, or in the possession of the debtor’. This provision is in line 
with the Good Practice Standard 5.4 of the Asian Development Bank.30 Finally, point C5.3 
pertains to secured creditors and their actions; it provides that ‘a stay of actions by secured 
creditors also should be imposed in liquidation proceedings to enable higher recovery of 
assets by sale of the entire business or its productive units, and in reorganisation proceedings 
where the collateral is needed for the reorganisation.’ 
In doing so, the World Bank requires ‘a proper balance’ be reached between the creditor’s 
protection and the objective of maximising the value of the insolvency proceeding, both 
 




restructuring and non-restructuring. It is worth noting, as articulated above, that the World 
Bank Principles also expressly recognise the importance of coordination with respect to 
secured creditors in order to ensure the success of a future reorganisation. The EIR Recast, by 
contrast, does not; it provides that the opening of insolvency proceedings must not affect the 
rights in rem of creditors (and third parties) in relation to assets situated within the territory 
of another Member State. This lack of coordination with regard to secured creditors, as 
already noted in Report 1 of the JCOERE Project, may causes serious problems, particularly in 
preventive restructuring, and endanger any effort to restructure a viable business given the 
potential for differential treatment of secured creditors in the Member State of primary 
proceedings and those in other Member States.31  
6.3.4 The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: Moratorium and agreement from 
other insolvency practitioners 
The JudgeCo Principles deal with the treatment of the debtor’s assets in cross-border 
insolvency cases under Principle 8. This Principle provides that ‘insolvency cooperation may 
require a stay or moratorium at the earliest possible time in each State where the debtor has 
assets’ or if there is a litigation related to the debtor’s assets. That said, Principle 8 also 
provides that the constraints on the parties must be reasonable and that the exception to the 
stay and the moratorium should be limited and, above all else, well defined. In this regard, 
Principle 19 of the JudgeCo Principles considers the duties of the insolvency practitioners 
involved. It provides that, in case of parallel proceedings, the insolvency practitioners involved 
‘should obtain court approval for any action affecting assets or operations in that forum if 
required by local law’, with the sole exception of a different provision contained in the 
protocol (if present). 
The second paragraph of Principle 19 requires, in any case, that the above-mentioned 
insolvency practitioners ‘seek prior agreement from any other insolvency practitioner in 
relation to matters concerning proceedings or assets in that practitioner’s jurisdiction’. That 
said, seeking a prior agreement is not required in case of emergency circumstances, which 
would render such requirement unreasonable. Accordingly, it can be suggested that the 
combination these of Principles points to the need for a balance between the required 
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6.3.5 The CoCo Guidelines: Asset coordination and cooperation between insolvency 
practitioners 
The CoCo Guidelines consider the need for coordination when dealing with the debtor’s assets 
and regulating cooperation between insolvency practitioners (liquidators). In fact, Guideline 
12, paragraph 2, requires the insolvency practitioners involved to minimise the conflicts 
between the different procedures and in particular, to maximise ‘the prospects for the 
rehabilitation and reorganisation of the debtor’s business or the value of the debtor’s assets 
subject to realisation’ if reorganisation is not feasible. This provision is of considerable interest 
due to the fact that it directly links the assets’ value maximisation to an effective coordination 
and cooperation between the professionals involved in the different procedures. 
Guideline 13 governs the treatment of the debtor’s assets in cross-border insolvency 
situations where a cross-border sale of debtor’s assets is concerned. Guideline 13 provides 
that every insolvency practitioner should seek to sell these assets ‘in cooperation with the 
other liquidators so as to realise the maximum value for the assets of the debtor as a whole’. 
In connection to this cooperation duty, Guideline 13 provides that if required to act, the courts 
involved approve such value maximising sales. 
6.3.6. The ELI Report: The need for a coordinated strategy  
The European Law Institute Business Rescue Report (2017), which is the result of the 
collaboration between the University of Leiden and the Martin Luther University of Halle-
Wittenberg, also addresses the need for coordination between parallel proceedings in a cross-
border insolvency case. With specific regard to the insolvency of a group of companies, 
Recommendation 9.02 of the ELI Report provides that courts, when deciding on the opening 
of insolvency proceedings concerning a member of a corporate group, ‘should verify whether 
a coordinated strategy is being considered for some or all of the members of the group’. This 
provision highlights the widely recognised importance of a coordination strategy where 
different proceedings are concerned and requires the court to verify such a requirement when 
deciding on a request to open insolvency proceedings.33 
6.4 The Mechanism of Cooperation and Communication 
Most of the best practices and guidelines considered thus far stress the importance of 
cooperation between courts, between insolvency practitioners and between courts and 
insolvency practitioners. Cooperation between the main actors of the insolvency proceedings 
is recognised as the fundamental means to achieve a value maximising reorganisation or 
 
33 Stephan Madaus, ‘Insolvency Proceedings for Corporate Groups under the New Insolvency Regulation’ (2015) 6 International Insolvency 
Law Review 235; S Chandra Mohan ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?’ (2012) 21(3) International 
Insolvency Review 199. See also Chapter 2 of this Report for a discussion of the motivating factors behind the addition of provisions relating 





liquidation.34 It is also key to ensuring efficiency. For this reason, some interesting provisions 
pertain to the mechanism by which courts and insolvency practitioners can engage in dialogue 
and coordinate their actions. 
As can be seen from the provisions that follow and as evident from the coverage of the EIR 
and the EIR Recast in the previous chapters of this Report, cooperation and communication 
are intrinsically connected.35 Consequently, when regulating the mechanism of cooperation, 
the various guidelines and principles also deal with methods of communication that courts 
and insolvency practitioners should adopt. Therefore, in order to provide a full picture, 
cooperation and communication provisions will be addressed together. 
6.4.1. The Model Law: Cooperation and agreements concerning the coordination of 
proceedings 
As anticipated at the beginning of this Chapter, one of the key elements of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency is its focus on cooperation between courts and 
insolvency practitioners. Article 25 requires that courts cooperate to the maximum extent 
possible, both with foreign courts and with foreign representatives. The cooperation required 
by Article 25 can occur either directly or through an intermediary. That said, in order to 
simplify this duty, Article 25 provides that the courts are ‘entitled to communicate directly 
with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign 
representative’. A similar requirement is placed on insolvency practitioners involved in a 
cross-border insolvency proceeding in that they must cooperate to the maximum extent 
possible, both with foreign courts and foreign representatives (Article 26). 
Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law lists some possible means that can be used by courts 
and insolvency practitioners to implement these cooperation requirements. Under Article 27, 
cooperation can predominantly be achieved by means of the appointment of ‘a person or 
body to act at the direction of the court’ and the ‘implementation by courts of agreements 
concerning the coordination of proceedings’. In the same article, the following additional 
means of achieving cooperation are listed: the use of communication considered 
‘appropriate’ by the court; the enhancement of coordination when administering the debtor’s 
assets; and ‘coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the same debtor’. This idea of 
‘an independent person’ is reflected in the EIR and also discussed in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
In fact, this was a method which seemed attractive to members of the judiciary at the second 
meeting held with the INSOL Judicial Wing in September 2020. 
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It is worth noting that these points are rather general and do not clarify how, specifically, the 
actors in the insolvency proceeding should implement the required cooperation. Though also 
mentioned in the EIR Recast, it is not entirely clear what office or function the independent 
person would occupy. Would this be a clerk of the court? Or perhaps a third insolvency 
practitioner? The added value of these provisions is perhaps a harmonisation of the approach 
taken by the insolvency actors, when required to cooperate.36 At least the added cost is 
addressed in the EIR Recast.37 Most importantly it is not at all clear that these proposals would 
be acceptable in reality or as a matter of procedural law by either professionals working on 
any particular reorganisation or any of the courts involved in a cross-border insolvency. As 
discussed in Chapter 8 and 9, it would seem that courts, meaning judges, are resistant to 
imposed rules or guidelines in relation to the procedures or protocols which they adopt. This 
is also illustrated by the cases discussed in Chapter 4. 
6.4.2 The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: Communication and precautions 
The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines address the issues of ensuring cooperation between 
courts and of avoiding potential conflicts with the procedural rights of parties within the 
countries in which the insolvency proceedings are opened. In this last regard, the major issues 
seem to involve the fundamental right of the parties to ‘equality of arms’ set forth by Principle 
6 and the requirement, found in many European jurisdictions, to publicly administer 
insolvency procedures and, more generally, justice. When communicating and exchanging 
information, courts and insolvency practitioners may be viewed as violating the above-
mentioned right, as the requirement of publicity might not be respected. This could happen 
especially in those situations where the insolvency’s actors might discuss urgent matters 
informally.38 
Guidelines 7 and 8 of the JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines provide an effective solution to 
the potential obstacles identified above. Guideline 7 – entitled ‘method of communication’ – 
revolves around the need for the courts involved to ‘provid(e) advance notice to counsel for 
affected parties’ when communicating with each other,39 thereby allowing them to have 
complete knowledge of the documentary situation and to act on an informed basis. Guideline 
8 – entitled ‘court-to-court e-communication’ – gives guidance ‘in the event of a 
communication between the courts (…) by means of a telephone or video conference call or 
other electronic means’, mainly by requiring that counsel for the parties be allowed to 
participate; that the communications be recorded or transcribed; and that a time and place 
for communication be set that satisfies both courts. 
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There is a view that these measures, as a whole, should overcome any domestic, procedural 
requirement put in place to protect the effective participation of the parties of an insolvency 
procedure, which may represent the major obstacle to full and integrated cooperation 
between courts of different Member States.40 However, as we note in Chapter 3 of this 
Report, some constitutional provisions require a broader concept of publicity than one 
confined just to the parties. It is acknowledged that generally the public have a right to know 
of legal proceedings. Moreover, the nature of insolvency proceedings are such that other 
stakeholders, not necessarily parties per se, have an interest in the outcome. 
6.4.3 ALI-III Global Principles: The need for informal ways to communicate and 
cooperate 
The Global Principles address cooperation by highlighting the potential and increasing role of 
protocols and agreements in enhancing effective cooperation between courts and insolvency 
practitioners.41 Indeed, having provided that the insolvency practitioners involved in cross-
border cases should cooperate in every respect of the case, Principle 26 specifies that ‘the use 
of an agreement or “protocol” should be considered to promote the orderly, effective, 
efficient and timely administration of the cases’. Principle 26, paragraph 2, then clarifies 
fundamental issues that should be addressed in the aforementioned protocols, such as the 
coordination of requests for court approvals of decisions and actions and of communication 
with the creditors and the other parties involved.  
It is worth noting that the Global Principles also recognise the need for faster and less formal 
ways to communicate and accordingly provide that the protocols should envisage ‘timesaving 
procedures’ in order to avoid ‘unnecessary and costly court hearings and other proceedings’. 
If we combine this provision with the ‘protective measures’ of the JudgeCo Guidelines 7 and 
8 mentioned above, it is possible to outline a framework where courts and insolvency 
practitioners can effectively and legitimately use a less formal tool or process to 
communicate, exchange information and cooperate. This hypothetical framework can 
become relevant especially if we consider the fact that, pursuant to the ELI guidelines 
discussed in section 6.4.5, the insolvency protocols should incorporate the JudgeCo and CoCo 
guidelines and principles in order to enhance the cooperation in a cross-border insolvency 
scenario. 
Guideline 7(a) of the Global Principles pertains to the methods of communication from one 
court to another. Pursuant to it, courts can communicate by ‘sending or transmitting copies 
of formal orders, judgments, opinions, reasons for decision (…)’ directly to the other court, as 
long as advance notice to counsel for the affected parties is provided. Point b) of Guideline 7 
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provides an alternative method, which consists of directing counsel or one of the insolvency 
practitioners involved ‘to transmit or deliver to the other Court copies of documents, 
pleadings, affidavits and other documents that are filed or to be filed with the Court (…)’, 
provided that counsel for the affected parties is given notice. Finally, Guideline 7, point c), 
suggests additional methods of communication with the other court by means of a telephone 
call, video conference call, or another electronic means. 
In this last regard, Guideline 8 of the Global Principles requires that, unless otherwise directed 
by either of the two (or more) courts, counsel for all affected parties should be entitled to 
participate in person at such ‘e-meetings’ and that the communication between the courts 
should be recorded.42 Guideline 9 provides the same protective measures in cases of e-
communications between the courts and foreign insolvency practitioners, whereas Guideline 
10 pertains to the use of joint hearings with the other courts involved. 
6.4.4 The CoCo Guidelines: Direct communications and cooperation between 
insolvency practitioners 
As previously stated in section 6.3.6, Guideline 12 of the CoCo Guidelines categorises the 
cooperation duties borne by the insolvency practitioners involved in a cross-border case as 
applicable to the coordination of the debtor’s assets. Guideline 16 applies the duty to 
cooperate to the courts involved and requires that they ‘operate in a cooperative manner’. In 
this regard, Guideline 16 advises that the courts consider whether the appointment of an 
insolvency practitioner in the main proceedings or a co-insolvency practitioner in the 
secondary proceedings ‘would better ensure coordination’.  
Guideline 6 applies to the duty to communicate, which is imposed on insolvency practitioners: 
first, it requires insolvency practitioners ‘to communicate with each other directly and as soon 
as they are appointed’ and, secondly, it provides that the insolvency practitioner in the main 
proceeding ‘should always take the initiative to start or to continue communications’, thereby 
clarifying a potential aspect of confusion. By providing a simple and clear criterion, this last 
provision can help solve potential impasses between different procedures and may also be 
useful if applied in situations of court-to-court cooperation. Finally, the last paragraph of 
Guideline 6 requires the insolvency practitioners to respond to the other insolvency 
practitioners without any delay. 
6.4.5. The ELI Report: The inclusions of guidelines and best practices in the protocols 
In line with the provisions mentioned in the previous points, the ELI Report stresses the 
importance of protocols, in order to ensure cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. In 
this regard, Recommendation 9.03 specifies that communications and cooperation can take 
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‘any form, including the conclusion of protocols’, after requesting that domestic legislators 
ensure that insolvency practitioners and courts follow the CoCo and JudgeCo Guidelines and 
Principles.  
Pursuant to Recommendation 9.03, the protocol should, at least, include clauses regarding 
the right of the parties involved in the cross-border insolvency case (insolvency practitioners 
included) to appear and to access data and information, as well as provisions regulating the 
communications and coordination between the actors in the different proceedings. It is worth 
noting, as anticipated above, that Recommendation 9.03 of the ELI Report also considers the 
possibility of including the provisions of the guidelines and principles mentioned above (CoCo 
and JudgeCo) in the protocol, by means of a specific clause. This last provision reflects, in 
general, the approach of the ELI Report, which identifies cooperation at all stages of the 
proceedings as the key element to a successful and value maximising procedure.43  
Before concluding this section, it must be emphasised that guidelines are exactly that, 
guidelines and that none of these statements are specific instructions to domestic courts or 
indeed to practitioners. Other than in the situation where the Model Law has been 
implemented in legislation, which is rarely the case in member states of the EU, none of the 
guidelines discussed have legal effect. That is not to say that they will not prove useful to 
members of the judiciary or indeed practitioners, but it must be remembered that even where 
the language is couched in somewhat mandatory terms, there is no legal authority behind the 
statements. Their usefulness would be improved by providing quick summaries and ensuring 
the language is clear. 
6.5 The Mechanism of Notification or Service of Official Documents 
Another fundamental aspect of cooperation addressed by the international best practices and 
guidelines is the mechanism by which the relevant parties are notified of content or served 
documents. Arguably, the development of a simple and effective set of rules governing 
notification, where two or more proceedings are opened in different countries, is essential to 
reduce costs and delays. The relevant best practice and rules are also developed with a view 
to ensuring and incentivising the prompt exchange of information and participation of the 
actors in the insolvency proceedings, starting with the insolvency practitioners and creditors. 
In this regard, an important advantage comes from the use of new technologies, which can 
now have a primary role during all the stages of the proceedings.44 
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6.5.1. The Model Law: Notification to foreign creditors 
The UNCITRAL Model Law considers the regulation of notification to foreign creditors. Article 
14 provides that whenever notification is to be given to creditors within that State according 
to the domestic insolvency laws, notification must also be given to the known creditors that 
do not have an address in that country. Thus, pursuant to art 14, ‘the court may order that 
appropriate steps be taken with a view to notifying any creditor whose address is not yet 
known’.45 Art 14 also requires that such notification is made individually, with the exception 
of circumstances where another form of notification might be more appropriate. In order to 
reduce costs and save time, the Model Law does not require ‘letters rogatory or other, similar 
formality’. This provision is in line with the general trend toward a deformalisation of 
communication in the context of cross-border insolvency. Finally, article 14 pertains to the 
content of the notification of the commencement of proceedings to foreign creditors; it 
provides that such a notification must indicate a reasonable time for the filing of claims by 
creditors – including the place for the filing – and whether secured creditors need to file their 
claims. The notification must also include any other information required by domestic 
legislation or court order. 
6.5.2. ALI-III Global Principles: Electronic notices and service list 
With a view to minimising costs and ensuring an effective and rapid notification of the parties 
involved in cross-border insolvency case, the Global Principles envisage the introduction of a 
‘Service List’. Guideline 13 provides that the courts can coordinate the different proceedings 
‘by establishing a Service List that may include parties that are entitled to receive notice of 
proceedings before the Court in the other jurisdiction’. 
The Global Principles also have the availability of new technologies in mind: Guideline 13 
provides that all the notices and materials to be served should be made available 
‘electronically in a publicly accessible system or by facsimile transmission, certified or 
registered mail or delivery by courier’ to foreign parties. This provision should help in reducing 
the delays in favour of foreign insolvency actors and add transparency to the proceedings.46 
Regarding the language to be used in communication, Principle 21 of the Global Principles 
requires that the insolvency practitioners determine the language in which communications 
should take place ‘with due regard to convenience and the reduction of costs’. In any case, 
pursuant to Principle 21, the notices should specify their nature and significance using the 
language that the recipients are expected to understand. Principle 28 pertains to the notice 
to be provided to the insolvency practitioners involved in a cross-border insolvency case, 
stating that they ‘should receive prompt and prior notice of a court hearing or the issuance of 
 
45 See UNCITRAL Model Law, Part I, p. 7. 
46 Bernard Santen ‘Communication and co-operation in international insolvency: on best practices for insolvency office holders and cross-




a court order’. Clearly, such provisions aim to ensure the availability of information in relation 
to, and the participation of all the relevant parties involved in, a cross-border insolvency case. 
6.5.3. The JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines: The ‘sufficient’ notice and the online 
registry 
In line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, the JudgeCo Principles apply to the requirements 
associated with notifying creditors. Principle 18 provides that, if there are foreign creditors in 
a country wherein an insolvency case is not pending, then the court ‘should assure that 
sufficient notice is given to permit those creditors to have a full and fair opportunity to file 
claims and participate in the case’. In order to ensure that the creditors are given a fair 
opportunity, the court should – pursuant to Principle 18 – ask for the publication of the 
aforementioned notices in the Official Gazette or an applicable online registry of the relevant 
jurisdiction. Principle 18 also proposes a criterion for the recognition of foreign creditors for 
the purposes of the notification; ‘known foreign creditors’ are those expressly listed as 
creditors in the debtor’s business records or those entities or persons whose address is 
established in such records. 
Finally, Principle 20 addresses the issue of notice to an insolvency practitioner involved in a 
cross-border insolvency case, providing that the court must ensure that the insolvency 
practitioner ‘receives prompt and prior notice of a court hearing or the issuance of a court 
order, decision or judgment that is relevant to or potentially affects the conduct of the 
proceeding’. This provision aims to ensure that the insolvency practitioners are given timely 
notice of all the relevant decisions adopted during the proceeding and, therefore, act in 
coordinated manner. 
6.5.4. The CoCo Guidelines: Notices of court hearings and court orders 
The CoCo Guidelines address a fundamental aspect of the exchange of information and the 
service of documents. Guideline 9 deals with situations where authentication of documents 
is required and provides that ‘methods should be established so as to permit rapid 
authentication and secure transmission of faxes and other electronic communications relating 
to cross-border insolvencies’. Pursuant to Guideline 9, this method should develop a common 
basis for authentication thereby allowing the acceptance of the relevant documents by all the 
parties involved. 
Guideline 17 provides that the notice of court hearings and court orders should be given to 
each insolvency practitioner ‘at the earliest possible point in time where the hearing or order 
is relevant’ to the specific insolvency practitioner. If the insolvency practitioner is unable to 
attend the hearing, Guideline 17 also provides that the court should invite the insolvency 
practitioner to communicate her/his observations before the court makes its decision. Finally, 
pursuant to the final paragraph of Guideline 17, the insolvency practitioners should make 





The description of the guidelines, principles and best practices developed by various 
international institutions in this Chapter has shown some interesting and important shared 
trends in the evolution of the core principles that govern the cross-border insolvency context. 
In this regard, it is worth noting three different common aspects that seem to have a central 
role. First, the recognition of the importance of removing obstacles to direct cooperation and 
communication between the main actors of the insolvency proceedings, namely judges and 
insolvency practitioners. For this reason, less formal and direct communications between 
judges and insolvency practitioners are preferred over cumbersome procedures that cause 
delays and increase the costs of the insolvency process.  
The second aspect, which is connected to the first, is the acknowledged need for participation 
among the actors involved and the need for appropriate safeguards. Following our 
engagement with members of the European judiciary, it is not at all clear to us first, that there 
is much in the way of formal cross border activity in terms of litigation, second that there is 
much knowledge of these guidelines and finally and most importantly, that even following 
engagement with the guidelines, the increasingly informal nature of the exchange of 
information – between the representative and judges of the different proceedings envisaged 
by some of these guidelines would be acceptable.   
Before concluding it is worth noting that the potential for new technologies is highlighted in 
almost every collection of guidelines and best practices, with a view to enhance the exchange 
of information and the communication between the insolvency practitioners and the courts.  
Finally, on a more general note, it is also worth mentioning the strong focus on the need for 
preservation of the going concern of insolvent debtors – or those just facing financial 
difficulties – that is set out in almost every international report collecting guidelines and best 
practices in the last decade. This fundamental point, highlighted by the PRD and domestic 
legislation across member states, and in addition by the analysis of many scholars, is 
addressed in the above-mentioned guidelines, mainly with respect to the central role played 
by coordination and cooperation, in order to achieve a value maximising restructuring 
process. This is doubly important when considering the incoming preventive restructuring 
processes under the PRD, given their potential complexity, inclusion of sometimes 
controversial provisions, and the scope for key differences between the procedures 
implemented in different jurisdictions. Despite the attempts to provide guides to how 
cooperation might take place, JCOERE would take the view that the obstacles described in 
Chapters 3 and 5 are significant. This analysis is returned to in our concluding chapter.  
The next Chapter will examine how another key federalised jurisdiction has managed issues 
of court-to-court cooperation. The United States has been a key player in examples of 
interstate and international cross-border insolvency for decades. Chapter 7 will therefore 




drawing examples from both state-to-state cases requiring co-ordination as well as how 
similar problems are handled in an international cross-border insolvency context. The latter 
circumstances often rely on the rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law (implemented in Chapter 
15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code) as has been discussed in this Chapter. Finally, 
Chapter 7 will discuss the United States’ courts effective use of bespoke protocols and the 
advantages and disadvantages that have arisen to observe lessons that could be leaned in the 
context of the incoming PRD frameworks and their potential use of protocols over pre-existing 
guidelines and rules, or indeed, the obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast given the 
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VII. Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis of Co-operation in Other 
Federalised Systems: The United States 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to compare the approach of the EU in matters of cross-border 
insolvency with the approach in the United States as a comparator federal jurisdiction. Given 
the uncertainty as to how individual Member States will implement of the PRD, coupled with 
issues surrounding co-operation and coordination under the EIR Recast, considering how 
another federalised jurisdiction deals with multi-state cases is a useful exercise to benchmark 
actions related to the JCOERE Project going forward. Accordingly, this enquiry extends to both 
forum determination and the coordination of multiple proceedings. 
While there are arguments that will challenge the validity of comparing the EU with the United 
States – for example, whether the EU is truly federal in nature – we would hypothesise that 
there are enough practical parallels and connections to the problems of forum shopping and 
the coordination of cross-border cases to draw helpful comparisons as to how the same issues 
are handled in the United States.1 Although other federal jurisdictions were considered as 
additional possible comparators, such as Australia and Canada, the case law and literature are 
far more developed in the United States, which will therefore be the focus of the following 
discussion.  
The following discussion will also refer to how the US courts have developed protocols and 
addressed instances of co-ordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings to draw 
examples of how this might occur within the EU in relation to cross-border restructuring 
procedures.  
This Chapter will proceed as follows: Section 7.2 addresses forum determination and forum 
shopping. Section 7.3 addresses coordination, which includes not only recognition and 
enforcement mechanisms, but also for cross-border restructuring and insolvency, the 
coordination of assets, parties, and the implementation of plans. Section 7.4 will explore the 
 
1 For a discussion on federalism generally and in the EU in particular, see for example Andrew Glencross, ‘Federalism, Confederalism, and 
Sovereignty Claims: Understanding the Democracy Game in the EU’ (2007) SGIR Conference Turin, 12-14 September 2007 European 
University Institute 5; Armin Cuyvers, ‘The Confederal Comeback: Rediscovering the Confederal Form for a Transnational World’ (2013) 19(6) 
Eur L J 711; Jose Gomes Andre, ‘American Lessons: Legitimacy, Federalism, and the Construction of a European Compound Polity’ (2017) 
18(3) European Politics and Society 333; John Kincaid, ‘Confederal Federalism and Citizen Representation in the European Union’ (1999) 




concept of forum competition as compared to interstate competition in the USA and the 
potential for similar competition among EU Member States. Section 7.5 will then offer a 
comparative reflection upon the EU’s co-operation mechanisms and the other cooperative 
frameworks or mechanisms discussed below. 
7.2 Forum Shopping and Court Cooperation in the United States  
7.2.1 The idiosyncrasies of the United States bankruptcy regime 
Bankruptcy is set within the competence of the federal government by the US Constitution 
under the Bankruptcy Clause,2 which confers the federal government with the power to enact 
‘uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.’3 Interestingly, 
prior to the introduction of a federal bankruptcy procedure, the American states mirrored, to 
some extent, the current picture of EU Member States, with each state having its own 
perspective on how to deal with financially distressed companies, sometimes with different 
objectives and outcomes. This caused a number of constitutional challenges with little 
clarification from the Supreme Court4 until a Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1898.5 In that sense 
the period before 1898 represents a movement from states operating their own bankruptcy/ 
insolvency codes to a more federalised structure. Even after the 1898 Bankruptcy Act further 
steps were taken towards a fully federalised bankruptcy code including the enactment of the 
Chandler Act during the New Deal in 1938.6 In terms of timing, the much shorter period of 
European integration from the 1950s to the present allows us to perhaps view the current 
European situation in an historical frame.  
The connection between bankruptcy cases and other areas of law, where many of these areas 
of law are matters for regulation by state rather than federal law, presents interesting 
questions. This includes laws relating to tort, contract, property, and trusts and estates.7 It 
also includes company law or the law relating to corporations as matters of state law. Contract 
law was originally particularly problematic in multi-state (cross-border) bankruptcies and 
bankruptcy discharges as such procedures by their nature impair the obligations arising under 
 
2 US Constitution, art 1, s 8, cl4. See MH Redish, ‘Doing it with Mirrors: New York v United States and Constitutional Limitations of Federal 
Power to Require State Legislation’ (1993-1994) 21 Hastings Const LQ 593, 594-596. 
3 United States Constitution, article 1 paragraph 8 clause 4; For a detailed history on the evolution of the federal bankruptcy competence 
under the Constitutions Bankruptcy Clause, see SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause’ (2013) 64(2) Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 319, 341-342; Charles Jordan Tabb, ‘The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States’ (1995) 3(1) Am Bankr Inst 
L Rev 5, 12-15; and R Sylla, RE Wright and DJ Cowen, ‘Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis Management during the US Financial Panic 
of 1792’ (2009) 83 Business History Review 61, 62-63.. 
4 See Sturges v Crownshield 17 US (4 Wheat) 122 (1819); see also SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause‘ (2013) 64(2) 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 352-353. 
5 Act of July 1, 1898, Ch 541 30 Stat 544 (repealed 1978); see also SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause‘ (2013) 64(2) 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 388-389. 
6 The full development of a federal bankruptcy framework is described in SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause’ (2013) 
64(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 341-342. 






contract.8 State bankruptcy laws were therefore challenged as being unconstitutional in 
interstate bankruptcies because of their potential impairment of contracts in another state. 
To some extent, this mirrors the difficulties in aligning insolvency procedures among the 
Member States of the EU due to different legal principles on how to deal with issues such as 
secured debt, the order of priorities, and rights in rem.  
Today, bankruptcy and restructuring laws are contained in the US Federal Civil Code9 within 
the Bankruptcy Statute under Title 11. It is a hybrid system that relies on both federal and 
state law.10 The Federal Bankruptcy Code establishes the substantive entitlements of debtors 
and creditors that then intersects with state competences in areas of corporate law, tort, 
contract, property, and trusts and estates.11 Arguments begin in state District courts and it 
must be shown that the jurisdiction of bankruptcy has been earned before a case will be 
transferred into the bankruptcy court system, and then only if some bankruptcy policy is being 
furthered.12  
The dividing line between bankruptcy and other related areas of law is also reflected in how 
the judiciary bankruptcy judges are appointed in the US. US bankruptcy judges derive their 
authority under Article I section 8 of the US Constitution, which details the powers of Congress 
including the power to enact a bankruptcy statute.13 By contrast, other judges derive their 
authority under article III, which creates the judicial branch of the United States Government. 
The individual rights and effective administration of justice protecting judicial independence 
and competence is embedded within article III; whereas, it has been argued that article I 
judges lack the same level of constitutional protections.14 Bankruptcy judges also differ from 
article III judges because they are not appointed by the President, but by the United State 
Court of Appeal for the Circuit in which they sit and for a term of only fourteen years.15 For 
this reason, their position is not as secure as article III judges, and there is the perceived 
danger of being subject to external influence.16 Because Article III judges benefit from express 
constitutional protections over their independence due to the nature of their role and method 
 
8 See Ogden vs Saunders 25 US (12 Wheat) 213 (1827); see also SJ Lubben, ‘A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause ‘ (2013) 64(2) 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 319, 349-350 and Charles Jordan Tabb, ‘The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States’ (1995) 
3(1) Am Bankr Inst L Rev 5, 16-18. 
9 The US Civil Code codifies general and permanent statutory law at the federal level of the United States legal system. Federal law pre-empts 
state and territorial law if there is a conflict so long as the federal law is also in accordance with the United States Constitution. 
10 See for example, 11 USC §362(a) which enjoins all entities from taking almost any action outside of the bankruptcy process that would 
affect a debtor’s property; §541, which designates all legal and equitable interests as property of the estate; and §544 which creates rights 
in the bankruptcy trustee based on the powers allowed to certain lien creditors under relevant state law.  
11 G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 
511, 515. 
12 G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 
511, 529-530.  
13 Article 1 details the powers of Congress, while clause 8 lists those powers, including the power to establish ‘uniform laws on the subject 
of bankruptcies throughout the United States.’ US Constitution art 1 §8 cl 4. 
14 G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 
511, 533. 
15 28 USC §152(a)(1) (2006); for a discussion about judicial appointment see David A Skeel, ‘Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue’ (1998) 
1(1) Delaware L Rev 1, 32-33. 
16 G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 





of appointment, they are better protected from being influenced by external factors that 
could influence their decision-making. In order to ensure that judicial independence is 
maintained, a norm was adopted in the Marathon17 case and later incorporated into the 
Bankruptcy Code requiring that all bankruptcy cases be filed in an article III District Court,18 
which could then choose to refer the matter to a bankruptcy judge ‘operating as a type of 
special master to the District Court.’19  
The key difference between article I and article III judges in relation to bankruptcy revolve 
around whether a matter is considered ‘core’ or ‘non-core’. Core proceedings are essentially 
those actions that arise from public rights created by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.20 
Whereas, non-core proceedings are predicated on rights that are usually decided outside of 
bankruptcy, whether under state or federal law, such as contractual or tortious matters.21 
Bankruptcy judges can hear both types of proceedings, but are only empowered to exercise 
their full competence over core proceedings, with only limited competence over the non-core 
matters22 in which they can only submit ‘proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
the district court, subject to de novo review.’23 There have been arguments justifying this 
approach24 but what is interesting is the overall recognition of the difference between 
insolvency or bankruptcy law and proceedings and other actions in contract or tort or other 
related areas. These distinctions are also reflected in the EU approach to enforcement of 
insolvency processes and determinations under the specialised European Insolvency 
Regulation (original and Recast) as distinct from the more generally applied Brussels 
Judgement Regulation. 
These distinctions have further implications regarding co-operation in insolvency matters as 
adumbrated in the discussion of cases on assistance of foreign courts in insolvency at common 






17 N Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co 458 US 50, 87 (1982). 
18 28 USC §157 (2006). 
19 Model Emergency Bankruptcy Rule (a) (1982) reprinted in Bankruptcy Code, Rules and Forms, xv (West 1983); see also G Marcus Cole and 
Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 511, 530. 
20 See N Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co 458 US 50, 71 (1982).  
21 See Broyles v US Gypsum Co 266 BR 788, 783 (ED Tex 2001). 
22 G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 
511, 518-519. 
23 Wood v Wood (In re Wood) 825 F2d 90, 95 (5th Cir 1987).  
24 G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: A New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2010) Utah L Rev 





7.2.2 Forum determination in the USA 
Forum shopping between states in the United States is common for a variety of matters and 
most importantly, in the current context for corporate law matters. While it is allowed and 
facilitated by the legal system, Congress and the courts have often disparaged the practice.25 
In corporate law cases, forum shopping also implies choice of law issues whereas because the 
substantive law of bankruptcy in the United States is federal in nature, it would seem to follow 
that this should exclude forum shopping driven by choice of law. However, there remain a 
number of ‘jurisdictional hooks’ to shop among the bankruptcy courts.26  
Chapter 11 proceedings are the most similar type of proceeding to that envisaged by the new 
EU PRD so the discussion in this Chapter will focus on this issue. Forum shopping occurs 
frequently in Chapter 11 reorganisation cases27 by filing a petition in a court other than in the 
location of the company’s head office.28 In the Chapter 11 petition, the debtor or its 
representative simply states its preferred venue and if it satisfies the requirements for forum 
determination as set out in the Bankruptcy Venue Statute,29 it tends to be accepted without 
question. The Statute ostensibly provides two methods of determining venue: domicile or 
residence30 and affiliation.31 These two criteria have been interpreted as giving rise to 5 
different options to establish forum:  
1. place of incorporation; 
2. location of the debtors’ principle assets;  
3. the debtor’s principle place of business;  
4. a case concerning an affiliate of the debtor is pending in the jurisdiction; or 
5. objections to the venue have been waived expressly or through conduct.32 
The Bankruptcy Venue Statute therefore provides for a virtually unlimited choice for large 
debtors with extensive operations.33 The presumption that favours the debtor’s first choice 
of venue that must be rebutted should another party wish to transfer the venue elsewhere. 
To rebut the presumption of the debtor’s choice, it must be demonstrated by a 
preponderance of evidence that a different venue is better. This allows debtors to file, with 
 
25 Mary Garvey Alegro, ‘In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue’ (1999) 78 Neb L Rev 79, 87.  
26 Gerard M McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 68(1) Cambridge L J 169, 169; 
see also Samir D Parikh, ‘Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy’ (2013) 46(1) Connecticut L Rev 159 for an empirical analysis and discussion 
of instances of forum shopping in the United States.  
27 Gerard M McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 68(1) Cambridge L J 169. 
28 T Eisenberg and L LoPucki, ‘Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganisations’ (1999) 84 
Cornell L Rev 967, 975. 
29 28 U.S. Code § 1408 - Venue of cases under title 11. 
30 28 USC §1408 (1). 
31 28 USC §1408 (2). 
32 Lynn M LoPucki and William C Whitford, ‘Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large Publicly Held 
Companies’ (1991) 1991 Wis L Rev 11, 16. 
33 Lynn M LoPucki and William C Whitford, ‘Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large Publicly Held 





little or no interference, in a jurisdiction where they believe they will receive the most 
favourable judgement.34  
This has led to a focus on two main courts for bankruptcy filing: the District of Delaware and 
the Southern District of New York (SDNY). The ‘jurisdictional hooks’ mentioned above do not 
derive from differences in state laws but derive from a number of less obvious factors. Both 
jurisdictions are considered debtor friendly and have judges with extensive expertise and 
experience. Both states provide rules that make it fairly easy to file, including Delaware’s rule 
on incorporation; this allows any of the many companies incorporated in Delaware with little 
or no business activities in the state to file for insolvency in Delaware. In the case of New York, 
its affiliate rule, which allows companies to file if they have some affiliate in the state already 
filing for bankruptcy there, offers a jurisdiction with flexible rules for parties to claim a 
connection with that jurisdiction.35  
As Delaware grew in popularity, the bankruptcy industry grew up around it. Delaware’s 
popularity in the bankruptcy arena is of course linked to the underlying popularity of Delaware 
as a state of incorporation and as a forum of choice for corporate litigation generally. Because 
of the experience and significant body of specialised jurisprudence in the state system, 
Delaware judges are viewed as more predictable with certainty of outcomes. While certainty 
may be beneficial, John Coffee notes that it can sometimes be ‘manipulated by management 
in those areas where its interests conflict with those of the shareholders.’ 36 While there are 
arguments that challenge the morality and appropriateness of shopping for what is 
sometimes perceived as judicial favour, few real efforts have been made to change this status 
quo.37 In addition, it has been suggested by Coffee and others that the role of markets will 
actually provide an incentive for states to ensure efficient legal systems, which will be of 
benefit to any party involved in a corporate law or bankruptcy case. The argument goes that 
if a company were to choose a jurisdiction with inefficient laws, it would suffer in the product 
and capital markets and its stock price would also fall, making the firm an attractive takeover 
target. Thus, the availability of forum shopping may actually facilitate a race to the top for 
states providing efficient laws.38 Nevertheless and despite arguments regarding the merits or 
 
34 Mary Garvey Alegro, ‘In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue’ (1999) 78 Neb L Rev 79, 99. 
35 Laura Napoli Coordes, ‘The Geography of Bankruptcy’ (2015) 68 Vand L Rev 382, 388-389; see also Samir D Parikh, ‘Modern Forum Shopping 
in Bankrupcty’ (2013) 46(1) Connecticut L Rev 159, 181-192. 
36 John C Coffee, ‘The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards’ 
(1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 759, 766; see also Leslie R Masterton, ‘Forum Shopping in Business Bankrupcty: An Examination of Chapter 11 Cases’ 
(1999) 16(1) Bankr Dev J 65, 67 .  
37 For a discussion of competing arguments about the pros and cons of Delaware’s popularity, see L LoPucki, ‘Shopping for Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganisations’ (1999) 84 Cornell L Rev 967, 1002; T Eisenberg and L LoPucki, 
‘Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganisations’ (1999) 84 Cornell L Rev 967, 971; and see 
also Lynn M LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts (Ann Arbor 2005), which offers an 
in-depth critique of forum shopping in the United States. 
38 John C Coffee, ‘The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards’ 
(1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 759, 766; see also Leslie R Masterton, ‘Forum Shopping in Business Bankrupcty: An Examination of Chapter 11 Cases’ 
(1999) 16(1) Bankr Dev J 65, 67; David A Skeel, ‘Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue’ (1998) 1(1) Delaware L Rev 1, 22; for a discussion 
around the relevance of either racing to the top or to the bottom in the United States federal system, see Anne Anderson, Jill Brown, and 
Parveen P Gupta, ‘Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters and Firm Value: a Re-examination of the Delaware Effect’ (2017) 14 Int 





demerits of forum shopping and a lack of consensus about the correct interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Venue Statute on forum determination, most Chapter 11 cases are heard in one 
of these two jurisdictions.39   
Objecting to a venue selection in the United States after it has already been filed is also 
difficult. In fact, most cases proceed with little discussion over the choice of venue at all, as 
the alternative is costly, timely, and challenging. Courts view debtors as being in the best 
position to better know their operations and the extent of their problems than any other 
party, so tend to defer to the better information that the debtor is perceived to have to make 
this choice. There is also a concentration of professionals and experts in New York and 
Delaware, so there is a strong ‘club atmosphere’ that tends to influence the maintenance of 
the status quo.40 As noted by LoPucki and Whitford:  
Although the benefits of venue transfer may well exceed the costs for all claimants as a 
group, the benefits to any one claimant are likely to be far less than the costs of a 
successful challenge to the initial venue choice. These costs are high, in part because 
much of the information needed to assess what venues are possible…tend to be under 
the exclusive control of the debtor during the crucial period from the filing of the case 
until momentum renders the case unmoveable.41 
Finally, judges, while empowered to transfer venue themselves, will rarely do so.42  
Despite the fact that bankruptcy law is a federal competence in the US, there still exist 
significant variances on case-defining issues from circuit to circuit, such as the treatment of 
key non-assignable contracts43 and third party releases under reorganisation plans.44 Thus, 
while the bankruptcy law remains the same, decisions that relate to a plan and which have an 
element of judicial interpretation may find different results under different circuits.45 The 
exercise of discretion makes debtors and decision-makers quite sensitive to the perceived 
experience, knowledge, and personality of judges in a given district.46 It is not surprising then 
that debtors and decision-makers in a Chapter 11 case will take time to examine the 
characteristics of available potential venues and judges for a bankruptcy case to determine 
the greatest chance of success.47 
 
39 See Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, ‘The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law’ (2002) 55(3) Stanford L Rev 679, 725-726, 730-731. 
40 Laura Napoli Coordes, ‘The Geography of Bankruptcy’ (2015) 68 Vand L Rev 382, 394-396. 
41 Lynn M LoPucki and William C Whitford, ‘Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large Publicly Held 
Companies’ (1991) 1991 Wis L Rev 11, 42. 
42 Lynn M LoPucki and William C Whitford, ‘Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large Publicly Held 
Companies’ (1991) 1991 Wis L Rev 11, 42 and Laura Napoli Coordes, ‘The Geography of Bankruptcy’ (2015) 68 Vand L Rev 382, 394-396. 
43 11 USC §365(c); See In re Catapult Entm’t 165 F3d 747, 754-755 (9th Cir 1999) and In re W Elecs Inc 852 F2d 79 (3d Cir 1988). 
44 See In re Lowenschuss 67 F3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th Cir 1995); In re Zale Corp 62 F3d 746, 760-01 (5th Cir 1995); and In re W Real Estate Fund 
Inc 922 F2d 592, 601-02 (10th Cir 1990); Samir d Parikh, ‘Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy’ (2013) 46(1) Connecticut Law Review 159, 
193. 
45 Samir d Parikh, ‘Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy’ (2013) 46(1) Connecticut Law Review 159, 193. 
46 Samir d Parikh, ‘Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy’ (2013) 46(1) Connecticut Law Review 159, 194.  





7.2.3 European parallels 
The first point to make is that the development of an integrated market is of much more 
recent vintage in the EU; consequently, the development of a European insolvency legal 
framework is in a comparatively early phase. At this point in its development, the application 
of the COMI test in cross-border insolvencies and restructurings in the European Union under 
the original Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 and the EIR Recast 848/2015 renders the idea 
of forum shopping less possible. However, over time, the idea of orchestrating a ‘COMI shift’48 
prior to a proceeding has gained more familiarity and become more common. The emergence 
of case law and litigation on COMI49 is related to the operation of more traditional insolvency 
processes, rather than more recent developments in restructuring law. The development of a 
newer European approach to business failure represented in the PRD raises a number of 
possibilities that have been considered in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of this Report. Essentially, where 
some restructuring processes do not come within the EIR Recast, the impediment to forum 
shopping created by decades of COMI case law quite simply does not exist. 
The second point then comes into play, which is that unlike the US, restructuring laws are 
quite different across the EU and given our analysis in both the first JCOERE Report and the 
summary of different approaches in Chapter 3 of this Report, forum shopping driven by choice 
of law is a real possibility. We have already seen this in relation to English Schemes of 
Arrangement.50 However, given the range of choices built into the PRD, it will now be possible 
to have a process that both implements the PRD but that is more dynamic and ‘robust’ than 
other processes that may be implemented elsewhere in the EU. 
7.2.4 American cases on forum determination or transfer 
The following sample of cases demonstrate a habitual tendency for states such as Delaware 
or New York to accept jurisdiction or refuse to transfer it, despite the thin association a venue 
has to the actual operations of the company and evidence that participation by the more 
vulnerable stakeholders would be stymied due to the costs of attendance. There are further 
interesting points raised in the discussion below. 
Polaroid 200151 
The Polaroid case is demonstrative of some of the issues around objecting to the filing of a 
case in a venue distant from a company’s main activities.  
 
48 Gerard M McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 68(1) Cambridge L J 169, 180 
and (n 41). 
49 See generally Chapters 2 and 5 of this Report. 
50 Jennifer Payne, ‘Cross-border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 563-
589. 





In 2001, after years of financial difficulty, Polaroid filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy code. A sale of substantially all of its assets under section 363(b) of the US 
Bankruptcy Code was approved by the Bankruptcy Court of Delaware,52 although the 
company’s nerve-centre was in Massachusetts where it had thousands of employees.53 There 
was considerable controversy around the section 363 sale, which the financial press criticised 
for being undervalued by around a third of the actual value.54 Judge Walsh of the Bankruptcy 
Court of the District of Delaware declined to take into account the creditor committee’s 
evidence that the company would be worth more in a reorganisation, relying instead on a 
market approach in which a transaction appropriately conducted is viewed as the best test of 
value.55  
During a hearing on the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011, the Chief 
Bankruptcy Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, the 
Honourable Frank J Bailey, noted in his testimony that filing in certain magnet courts, such as 
Delaware, has an adverse effect on ‘the rights of small creditors, vendors, employees and 
pensioners’ because ‘efforts to overrule the filer’s choice have proven to be much too 
expensive for all but the most well-heeled creditors.’56 Polaroid’s filing of Chapter 11 in 
Delaware far from its assets and investments, meant that anyone interested in pursuing their 
rights would have to either travel to Delaware or hire a lawyer to appear in court on their 
behalf.57 As noted by Judge Bailey in his testimony to Congress on reforming the Bankruptcy 
Venue Statute:  
[…]the stakeholders, large and small, would have had an opportunity to participate in 
the proceeding. At a minimum, stakeholders would have received notices that told 
them that they could participate in the proceeding at courthouses near where they 
live and work before a judge that lives in the same community as they do. This is to 
say there would have been the perception that their opportunity was real and 
accessible. And perception is often paramount.58 
It is suggested by Coordes that the Polaroid case ‘demonstrates the difficulties that can arise 
when a company files far from its primary operating region’.59 While there are ways to 
challenge the venue filing under section 1412 of the Bankruptcy Venue Statute, Judge Bailey 
 
52 In re Polaroid Corp, No 01-10864 (Bankr D Del July 3, 2002). 
53 Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 2533 Before the H Subcomm on Courts, Commercial, and Administrative 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Congress (testimony of Honorable Frank J Bailey, Us Bankr Ct, D Mass). 
54 Kris Frieswick, ‘What’s Wrong with this Picture?’ (CFO 2003) <https://www.cfo.com/banking-capital-markets/2003/01/whats-wrong-with-
this-picture/> accessed 22 June 2020; see also Tom Becker and Lingling Wei, ‘Questions Mount in Chapter 11 Case of Former Polaroid’ (WSJ 
Online 2003) as cited in Lynn M LoPucki and Joseph Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Fire Sales’ (2007) 106 Mich L Rev 1, 13. 
55 In re Polaroid Corp, No 01-10864 (Bankr D Del July 3, 2002), Transcript of Sale Hearing before Honourable Peter J Walsk United States Chief 
Bankrupcty Judge, 172-173, 177 as cited by Lynn M LoPucki and Joseph Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Fire Sales’ (2007) 106 Mich L Rev 1, 14. 
56 Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 2533 Before the H Subcomm on Courts, Commercial, and Administrative 
Law of the H Comm on the Judiciary, 112th Congress (testimony of Honorable Frank J Bailey, Us Bankr Ct, D Mass) 35-36.  
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notes that litigating a motion to change venue is very expensive and often out of the reach of 
small vendors and former employees. The strong presumption in favour of the debtor’s 
chosen forum also makes it difficult to persuade a Court to change the venue of the case.60 In 
a European context these issues are aggravated by legal and cultural differences.  
Enron (2002)61 
The Enron case is well-known for many reasons. According to C William Thomas, it is an 
example of failure due to ‘individual and collective greed born in an atmosphere of market 
euphoria and corporate arrogance’.62 Unusually, there was actually a request to transfer its 
venue to the Southern District of Texas instead of being heard in the Southern District of New 
York. There were multiple litigant companies and groups involved in the Enron case, along 
with a class-action lawsuit on behalf of pension beneficiaries. In short it was a complex, multi-
faceted case that garnered much media attention at the time due to the scandals associated 
with it. 
Enron’s business activities took place mainly in Portland, Oregon and Houston, Texas, with no 
real property owned in New York. The debtor companies were organised under the laws of 
Oregon, California, and Delaware with only one organised under the law of Texas and one 
under Pennsylvania law. None of the debtor companies were organised under the law of New 
York and the principle place of business was almost unanimously identified as Houston.63 
Around 25,000 employees worked for Enron worldwide, with 7500 employees in Houston 
Texas and only 63 employees in New York, where it decided to file for bankruptcy. At the time 
of filing the motion to change venue, almost all of the dismissed employees in the United 
States were employed in Houston.64 In addition, much of the debtor’s real property was also 
located in Houston.65 The only connection Enron had to New York was Enron Metals & 
Commodity Corp, a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in New York with 
assets consisting of furniture and fixtures at a rental office; deposit accounts at Citibank; 
contracts, accounts receivable, prepaid transactions, and trades in progress, comprising less 
than 0.5% of the assets of the debtor as a whole.66 
A group of creditors and state officials moved to transfer the venue to the Southern District 
of Texas to make it easier for small stakeholders to participate. Because the venue was found 
to be properly filed, it was the burden of the movant to ‘show by a preponderance of the 
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evidence that the transfer of venue is warranted.’67 The judgment in the motion to transfer 
also noted accessibility of both potential venues, observing that while New York is one of the 
most accessible locations in the world, it is 1,600 miles from Enron’s headquarters, which is 
blocks from the Texas District Bankruptcy Courts. It also noted the challenges of plane ticket 
costs and the limitations of arrival times in terms of travel from Texas to New York,68 which 
indicates that the Court was considering the convenience of the most affected stakeholders 
in their decision-making. 
Judge Arthur Gonzalez of the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York refused 
to move the venue, despite the overwhelming amount of business operations conducted in 
Texas. Key considerations included the number of creditors and the relative amount of their 
claims, placing an importance on the value of the debt owed, which placed the banks and 
financing creditors in a high position of preference. It was also noted that given the worldwide 
nature of the Enron bankruptcy, New York was more accessible overall than Texas.69 Further, 
both the creditors’ committee and the banks, Enron’s largest creditor, opposed the transfer. 
Primarily, support of the venue transfer came mainly from Texas state and local authorities 
with an economic interest in the case. While clearly employees may not have been able to 
attend in person, the Judge considered that the issues most pertinent to employees would 
not likely be heard by the bankruptcy court in the first place.70 That said, the issue of greatest 
concern to those employees in Texas was the fate of their 401k pension plans, which were 
heavily affected by the failure of the company due to the high percentage of Enron stocks in 
which the plan had invested.71  
Fundamentally, Judge Gonzalez deemed that there was not really a necessity for those arguing 
for the venue change to attend court, and that court management protocols would make it 
possible for interested parties to follow the case from a distance.72 
The court found that:  
New York is the more economic and convenient forum for those whose participation 
will be required to administer the cases. Accordingly, New York is the location which 
would best serve the Debtors’ reorganization efforts – the creation and preservation 
of value.73 
Jurisdiction was retained in the Southern District of New York, which was arguably exactly the 
correct decision based on wealth maximisation principles. That said, little consideration was 
given to what Judge Bailey considered important in relation to Polaroid in his testimony to 
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Congress: the perception of an opportunity to participate, which employees and smaller local 
stakeholders will not have had due to the costs of travel and their lack of income due to lay-
offs. Again, in a European context the issue of what has been termed ‘jurisdictional reach’ will 
be even more pertinent and it is one to which European judges may be more sensitive. 
General Motors (GM) Case (2009)74 
The General Motors’ bankruptcy is another example of a company filing in a place that is 
clearly not its headquarters and highlights the relative ease with which this can be done in the 
United States. A Chevrolet-Saturn dealership in Harlem filed under Chapter 11, making it 
possible for GM to utilise the affiliate rule under the Bankruptcy Venue Statute, which allows 
a filing to be made in a place ‘in which there is pending a case under Title 11 concerning such 
person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.’75 GM was headquartered in Detroit, 
Michigan and incorporated in Delaware with its only affiliation in New York a single subsidiary 
dealership in Harlem. GM lawyers centred on the Harlem affiliate so that it could find a way 
to bring the whole case to the Southern District of New York, which as noted by Reuters, is 
‘known for its expertise and speed in handling huge bankruptcies such as Enron and 
WorldCom.’76  
Out of the 26 representative groups appearing in the case, 18 were at least partially based in 
New York, including GM’s representatives, the representatives of the creditors’ committee, 
and the various Unions representing the workers. These are clearly some of the largest groups 
of stakeholders in the case, while those based elsewhere comprise individual tort victims, 
other US States, single creditors, a retirees’ association, and a public citizen litigation group,77 
in other words, groups that on the face of it have relatively minor financial interests when 
compared with those represented by New York legal professionals. In 2011, after the GM 
Bankruptcy, reforms were being mooted for the Bankruptcy Venue Statute to reduce forum 
shopping. It was noted by a congressman of the House Judiciary Committee sponsoring the 
Bill that venue shopping for sympathetic courts ‘…significantly disadvantages displaced 
employees, creditors and shareholders who should be able to participate in the reorganisation 
negotiations.’78 
In line with this statement by Congressman Lamar Smith (Republican-Texas), it has been 
observed by Coordes that ‘running the bankruptcy from New York could make it more difficult 
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for GM’s Detroit-based employees, trade creditors, and other stakeholders to interfere in the 
case’ noting further that ‘filing close to home might have fuelled local tensions, invited more 
voices into the courtroom, and slowed down the case – all risks GM probably preferred to 
avoid’.79 While no written evidence of this intention has been unearthed, filing in New York 
will certainly have been easier for the many party representatives and professionals in the 
case based there. There was no objection or request for change of venue filed in the GM 
bankruptcy, which proceeded on the basis of a s363 sale80 to the US Treasury and the 
governments of Canada and Ontario through Export Development Canada (EDC), as a Chapter 
11 reorganisation would have been too lengthy to ensure that the company would not end 
up in liquidation.81 The only objections listed in the case relate to the fairness of the sale to 
the various parties and it was approved by SDNY Bankruptcy Judge Robert E Gerber. 
While the filing in New York was legal, the media,82 interest groups,83 and even Congress84 
questioned the appropriateness of choosing New York over Delaware (incorporation) or 
Michigan (headquarters), not only in relation to GM, but generally in similar cases. As noted 
by the Honourable John Conyers Jr:  
By choosing to file for Chapter 11 in a distant venue such as New York, a business— 
with its principal assets and most of its creditors and employees located in Michigan 
or California for example—makes it much more difficult for these creditors, 
particularly smaller creditors and workers, to participate in the case and defend their 
claims. 
These creditors are forced to retain counsel in the distant venue and, if they want to 
physically appear, incur travel costs. In effect, they have to pay more to collect on their 
claims. 
As a result, the ability of these small creditors and workers to influence the bankruptcy 
proceedings is greatly diminished. And, by choosing a distant forum, a company can 
reduce local press coverage of the case.85 
While the reform of the Bankruptcy Venue Statute failed to change the venue determination 
rules around Chapter 11 filings, in part due to resistance from a powerful Delaware 
Congressman at the time, Joe Biden, the discussions within Congress, the media, and interest 
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groups illuminated how easy it is to file in a state with little connection to the business of the 
company and how difficult it is to challenge that filing once made in practical and financial 
terms. Those who benefit from filing in New York, for example, often tend to have the greatest 
financial strength while those who are most adversely affected by a distant filing tend to have 
far less financial stake in the case, in terms of the proportion of debt owed to them.  
Conclusion 
The forgoing cases show a range of forum issues. The common thread between all of these 
cases is that a forum, which might not have been the most appropriate under the Bankruptcy 
Venue Statute or convenient to a large number of creditors (even if those creditors did not 
command a commensurate value of the debt owed), has been confirmed or accepted by the 
courts. The tendency of courts, as well as the strong presence of insolvency professionals in 
New York and Delaware and the powerful lobby they also control, make changing venue that 
much more difficult. This is particularly true as the larger creditors usually command more of 
the value of the debt and there is a for bankruptcy judges to look at convenience of creditors 
from a proportion of value perspective. Finally, the presumption that appears to follow forum 
selection by the debtor that it will know best where it should file, adds a further burden onto 
stakeholders who may be left out-of-court. As surmised by Coordes, these ‘judicial 
considerations suggest that small creditors must fight an uphill battle when they object to 
venue in large cases’.86 Other commentators have described the ‘harm’ of forum shopping87 
but there are yet others who do not regard the fact that specialist courts and jurisdictions 
have emerged in the US to be a problem. This debate is expected to resonate in the EU. 
In an emerging European context, the key difference is the strength of the jurisdictional tie 
created by COMI jurisprudence in the EIR Recast, coupled with normative resistance to forum 
shopping (possibly derived from elements of legal culture described in Chapter 4). However, 
the phenomenon of emerging patterns in recent significant European corporate insolvency 
cases, particularly relating to corporate restructuring that are run out of the courts in London 
under the Scheme of Arrangement framework,88 raises questions regarding the alleged 
difference between Europe and the US. It is possible that as the European Union becomes 
more integrated that patterns of forum shopping may begin to reflect patterns that have 
emerged in the United States over a long period of more than 100 years. More integration 
implies a greater knowledge of the characteristics of a particular jurisdiction, reflected in the 
taxonomic characterisation presented in Chapter 3 of this Report. Thus, certain jurisdictions 
appear more attractive as forums. 
However, there is another consideration. It has always been assumed that one of the key 
differences between the US and the EU is that unlike the US, there is very little by way of 
harmonisation of insolvency law as between state frameworks in the EU compared with the 
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federalised approach of the US. As we progress incrementally towards harmonisation in 
Europe and as we discover through our work in preventive restructuring and cross-border 
practise generally, there is in fact there is a commonality of concepts (eg. actio pauliana and 
variants thereof) across European jurisdictions. It is therefore likely that greater convergence 
will occur. Against that background, deliberate forum shopping driven by a search for issues 
like efficient and expert courts; a concentration of legal and financial expertise in a particular 
jurisdiction; and a willingness or openness to accept jurisdiction over cases may be a feature 
of future European practice.  
7.3 Coordinating Proceedings in other Cooperative Paradigms  
This Chapter has illustrated that the issue of interstate court-to-court recognition and co-
ordination is not a hotly contested legal issue in bankruptcy proceedings in the United States, 
although it is controversial in other respects. Comparisons with the EU system are therefore 
not entirely fluid because even though harmonisation is acknowledged as a goal and an 
important element in court co-operation (see Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 8 of this Report), this is not 
near the EU reality.  
There is the separate but related issue of co-ordination in the US cases that typically involve 
jurisdictions outside the US. And indeed, in terms of the EU there are Member States such as 
the UK that have been identified as possessing similarly attractive forums for international 
restructuring particularly, as distinct from more traditional insolvency processes.89 In this 
context US courts are considered exemplars of the conduct of co-ordination proceedings in 
an international context. New York in particular is considered to be a centre point for 
restructuring and therefore this Report would not be complete without a consideration of 
how the co-ordination of proceedings is actually achieved. This Report has considered what 
the EIR Recast itself describes as co-ordination in Chapters 2 and 3, and in Chapter 5 has 
considered some case law within European jurisdictions, mostly from England and Wales, on 
co-ordination in international insolvency and restructuring proceedings. Hence a 
consideration of how US courts co-ordinate proceedings is pertinent to the extent that it 
might provide some useful examples for cross-border insolvency co-ordination either within 
the EU or in cases involving one European jurisdiction operating externally to the EU. 
Comparisons are therefore not entirely straightforward; nevertheless, European insolvency 
practitioners, lawyers and policy-makers may assess the likelihood of successful co-ordination 
within Europe against this comparative context. Alternatively, with the new interest in 
preventive restructuring, the real focus might be on external cases even in a European 
construct where Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg already look to attract legal and 
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financial services business into their jurisdictions and the EU.90 This discussion is continued in 
7.4 below. 
There are a number of examples of how the US has coordinated complex multinational 
bankruptcies in the US courts under Chapter 15, which demonstrate that co-ordination is 
often achieved through the use of bespoke protocols,91 in addition to or instead of following 
guidelines such as those discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report, though some of those also refer 
to the use of protocols in aid of co-ordination. The following examples of protocols used in 
international cases may indicate what could be expected in future cross-border restructuring 
cases within and external to the EU.  
7.3.1 Maxwell92 
The Maxwell case is one of the first recorded uses of a coordinating protocol in a cross-border 
insolvency case. The parties created a bespoke protocol to coordinate what were effectively 
two primary insolvency proceedings in the UK and the USA. An examiner was appointed under 
the Chapter 11 proceedings to work towards harmonising the two proceedings. The protocol’s 
two primary goals were to maximise the value of the estate and to harmonise the proceedings 
to minimize expense, waste, and jurisdictional conflict.93 Under the protocol framework, UK 
administrators were tasked with the corporate governance of the Maxwell estate, while major 
decisions concerning the estate would require the approval of the US examiner or approval 
by the US Court. While much of the decision making in the case was left open, the protocol 
provided direction regarding the conduct of certain matters to be determined in the case, in 
particular that the parties should develop a coordinated plan of reorganisation and scheme 
of arrangement. The UK administrators and US examiner were able to consensually 
accomplish all matters of coordination and co-operation, with only one material conflict 
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Nortel was a multinational group of high-tech companies with the parent company in Canada 
and much of its business occurring in the United States. Insolvency proceedings were filed in 
Canada, the USA and the UK. The results of this case indicate both the best of co-operation, 
through bespoke protocols, and the worst. Although reorganisation failed, the parties were 
able to co-operate to sell the debtor’s global assets in large pieces spanning many different 
countries. Co-operating with the disposition of the assets produced more value than would 
have happened if individual jurisdictions had dealt only with their domestic assets. However, 
the parties could not then agree on how to allocate the proceeds of sale without resolution 
through the courts, which heavily dissipated the benefits gained from the initial co-operative 
efforts.96 
7.3.3 Blackwell 
The Blackwell case97 concerned Inverworld, which collapsed in a scandal after defrauding 
investors in the United States and several Latin American countries. Insolvency proceedings 
were brought in the United States, Cayman Islands, and England. A protocol was agreed that 
led to the dismissal of the English insolvency proceedings if certain conditions to protect 
claimants were met between the other two courts. The US Court was tasked with resolving 
the outstanding legal and factual issues, while the Cayman court oversaw the creation and 
operation of the mechanism formulated to distribute the claimants’ proceeds, with full 
recognition and enforceability agreed between the courts. It is generally considered that this 
led to a successful worldwide settlement at a much lower cost that would have occurred if 
the three courts struggled for power over the case.98 The key factor that is attributable to the 
success of this case and its protocol is the substantial amount of communication aimed at 
resolving the global case. The judges involved: 
actively encouraged the professionals to engage in cross-border negotiations with an 
emphasis on non-litigious solutions despite plausible conflicting claims for several 
groups of claimants under each of the seven arguably applicable laws (...) Judicial 
activism combined with a first-rate performance by the professionals produced 
spectacularly fast, fair, and efficient results.99 
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The Nakash protocol is an example of a protocol agreed between the United States and a civil 
law country, Israel. The fact that it was agreed with a civil law country is significant because 
of the strict adherence to statutory law required of a civil law judiciary, which often inhibits 
effective co-operation in such cases due to a lack of legislative standing to do so. This potential 
obstacle arising from legal origin differences was noted in this Report in Chapter 4 section 
4.3.2 and is discussed in some detail by Mangano.101 Express statutory permission to enter 
into the protocol was required, which was perhaps surprisingly found by the Israeli court. It 
also focused on enhanced coordination of court proceedings between the civilian judiciary of 
Israel and the American court along with coordinating the actions of the parties. This 
enhanced coordination was needed because of the increased level of involvement in the 
civilian court setting required to harmonise the international proceedings.102 Flaschen and 
Silverman’s view is that the success of this protocol can largely be attributed to the willingness 
of the two courts to work together along with the extraordinary agreements made to 
harmonise and respect the actions of each other.103 In this context, the particulars of the case 
are less important than the nature of the two systems and the fact that they were able to 
conduct proceedings in a coordinated fashion despite the fundamental differences between 
the legal systems, which might otherwise have inhibited effective co-operation to the extent 
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Finally, the Lehman bankruptcy is a particularly complicated example of an international 
cross-border insolvency case.104 The Lehman Brothers insolvency resulted in 75 separate 
insolvency proceedings105 subject to the laws of nine different countries all of which had 
competing and sometimes conflicting policy and social influences.106 The Protocol107 itself was 
agreed as a response to a lack of applicable law that would bind all of the parties in the 
Lehman bankruptcy and was broadly similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law containing 
references to the Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-Border 
Cases by the American Law Institute, which was discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report.108 We 
would consider it exceptional in this discussion. 
7.3.5 Limitations of the United States’ approach to cross-border co-ordination 
Protocols have been powerful tools in cross-border insolvency cases heard in the United 
States but they are also flawed. In a protocol, it is still possible for a party to ‘hold-out’ for a 
better deal to the detriment of the collective and they do not resolve territorial disputes about 
substantive law.109 There have been a variety of cross-border cases resolved through the use 
of protocols, but with a broad range of success and efficiency. That said, as will be shown in 
Chapter 8 in the responses to the Judicial Survey, many judges would still prefer to draft their 
own bespoke protocols on a case by case basis.  
As with provisions in the Article 26 of the EIR Recast, the US courts have the discretion to 
refuse to recognise a plan that contains some action that would be manifestly contrary to 
public policy under the rules of Chapter 15 in cross-border insolvency cases.110 This exception 
provides flexibility to avoid recognising foreign insolvency proceedings, as public policy is a 
decision based in national law, which was discussed in some detail in relation to the EIR Recast 
in this Report’s Chapter 5 section 5.5.3.  
Protocols also often contain a similar public policy exception. The exception can have a broad 
range of interpretations from differences in substantive law, to conflicts with fundamental 
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constitutional principles.111 This is particularly acute when a protocol attempts to bring 
together both civil and common law jurisdictions.112 As observed by Sexton:  
Courts in civil law jurisdictions meticulously scour their civil codes for authorisation to 
engage in any practice, but because protocols frequently interact with rules limiting 
ex parte communications and communications between courts, civil law courts have 
found their authority to endorse protocols lacking.113 
It is not entirely clear to us in our research on the JCOERE Project that, despite the fact that 
some civil law jurisdictions such as France and Italy have standardised rules relation to co-
ordination and co-operation as discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of this Report, all civil law 
countries have the same approach. Nor is it clear that all common law jurisdictions would 
approach the adoption of co-ordination protocols without significant and careful 
consideration of the constitutional and administrative law principles mentioned in Chapters 3 
and 5 of this Report. Otherwise, the information on what co-ordination looks like or indeed 
might look like in the EU in reality is sparse, and this would be equally applicable both within 
the EU and in relation to any one jurisdiction within the EU co-operating externally. Although 
some of the guidelines referred to in the foregoing Chapter 6 (section 6.4.3 and 6.4.5), notably 
the European JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines114 along with the ELI Report115 as well as the 
well-known ALI-III Principles, 116 do refer to the usefulness of creating protocols to co-ordinate 
cross-border proceedings, evidence of their use by courts in EU countries in strictly EU cross-
border cases is not prevalent. Nor is there significant evidence of use in external cases by 
courts in EU of such protocols, other than in relation to cases deliberated upon in England and 
Ireland, a sample of which are mentioned in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
7.4 Competition in the International Restructuring Forum Context 
The United States provides an interesting example of how competing for forum in 
international cross-border corporate insolvency cases may (or may not) arise. As the 
restructuring frameworks implemented as a result of the PRD may not be covered by either 
the EIR Recast or the Judgments Regulation, it has already been noted that there may be 
opportunities for competition between European jurisdictions for restructuring business. The 
Netherlands has already been clear that they would like to become the next restructuring 
destination post-Brexit, as was discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.5.4, and also currently have 
 
111 Anthony V Sexton, ‘Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies Involving Enterprise Groups: The 
Mixed Record of Protocols, the UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2011-2012) 12 Chi J Int’l L 811, 824. 
112 Evan D Flaschen and Ronald J Silverman, ‘Cross-border Insolvency Co-operation Protocols’ (1998) 33(3) Texas International Law Journal 
587, 593-94 
113 Anthony V Sexton, ‘Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies Involving Enterprise Groups: The 
Mixed Record of Protocols, the UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2011-2012) 12 Chi J Int’l L 811, 824. 
114 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles’ (Tri Leiden, University of Leiden, and Nottingham Law School 2014) 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’). 
115 Bob Wessels, Stephan Madaus, and Gert-Jan Boon, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (European Law Institute 2017) (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘ELI Report’). 
116 ‘ALI-III Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases’ (International Insolvency Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred 





plans to create a non-EIR Recast procedure similar to the English Scheme of Arrangement. 
Ireland already has a Scheme of Arrangement process in place that was used effectively 
recently in Re Ballantyne plc.117 
Competition for international (or European) forum also brings to mind the ‘race to the 
bottom’ debate.118 McCormack has refuted the ‘race to the bottom’ argument in the realm of 
European cross-border insolvency, suggesting that in a European context, involuntary or 
poorly adjusting creditors can also be protected by secondary proceedings, ‘which truncates 
the possibility for a ‘race to the bottom’ leaving only opportunities for a “race to the top.”’119 
This protection is not available from state to state in the USA as all creditors who are party to 
a bankruptcy will be governed by the same federal bankruptcy regime. Co-ordination 
procedures and co-operation obligations contained in the EIR Recast add further assurance in 
this vein.120 
7.5 Comparing Co-operation in the US with the EIR Recast 
7.5.1 Comparing procedural co-ordination 
Without a recognised procedural framework such as the EIR Recast, coordination tends to be 
either subject to soft law or at the discretion of the parties. This can lead to a delay in acting 
quickly to seek recognition and coordination, as happened in the Nortel case, which resulted 
in two or more independent insolvency proceedings with little or no co-operation and a 
subsequent loss of value. The Lehman case is also an example where a delay caused serious 
problems as recognition and coordination were not sought for months. Whereas early co-
operation facilitated perhaps by a regulation such as the EIR Recast promotes earlier contact. 
As noted by Westbrook: 
Early co-operation permits the establishment of protocols and lines of authority in a 
cooperative direction from the start. It also has the benefit of being put in place before 
tactical considerations have become so apparent as to make it difficult for the parties 
to agree.121  
The presence of an overarching regulation applicable to all jurisdictions helps to create 
certainty in the procedural aspects of a cross-border insolvency cases. Our engagement with 
the European judiciary gave a clear indication that judges bound by the EIR Recast would not 
 
117 Ruairi Rynne, ‘Landmark Scheme of Arrangement in Ireland’ (2019) Autumn Eurofenix 30. See also Irene Lynch Fannon and Gerard 
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for over 50 years) as a tool to implement complex international debt restructurings. Together with the extensive use of the examinership 
process to restructure insolvent Irish businesses it highlights the effectiveness and robustness of Ireland as a jurisdiction in which to pursue 
such restructurings.’  
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environment in the interests of economic efficiency to attract external investment that may effectively remove protections and limit 
regulatory interference that might otherwise ensure a higher level of corporate responsibility. 
119 Gerard M McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 68(1) Cambridge L J 169, 181. 
120 See further, Chapter 3 of JCOERE Report 1. 
121 Jay L Westbrook. ‘Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market: The Universalist System and the Choice of A Central Court’ (2018) 




argue with a request for recognition of foreign main proceedings because the wording of the 
provisions is obligatory. While co-operation and recognition between courts in the USA in 
relation to inter-state insolvency and restructuring proceedings is not a problem due to the 
federal nature of bankruptcy, it does arise in cross-border cases occurring within the US 
Bankruptcy Court when there are multiple international proceedings occurring within the 
same case. That said, the use of ‘sufficient connection’ rather than the COMI test seems to 
continue to be the rule, even when a case falls under Chapter 15, which provides for a COMI 
test. This flexibility of interpretation is in part due to the ability of common law courts such as 
the US, Ireland, and the UK to interpret the test of COMI in a way that is more likely to make 
jurisdiction possible in more spurious situations.  
The examples of coordination of international cross-border procedures in the USA may also 
serve as useful instruments of reference for coordination efforts between EU Member States 
when having to deal with potentially competing restructuring procedures.122 However, 
bespoke protocols can also be problematic for civil law jurisdictions due to the nature of the 
judicial role as the applier of statutory law, rather than the interpreter. As aforementioned, 
most of the time a judge would need some kind of legislative permission to involve him or 
herself in a protocol that dictated its role in a case. The Nakash protocol was a significant 
exception to this characteristic conflict but is likely due to the relationship between the two 
relevant jurisdictions (the USA and Israel). Protocols can be created to suit the particulars of 
a case and provide a flexible and party-specific resolution to cross-border conflicts. However, 
protocols are also potentially subject to holdouts and will also differ on a case by case basis, 
though there is also an argument that case specific protocols may be more beneficial than a 
one-size-fits-all approach.  
7.6 Conclusion and Transition 
This Chapter has focused on the methods and means used by the United States in both its 
cross-border interstate bankruptcies as well as in the international restructuring arena. Co-
operation in this context has focused on how certain conflict of laws issues are resolved in a 
place not covered by the EIR Recast, namely forum determination and the coordination of 
procedures. These comparisons are useful as the EU is itself both a species of federal 
organisation somewhat similar to the United States but is also a confederation of states that 
exhibit international relationships, similar to the United States’ relationships with other 
countries. Thus, looking at the US from an interstate and international bankruptcy perspective 
offers some insight into the mechanisms that exist for co-operation both within and outside 
of the EU that may be instructive in both insolvency generally and restructuring particularly. 
Drawing parallels to the current paradigm of co-operation under the EIR Recast, the inevitable 
conclusion is that the EIR Recast provides certainty and a harmonised approach that will be 
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lacking should there be a proliferation of restructuring procedures that Member States 
choose to keep out of the EIR Recast.  
The next Chapter will present the results of the JCOERE Judicial Survey. It is organised along 
several key themes: experience with cross-border co-operation; awareness of co-operation 
guidelines; demand for resources among the judiciaries of the EU; and interpretative 
observations in relation to judicial training.
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VIII. Chapter 8: JCOERE Focus Group Survey on Judicial Cooperation 
Guidelines Awareness, Use, and Recommendations 
8.1 JCOERE Survey of Judicial Practice: Introduction and Methodology 
One of the aims of the JCOERE Project has been to explore awareness of the guidelines 
described in Chapter 6, their use, and their potential to support co-operation amongst 
members of the European judiciary. This Chapter describes a survey that was disseminated to 
three separate focus groups of judges within the EU to determine their experience with cross-
border co-operation, as well as their awareness of the guidelines applicable court-to-court co-
operation, along with other aspects that could bear some relevance to the ease of judicial co-
operation generally. The latter aspect of the survey reflects some of the themes and 
observations outlined in Chapter 4 of this Report which described how the EU has adopted 
policies and initiatives addressing challenges to the rule of law within the EU and supporting 
increased mutual trust between jurisdictions. 
At the planning stage, it was intended to disseminate an English language survey among 
networks of judges throughout the EU. On the recommendations of our partners at Università 
degli Studi di Firenze and Universitatea Titu Maiorescu in Bucharest, the team undertook to 
create the survey in both Italian and Romanian to avoid any reticence to take the survey based 
on a language preference. The survey was therefore produced in three different languages 
(English, Italian, and Romanian) and disseminated to three different focus groups: INSOL 
Europe Judicial Forum and an additional group of Irish judges;1 networks of Italian Judges;2 
and the Romanian Magistracy networks.3 There was a window of approximately one month 
within which the surveys could be completed, resulting in 17 responses to the English 
Language Survey, 14 responses from the Romanian Language Survey, and 19 responses to the 
Italian Language Survey.  
The survey was divided into three main sections. The first section contained preliminary 
questions pertaining to the judicial role, specialism, jurisdiction, and finally, the requirements 
 
1 The JCOERE Project Team would like to express its gratitude in particular to the Honourable Judge Michael Quinn of the Irish High Courts 
and Lorna Reid for facilitating the contact with both the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum and the group of Irish judges hearing commercial cases 
in Ireland. This group of judges will be referred to throughout the rest of this Report as the English Language Focus Group or “ELFG”. 
2 The JCOERE Project Team would like to express its gratitude in particular to Professor Lorenzo Stanghellini of Universita degli Studi di Firenze 
for facilitating the contact with the network of Italian Judges.  
3 The JCOERE Project Team would like to express its gratitude in particular to Judge Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie of the Bucharest Tribunal for 




for training, both to become a judge and in relation to hearing insolvency cases. This section 
was designed to highlight commonalities and differences between the participants and to 
assist in the categorisation of responses to questions asked later in the survey. The second 
section focussed on the participants’ experience with co-operation and communication in 
cross-border insolvency cases. The final section then assessed the awareness and use of a list 
of 14 guidelines, both European and international, that provide advice on co-operation and 
communication in cross-border cases, as described in Chapter 6 of this Report. Some of these 
guidelines focus on cross-border insolvency, whereas others are less specialised in nature. The 
questions in this survey were intended to satisfy one of the tasks under Workpackage 3 of the 
JCOERE Project, specifically to gauge awareness of co-operation guidelines amongst members 
of the judiciary and to enhance such awareness.  
8.2 Observations from the Judicial Survey 
The Judicial Survey was answered by a total of 50 judges from 11 different jurisdictions. Of 
these judges, 13 indicated that they only hear insolvency related cases, while 25 hear cases of 
a commercial or corporate nature, with the last 12 hearing a variety of civil cases.  
8.2.1 Judicial experience with co-operation 
A key theme explored by the survey was the experience that members of each focus group 
had with cross-border co-operation. It is interesting to note initially that out of the 50 
responding judges, 16 had specific training on how to deal with co-operation in cross-border 
cases (6 in the English Language Focus Group (ELFG); 4 in Italy; and 6 in Romania). In terms of 
the experience indicated in relation to co-operation, there were some interesting results, as 









Insolvency co-operation experience in the EU 4/17 2/19 6/14 
Of those, also trained in co-operation 2/4 1/2 4/6 
Co-operating on EU insolvency cases only 3/4 1/2 2/6 
Co-operating in international insolvency cases 1/4 1/2 4/6 
    
Non-insolvency co-operation experience in the EU 5/17 4/19 8/14 
Of those, also trained in co-operation 4/5 2/4 3/8 
Co-operation in international non-insolvency cases 3/17 2/19 4/14 
Of those, also trained in co-operation 2/3 0/2 3/4 
The focus group responses indicate a diverse experience with both co-operation itself and 
with training in co-operation. Interestingly, a strong correlation between the two is not 
actually indicated. Some judges appear to have co-operated without any training in the area, 
while others have had training that they have not yet had the opportunity to use. In the 
responses to the English Language Survey, there does seem to be a correlation between the 
length of service and experience co-operating in cross-border matters; however, no such 
correlation exists in the Italian or Romanian responses.  
It can be observed from the responses that the reach of current co-operation training could 
be improved. It is recommended that the EU Commission could address this matter in 
coordination with national training initiatives, which will be discussed below in section 8.3. 
The responses also indicate that co-operation may not be as widespread as initially surmised 
within the JCOERE hypothesis. While some of the judges have co-operated both inside and 
outside of the EU and in both insolvency and other matters, the numbers who have engaged 
in cross-border co-operation are still less than half of the total number of responding judges.4 
Interestingly, it seems the Romanian magistracy has experienced requests for co-operation 
more frequently than the judges who responded to the English Language or Italian surveys. 
Our survey did not collect information that could be specifically useful in identifying why this 
may be the case, however, it is certainly an area worth exploring. The general response 
reflected the experience of practitioners as reported at INSOL events, namely that cross 
border insolvency litigation issues, as distinct from transactions, were not that common within 
 




the EU, nor were issues requiring the formal need to raise or address court-to-court co-
operation. In contrast, the relative frequency in Romania could indicate an interesting 
characteristic of Romania and the Romanian judiciary, or may perhaps be reflective of 
patterns of trading in newer EU Member States, or of those states, which are located centrally 
within Europe, or which are close to a number of non-EU countries.  
It should be noted that because the EIR Recast has only been in effect since 26th June 2017 
and therefore a relatively short period of time, little case law has been generated under it. 
This could be a factor in the low numbers of judges with co-operation experience, as it may 
be that the issue of cross-border co-operation as it pertains to the enhanced obligation to co-
operate in the EIR Recast has not yet arisen for the judges within these groups. That said, as 
the obligation becomes more known and companies become even more global, training in 
this area should certainly be more targeted to ensure that those who may be asked to co-
operate have had the training to do so effectively. Given the COVID-19 crisis, current at the 
time of writing, and the likely impact to the economy that it will have, there will certainly be 
an increase in insolvencies internationally over the next several years. Cross-border co-
operation may become even more important in that context.  
8.2.2 Awareness and use of co-operation and communication guidelines 
The second key theme of the survey is the awareness and utilisation of various co-operation 
guidelines that have been developed either internationally or at a European level, in 
connection with the original EIR.5 Given the relative newness of the EIR Recast, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a new specific co-operation and communication guideline has not yet been 
fully developed to reflect the enhanced obligation to co-operate within the EU, though a 
project to update the CoCo guidelines6 is ongoing with an expectation that a revised set of 
guidelines will be released in late 2020. This project is discussed further in section 8.2.3.  
The JCOERE Judicial Survey noted 14 different co-operation and cross-border insolvency 
guidelines and recommendations, 6 of which were discussed in detail in Chapter 6 in terms of 
shared themes that arise in cross-border insolvency cases requiring co-operation.7 The 
resources were chosen on the basis that they had some connection with both cross-border 
insolvency law and advice or guidelines on dealing with such cases from a co-operative 
perspective, or because they touched on the benefits of co-operation in some way. Such 
guidelines range from bespoke communication and coordination guidelines, to 
recommendations on how to deal with certain issues arising in cross-border insolvency and 
restructuring. The level of awareness of each of these guidelines in each focus group is set out  
 
5 Council Regulation (EC) no 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings OJ L160/1 (hereinafter referred to as the “EIR”). 
6 Bob Wessels and Miguel Virgos, ‘European Communication and Co-operation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency’ (INSOL Europe 
Academic Wing 2007) (herineafter referred to as the “CoCo Guidelines”).  
7 Chapter 6 focuses on the Model Law, the ALI-III Global Principles, the World Bank Principles, JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines, CoCo 




in the table below: 
 
8 ‘EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles’ (Tri Leiden, University of Leiden, and Nottingham Law School 2014) 
(hereinafter referred to as the “JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines”).  
9 ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’ (United Nations 2014) (hereinafter referred 
to as the “Model Law”).  
10 ‘Core Principles for an Insolvency Law Regime’ (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2004) (hereinafter referred to as the 
“EBRD Principles). 
11 The Role of the Judge in the Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (Judicial Wing of INSOL Europe 2013) (hereinafter referred to as 
the “INSOL Europe Judicial Wing Book”).  
12 Bob Wessels, Stephan Madaus, and Gert-Jan Boon, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (European Law Institute 2017) (hereinafter 
referred to as the “ELI Report”).  
13 Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) Statement 2018/01 in Insolvency Regulation (Recast) and National 
Procedural Rules 
14 ‘ALI-UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’ (American Law Institute and UNIDROUT 2004).  
15 ‘Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’ (World Bank 2011) (hereinafter referred to as the “World Bank 
Principles”). 
16 ‘ALI-III Global Principles for Co-operation in International Insolvency Cases’ (International Insolvency Institute 2017) (hereinafter referred 
to as the ALI-III Global Principles).  
17 ‘Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases’ (The American Law Institute and the International 
Insolvency Institute 2001). 
 
 ELFG 
Out of 17 
Italian 
Judges 
Out of 19 
Romanian 
Judges 
Out of 14 
Coco Guidelines  12 1 1 
JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines8 11 3 0 
The UNCITRAL Model Law9 15 4 2 
EBRD Core Principles10 3 0 0 
INSOL Europe Judicial Wing Book11 9 2 1 
The ELI Report12 7 2 0 
CERIL Statement13 5 2 0 
CODIRE* 5 2 0 
ACURIA* 3 1 0 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles14 5 6 1 
World Bank Principles15 7 0 0 
ALI-III Global Principles16 4 0 0 
ALI General Principles 4 0 0 




*While the CODIRE Project18 was completed following the period in which the EIR Recast came 
into force, its reference to co-operation and communication are not as direct as some of the 
more targeted guidelines discussed in Chapter 6. The same applies to the ACURIA Best 
Practices.19 As a result, any aspects relevant to cooperation contained in these projects are 
discussed in Annex III (annex to Chapter 6), which is available at the end of this report. 
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of those responding to the English Language 
Survey were aware of at least one of these guidelines (15/17). This is perhaps unsurprising for 
two reasons First, the majority of the judges within this group were derived from the INSOL 
Judicial Forum. Second, the majority of the respondents (16/17) indicated that they attended 
international judicial events, predominantly INSOL Europe Judicial Forum meetings, wherein 
it is common to discuss European guidelines and reports. Among the Italian and the Romanian 
groups, there was comparatively less awareness of the guidelines, with 8 of the 19 
respondents for Italy and 4 of the 14 respondents for Romania indicating awareness of one or 
more of the 14 resources listed in the survey. 
There appears to also be an interesting connection between the attendance at international 
events and knowledge of at least one of the guidelines. Of the 7 Italian respondents who had 
attended international events, 4 were aware of at least one of the guidelines. 1 of the 4 
Romanian respondents who was involved in international events was also aware of at least 
one of the guidelines. The same filter when applied to the English Language Survey Group 
revealed that 14 of the 16 who attended international events also had awareness of at least 
one guideline. It is perhaps an obvious connection, but it does support the Commission’s 
training policy, as described in Chapter 4 of this Report, to involve judges in networks and 
events to encourage the Europeanisation of Member State judiciaries. Extending this analogy 
here, it is recommended to encourage a greater proportion of judges (and practitioners) in 
the Member States, who may be involved in cross-border cases, to attend networking and 
training events hosted by organisations such as the EJTN or the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum. 
It is argued that this will help increase awareness of the resources available to aid them in 
meeting the enhanced obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast. 
Regarding the use of co-operation guidelines, only 4 of the 50 of judges surveyed have 
referred to such guidelines to aid them in communication and co-operation in cross-border 
insolvency cases. These 4 judges were split between the English and Italian Language Surveys. 
On a related point, almost half of the judges surveyed had a preference for creating their own 
protocol on a case-by-case basis. This may be indicative of a number of things, for example, a 
desire amongst judges to consider things flexibly and perhaps a preference not to be 
constrained in advance by a specific set of guidelines, which may be perceived as not being 
appropriate in every cross-border circumstance. The importance of the jurisdiction of the 
 
18 Lorenzo Stanghellini, Riz Mokal, Christoph G Paulus, and Ignacio Tirado, Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress 
Resolution in the Shadow of the Law (Wolters Kluwer 2018) (hereinafter referred to as “CODIRE”).  
19 Catarina Frade, et al, ‘Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: Best Practices, Blockages, and Ways of 




court itself, and its control over proceedings seems to be a second important consideration. 
The need to respond particularly to the parties to the actual proceedings would also drive 
flexibility and court control over any co-operation process. The view that protocols created 
on a case-by-case basis may be preferable was also expressed by some members of the 
judiciary at INSOL Europe events.20 This could indicate that members of the judiciary are 
aware of the possibility raised by the JCOERE project that substantive and procedural issues 
may arise that will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis rather than with set 
guidelines, which may not accommodate them. 
It is interesting to note, however, that while only 4 judges in total said that they had actually 
referred to the guidelines when dealing with a cross-border case requiring co-operation, it 
seems that those who did refer to guidelines referred to several of them, with different 
guidelines being referred to in the different cohorts. The English and Italian language groups 
both referred to the CoCo Guidelines, the Model Law, and the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, with 
the English Language respondents also referring to the JudgeCo Principles, the EBRD 
Guidelines, the Judicial Wing, the ELI Project, and the ALI Transnational Insolvency Principles. 
Again, it is possible that membership in the INSOL Europe Judicial Wing among the English 
Language Focus Group has led to a wider awareness of resource among its members. Given 
the broad awareness of the Model Law, it is unsurprising that all three groups referred to it. 
The Romanian group was more familiar with international principles, such as the EBRD and 
the World Bank principles and did not refer to any of the European guidelines, such as JudgeCo 
and CoCo. As suggested in relation to other aspects of the survey, perhaps this is a reflection 
of its proximity to and trade with non-EU countries.  
8.2.3 Desired access to information 
Amongst the respondent judges, there seemed to be a real interest in having access to 
information either in relation to substantive rules on preventive restructuring processes in 
other member states (43/50), or case studies demonstrating instances of co-operation 
(44/50), or both. That said, even access to information is not a clear-cut issue for members of 
the judiciary. Approximately half of the respondents across the three groups indicated that 
there were rules applicable to the way in which judges could access information external to a 
case, while the remaining respondents indicated that there were not. One possible 
explanation for the contradicting responses, particularly within the same jurisdiction, was that 
some respondents answered the question as though a proceeding had already commenced 
before their court, whereas others were answering more generally. In certain jurisdictions, a 
judge can only formally rely on sources that are opened to them by the parties during the 
proceedings. In some countries, it appears there are specific rules regarding permitted 
sources of information. Thus, what may have seemed like quite a simple question at the outset 
 
20 This was discussed by the Judicial Wing Panel: ‘Co-operation and Communication between Judges in Cross-Border Insolvencies under the 
EIR Recast’ (INSOL Europe Annual Congress, Athens, 5th October 2018). The Judicial Wing Panel was composed of Judge Caroline Costello, 




turned out to be more multifaceted than initially imagined.  Questions still remain as to what 
kind of information judges would be able to access from outside sources. There are also 
challenges regarding providing content to such sources, which clearly illustrates the need for 
further action research projects.  In general, the guidelines described in Chapter 6 of this 
Report defer to national rules on the issue of how judges access information about other 
Member States or other state processes. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, a set of guidelines specific to communication and 
coordination of cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases that includes the enhanced 
obligations set out in the EIR Recast is not yet available. However, a project to revise the CoCo 
Guidelines in line with the EIR Recast has been ongoing since the end of 2017 and a working 
group comprised of academics, judges, and practitioners belonging to both INSOL Europe and 
the Conference of European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) are expected to 
complete this this task.21  
It is hoped that the specific dataset on case studies provided by the JCOERE project on its 
website will provide much needed examples to members of the judiciary of methods of co-
operation. Additionally, information pertaining to the preventive restructuring processes in 
other jurisdictions is provided on our website. 
8.2.4 Judicial training requirements 
Within each focus group, discrepancies were observed in the responses to the questions 
posed on training requirements. Respondents were asked: ‘Before you qualified as a judge or 
administrative decision-maker, were you required to take specific training?’ This was an open 
question in which respondents were invited to write what the relevant training requirements 
were in their jurisdiction to become a judge in a comment box. The question did not specify 
“formal” training or educational prerequisites, so it is unsurprising that there was a range of 
interpretations, sometimes leading to conflicting responses. The variety of answers to this 
survey question, particularly from participants in the same jurisdiction, points more towards 
a non-uniform interpretation of the survey question itself rather than to actual differences in 
training. 
The preliminary questions in the survey also queried whether judges in the three focus groups 
were required to undertake training to hear insolvency related cases. The overwhelming 
response was that such specialist training is generally not required. Of the 13 total 
respondents across the three focus groups who hear insolvency cases only, 1 from the Italian 
group indicated that they were also required to undertake specialist training. Our impression 
of responses, which varied within jurisdictions, is that the open-ended nature of the 
preliminary question regarding training also led to different responses. For example, 1 of the 
Italian respondents indicated the need for specialist training, but other Italian respondents 
 




replied that no such training was required. As these respondents also indicated that they hear 
only insolvency cases, it must be queried whether the training indicated by that one 
respondent is actually a requirement, or if it is optional but perhaps undertaken as a matter 
of practice. For example, the training requirement could also be determined by the particular 
court level or region. It is also possible that respondents who answered in the affirmative were 
doing so in light of insolvency-related training undertaken in the past as part of their role.  
A further question asked whether there were requirements for Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) if a judge specialised in insolvency law, which could be answered by 
providing some commentary on what was required. While over half of the respondents 
indicated some requirement for CPD, in many cases the answers did not correlate within the 
same jurisdictions. In addition, this question received responses that do not align with those 
who had to take training to decide insolvency cases in the first place or with the numbers who 
hear only insolvency cases. As was the case with the responses discussed above, it is possible 
that respondents interpreted requirement along the same lines as custom and practice; thus, 
while it may not be a requirement that CPD is undertaken, it may be that it is generally 
accepted practice that a judge would do so. It could also be that the respondents felt that this 
kind of training was required in the sense of its absence being problematic in some way. 
Although it is difficult to draw reliable trends from the survey questions pertaining to training, 
the JCOERE Project has identified a number of key, and what may be perceived as significant 
differences between Member States in relation to the training and education required to 
become a judge. The JCOERE Questionnaire distributed and answered in connection with 
Report 1 of the JCOERE Project investigated training requirements for judges, to which 11 
answers were received. These responses were discussed in detail in section 4.6 of Chapter 4 
of this Report, which gives a clear picture of the training and education characteristics for the 
judiciaries in the relevant jurisdictions. While a number of similarities can be found in 
domestic requirements, for example a university (law) degree; experience of practice as a 
lawyer or a period of formal judge training; internships with courts or firms; exams; and 
certain character requirements, there are also a number of key differences that could impede 
judicial co-operation or interaction between the courts of Member States.  
In common law countries, for example, it is not uncommon for the minimum period of legal 
practice prior to judicial appointment to be 7 years, particularly for the courts that deal with 
preventive restructuring matters. In Ireland, the requirement is 12 years’ practice before an 
individual is eligible to be nominated as a judge of the High Court, which handles the vast 
majority of restructuring matters.22 With that said, the majority of High Court and Supreme 
Court judges in Ireland have considerably more experience than the minimum requirement. 
 
22 The Circuit Court has jurisdiction in relation to the examinership of small and medium enterprises, however the majority of examinership 





By contrast, other EU countries require a judicial internship after graduation lasting for 323 or 
424 years or a judicial training course lasting 2 years.25 Furthermore, in France judges of the 
local Commercial Courts are businesspeople elected to the role; this is an entirely different 
construct to the Irish or English Commercial Court or indeed most of the rest of the EU, 
wherein the usual – and clearly varied – practice requirements apply to judicial appointment. 
Therefore, even in these examples there are some substantial differences in types of 
experience required for judges, thus a legitimate question arises as to what effect these 
imbalances and may have on court-to-court co-operation. 
8.3 Analysis of and Reflection on the Results  
The main purpose of the survey of the three judicial focus groups was to assess the awareness 
of current existing guidelines pertaining to communication and co-operation and to gauge 
experience with co-operation among the respondents. The promotion by the EU of judicial 
involvement in networks and training to encourage the development of a European judicial 
culture coincides with the importance of such networks for the dissemination of knowledge 
about resources to assist with the EU derived obligations to co-operate between the courts 
of different Member States. While the correlations are not necessarily present across the 
three focus groups, there is certainly a correlation between attendance at events, such as the 
INSOL Europe Judicial Forum, and awareness of such guidelines among the English Language 
survey participants. While knowledge of the guidelines will not impact judicial experience with 
co-operation on a case-by-case basis, it does point to the effectiveness of networks and 
training in raising awareness of the resources in co-operation and communication available 
to judges. In addition, it also seems clear that there is not a broad experience of co-operation 
in cross-border insolvency cases, which could potentially be attributed to the newness of the 
enhanced obligation to co-operate under the EIR Recast. That said, given the crisis looming 
for national economies at the time of writing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated 
limitations on business and industry, the potential for a growth in cross-border cases is 
significant over the next few years. 
At the time of writing, the judiciary has also been forced to make a lot of serious changes in 
the way that they deal with hearings and cases as a result of the inability to hold such hearings 
in person due to limitations and lockdowns associated with the COVID-19 crisis of 2020. INSOL 
International conducted a webinar hosted by Judge Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie of the Bucharest 
Tribunal with Judge Martin Glenn of the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court and 
Judge Aedit Abdullah of the Singapore Bankruptcy Courts, during which the impact on the 
judiciary of the COVID-19 crisis, as well as the changes made to accommodate the need for 
social distancing, were discussed. While these reactions are not directly pertinent to co-








be resistant to virtual options for a variety of reasons prior to these being necessitated by the 
crisis. Virtual tools not only make it easier for parties to access courts and each other, but may 
well enhance the possibility of co-operating in cross-border cases. Judge Aedit Abdullah 
acknowledged that the Singapore judiciary may have had to order equipment and even 
laptops to accommodate the needs of virtual courtrooms, but the fact is that judges have 
been able to do so despite some understandable reticence towards moving hearings on-line. 
As noted by Judge Martin Glenn: “Financial distress does not know geographical boundaries”. 
As companies continue to expand into global enterprises, the administration of justice must 
find a way to keep up, including the facilitation of co-operation between courts. 
While it was also recognised that there are differences in the level of discretion that judges 
have in common law jurisdictions like the United States and Singapore to adopt new methods 
of administering justice, Judge Nastasie was absolutely clear that she did not believe that the 
civil law jurisdictions were especially different, particularly given the obligation to co-operate 
under the EIR Recast and the fact that some Member States have also adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. While judges in all jurisdictions are constrained in how 
they operate under procedural rules, there is no reason why new methods, supporting co-
operation and communication in cross-border insolvency, cannot be considered. 
Given the potential increase in cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases following the 
economic crisis likely to be precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which was ongoing at the 
time of writing this Report, but prior to the survey being distributed and answered, it is likely 
that there will be an increased need for co-operation, in order for the enhanced obligations 
set out in the EIR Recast to be met effectively. The current prevalence of virtual training and 
interactivity due to the inability to meet in person arising from current travel restrictions 
presents an opportunity to increase the reach of training in co-operation and the awareness 
of guidelines. 
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IX. Chapter 9: Reflections, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the 
JCOERE Project 
9.1 Introduction: The JCOERE Research Project 
This Chapter will provide some reflections based on the two Reports presented as part of the 
JCOERE Project. The Project began with the obligations imposed on courts to co-operate with 
courts in other jurisdictions and with insolvency practitioners in the European Union, which 
were introduced in the EIR Recast 848/2015. The obligations were newly introduced in the 
Recast Insolvency Regulation. As the Regulation itself did not come into force until June 2017, 
it is very early on in its application, and accordingly quite early to assess the overall impact of 
these enhanced obligations, particularly since no cases to date that deal with co-operation 
matters have been heard under the EIR Recast. Meanwhile, the European Commission 
published an intention to address corporate failure and rescue in its policy document entitled 
‘A New Approach to Business Failure’.1 It was therefore appropriate to consider preventive 
restructuring processes in light of the operation of the EIR Recast and, in particular, in light of 
the co-operation obligations contained therein. Thus, the JCOERE Project hypothesis was that 
the co-operation obligations would be particularly problematic in the context of preventive 
restructuring because of the nature of the substantive rules involved in restructuring, coupled 
with existing procedural challenges to co-operation. In short, the question was whether the 
ability of judges to comply fully with the co-operation obligations placed on courts by the EIR 
Recast would encounter substantive and procedural obstacles in the context of cross-border 
preventive restructuring. 
9.2 The Preventive Restructuring Directive 
Just as the JCOERE Project got underway in 2019, progress on the final passing of the 
Preventive Restructuring Directive (‘PRD’) 1023/2019 advanced significantly when the PRD 
was passed in June, the evolution of which was outlined in Chapter 5 of JCOERE Report 1. 
Accordingly, against a backdrop of lively academic commentary and considerable policy 
engagement from the EU Commission, the JCOERE Project began an interrogation into the key 
substantive rules, which were both core to an effective preventive restructuring process and 
also likely to be problematic in terms of the type of recognition and co-operation envisaged 
 
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee ‘A new 




by the EIR Recast. Based on experience with the Irish preventive restructuring process – the 
Examinership process – and familiarity with English Schemes of Arrangement, the JCOERE 
Project identified the following core rules or concepts as being particularly challenging to co-
operation across jurisdictions: 
• Provision for a stay of individual enforcement actions; 
• Focus on a debtor in possession model; 
• Cram-down of dissenting creditors, including intra-class cram-down and more 
importantly cross-class cram-down; 
• Protection of new and interim financing of a restructuring; and 
• The role of a court or administrative authority in approving a restructuring plan. 
9.2.1 Methodology 
In addition to a doctrinal approach to existing preventive restructuring processes with which 
we had familiarity, namely the Irish Examinership and Scheme of Arrangement process and 
the similar English Scheme of Arrangement process, the JCOERE Project adopted a 
comparative approach in relation to relevant restructuring processes (preventive or 
otherwise) in other jurisdictions within the EU.  
Accordingly, project gathered responses to a questionnaire disseminated among insolvency 
and restructuring specialists of 11 Member States to gauge both existing preventive and 
restructuring frameworks and likely attitudes to the implementation of the PRD within these 
Member States. We enlisted the help of additional contributors (including but also beyond 
the jurisdictions of the original JCOERE Project Consortium) across the EU to complete this 
survey which is described in detail in Report 1.2 Additionally as described below, we also 
conducted a survey of members of the European judiciary for the purposes of this second 
Report. 
9.2.2 Different approaches to preventive restructuring in the EU 
Pertinent to the issues of both recognition and future court-to-court co-operation and co-
operation between courts and insolvency practitioners, was the discovery of considerable 
differences amongst Member States both in relation to existing laws and to proposed 
implementation of the PRD. These differences were underpinned by a lively and contested 
academic debate on the merits of preventive restructuring, which was also reflected in the 
approach of lawmakers within the European Union during the negotiation on the scope of the 
provision of the PRD. While Report 1 of the JCOERE Project provides detail on different 
approaches within Member States responding to the JCOERE Questionnaire, Report 2 
summarises, in Chapter 3, these different approaches through the utilisation of a taxonomy 
 
2 See Chapters 6-8 of JCOERE Report 1 for a distillation and comparison of the JCOERE Questionnaire responses. The 11 jurisdictions 
responding to the questionnaire included Ireland, Italy, Romania (the original JCOERE Project Consortium members), France, German, 




broadly categorising the approaches along a spectrum representing those interested in what 
is termed ‘robust restructuring processes’ and those Member States, which are resistant to 
preventive restructuring. 
The fact that there are these differences is underpinned by the broad range of choice provided 
in the PRD. Despite aiming to harmonise an approach to business failure and preventive 
restructuring, there are so many options provided for in the PRD that it is a fairly weak 
harmonising instrument. This will obviously present challenges in terms of recognition and in 
terms of co-ordination as envisaged by the EIR Recast. The PRD is also somewhat unusual in 
its characteristics in that it does not envisage a harmonising ‘floor of rights’ that one might 
see in the area of employment law for example, or a set of ‘minimum standards’ that one 
might see in environmental law. Instead, Member States must comply with the PRD and 
implement a preventive restructuring process, but this does not mean that they cannot have 
additional restructuring processes, which do not exactly mirror the principles of the PRD. 
Not only that but, as is pointed out in both of the JCOERE Reports, there is a lack of 
complementarity between the terms of the PRD and the EIR Recast. This means that a 
restructuring process in a particular Member State, may be one of a few processes found in 
the legal code in a particular Member State and may or may not be included in the EIR Recast. 
As discussed in this Report, a process outside of the EIR Recast is not subject to either the 
recognition or the co-ordination provisions. Examples of this set of affairs are available in 
France, where some of the restructuring procedures are covered by the EIR Recast and others 
are not. In Ireland, for example, the Examinership process is covered by the EIR Recast and 
the Scheme of Arrangement process is not. The same applies to the new Dutch WHOA 
legislation, where one procedure is envisaged to be included in Annex A and the other is not. 
Furthermore, as identified in this Report, a conscious choice may be made by the Member 
State to create a procedure that would sit outside of the EIR Recast. 
9.3 The EIR Recast 848/2015 
As described, the JCOERE Project was focussed at the outset on the interesting co-operation 
obligations imposed on courts in relation to both individual debtor proceedings (in our case 
always corporate debtors) and groups. These obligations, in addition to the impetus for their 
creation, were discussed in detail in Chapter 2. As we continued our analysis and research it 
became important to articulate the distinction between recognition of a procedure and 
continued co-operation obligations that might arise.  As we see from the summary in the 
previous section, recognition of various restructuring processes may not even arise as the 
processes may be excluded from the EIR Recast. Furthermore, under the EIR, co-operation 
obligations will only apply to insolvency proceedings to which the Regulation applies. 
Even if a process is included in the Regulation, there is the possibility that main proceedings 
will be accompanied by secondary or territorial proceedings within the scheme of the 




co-operation is most likely to arise. Given the nature of the creditors’ interests and the 
challenge to those interests, which is inherent in preventive restructuring, it may be very likely 
that this eventuality will transpire following implementation of the PRD by Member States. 
Therefore, whilst courts may follow the normal obligations of recognition of another hearing 
in a Member State, co-operation will be distinctively important as it is a real issue where a few 
different proceedings are being run. 
However, the focus of our work was not on the original set of problems raised by the 
Regulation, which stem from the COMI concept and move through when secondary or 
territorial proceedings might be opened. Rather, our focus was on the co-operation 
obligations per se. The first part of our hypothesis – namely that substantive rules inherent in 
preventive restructuring might be particularly problematic – is borne out, we would argue, by 
the significant levels of theoretical disagreement and policy debate discovered during our 
research. While the PRD does set out essential basic principles in the form of minimum 
standards for restructuring frameworks, the scope and permitted derogations have made 
such disagreements possible, creating a fertile ground for further debate and the potential for 
not insignificant diversity among the Member State frameworks created under the PRD. 
The variety of preventive restructuring processes allowed for, both under the PRD and outside 
of it, will aggravate issues of co-operation as it is more likely that territorial and secondary 
proceedings will be maintained. Most importantly, the PRD will not be implemented across 
the EU until 2021 and so it is early days to predict how all of these variations will play out. 
9.4 Co-operation as a Separate Concept from Recognition 
Because it is early days in terms of describing how co-operation obligations may be treated in 
national courts, our discussion of some conceptual analysis of the obligation courts might 
have to assist a foreign court in Chapter 5 is pertinent to the nature of the co-operation 
obligations. In these common law decisions, the courts regard the obligation to assist a foreign 
court or officer of that court as standing separately from the issue of recognition of a 
proceeding or a court order arising from such a proceeding. It is possible that over time 
obligations to co-operate will emerge as a separately justiciable concept, not necessarily 
linked to the resolution of the recognition per se. 
9.5 Co-operation and the European Judiciary 
We demonstrated in Report 1 both how complex the Preventive Restructuring Directive itself 
was and the complexity generated around its design and implementation. However, when we 
turned to procedural obstacles and focussed on the courts and the nature of the obligation 
per se, we discovered a multilevel range of complexity. 
The first issue concerned, of course, when and how the obligation to co-operate would apply. 
Many questions that arose are generated by the applicability of the Regulation itself. 




These are considered in Chapter 3 and include unanswered questions of liability and 
consequences in the event of non-compliance with the obligation. 
In our applied research, which included considerable engagement with members of the 
judicial wing of INSOL Europe, we also discovered a considerable diversity of views amongst 
European judiciary regarding co-operation in live cases. Some judges expressed particular 
concern regarding propriety in terms of constitutional and administrative law in the context 
of co-operating with another court, with others regarding this matter in purely pragmatic 
terms. We began to understand the variety of cultures, which persist within the European 
Union. These differences are clear in areas such as judicial training, required qualifications and 
judicial appointments but do not end with these practical differences and continue on to areas 
of judicial reasoning and function. Chapter 4 of this report considers these issues in depth, 
with Chapter 8 complimenting this analysis by exploring the responses of members of the 
European judiciary to the survey questions on some of these very issues. There was 
considerable divergence of experience, outlook and approach to matters of co-operation, 
particularly when these have been couched in terms of a positive obligation. 
Furthermore, even when a generally positive approach was taken to the concept of European 
integration and co-operation in a broader context, (underpinned in rule of law concepts 
described in Chapters 1 and 4) we also identified considerable concern regarding the 
mechanics of co-operation. Even though some mention of specific issues is made in the 
Regulation, there is little to assist regarding the actual practice of co-operation. In this context, 
we considered the experience of the judiciary by engaging positively with them in workshops 
and through the survey, which is discussed in Chapter 8. We also considered the relevance 
and applicability of existing guidelines, which are described in Chapter 6. Overall, we found 
that many judges favoured creating their own protocols, something that is reflective of the 
US experience, (considered in chapter 7).  
9.6 UNCITRAL Model Law and Guidelines 
In this context it is not entirely clear that the aspirational, optimistic tone of the guideline 
documents discussed in Chapter 6 have engaged proactively with the legal principles, both 
substantive and procedural, which we have hypothesised will serve to block such co-
operation. We also found a lack of awareness and willingness to utilise such guidelines 
amongst the judiciary, with this reaction being gleaned from the responses to the judicial 
survey analysed in Chapter 8. It is unclear from the survey why this is the case, but it is 
something that the Commission may want to consider in conjunction with national training 
initiatives, particularly given the emphasis that the Commission has given to judicial 





9.7 Cross Border Insolvency? 
Overall one of our most interesting, if not somewhat puzzling discoveries, was the fact that 
despite companies operating across borders in the EU, when it came to insolvency the cross-
border nature of the trading patterns did not seem to result in significant cross-border 
insolvency issues or more accurately any formal argument, litigation or settlement of these 
issues. This phenomenon was first highlighted to us by practitioners in the field, who 
constantly expressed reservations regarding the frequency of any of these issues arising in 
practise, let alone in litigation. There seems to be a pattern of matters, which might have a 
cross-border element to them, being resolved informally. Indeed, it may be recalled that a 
contention in Chapter 2 was that a tendency towards co-operating prior to the introduction 
of the Recast, in the sense of concluding (in)formal agreements and protocols, was not 
particularly unusual amongst those practitioners in common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
the prevalence of informal resolutions possibly stems from the fairly rigid conception of the 
COMI rules, which has now become embedded in EU law given that the first Regulation was 
passed in 2000. 
Though they clearly anticipated that such cases might arise, the judges that we surveyed also 
had generally low levels of experience with cross-border insolvency cases. This was despite 
the fact that most of these judges either specialised in insolvency law, habitually attended 
international conferences, such as those held by INSOL Europe, or both.  
Within this unusual and surprising reality, we discovered some disquiet based on lack of 
knowledge of other Member States approaches and some level of disquiet regarding the lack 
of availability of official sources of information regarding the processes of other Member 
States. This is particularly aggravated in the context of preventive restructuring given the 
range of approaches and considerable concern about the prospective operation of the 
obligations in the Regulation. As discussed in Chapter 8, even the matter of receipt of 
information is far from clear-cut. Co-operation should also be considered in light of the 
adversarial nature of proceedings in certain jurisdictions, but not others. In other words, in 
certain jurisdictions, judges must generally rely only on sources that are opened to them by 
one side or the other during the course of a proceeding. Such a dynamic being present in only 
some EU jurisdictions may create a situation where some judges can freely attain necessary 
information, whereas others are confined by rules embedded in their legal system. In addition 
to this perceived informational challenge, judges continued to mention the simple barrier of 
language in a European context. 
We also discovered that there was some resistance to a pan-European approach from 
practitioners based on what has been described as jurisdictional reach. This is discussed in 
Chapter 5 and can be seen in evidence in some of the cases discussed therein where 
arguments are made that particular actions are not covered by the Regulation and do not 




These kinds of issues, concerning practitioner and court interest in keeping the litigation 
within state is also reflected in the more sophisticated US approach. 
9.8 Some Future Trends  
In Chapter 7 we considered a different federalised group of States, namely the United States, 
to provide additional understanding of what might emerge in Europe as we continue to focus 
on integration of Member State insolvency cases, ranging from recognition of forums by 
second Member States, the possibility of co-ordination between courts of different 
jurisdictions and how that might be accomplished and ultimately harmonisation of state laws. 
It is possible that as the European Union becomes more integrated that patterns of 
recognition, co-operation and forum shopping may begin to reflect patterns that have 
emerged in the United States over a longer period of 100 years. More integration implies a 
greater knowledge of the characteristics of particular jurisdiction, reflected in the taxonomic 
characterisation presented in Chapter 3. Thus, certain jurisdictions may appear more 
attractive as forums for insolvency litigation and this may become an acceptable feature of 
the European Union. 
As we progress incrementally towards harmonisation in Europe and as we discover through 
our work in preventive restructuring and in relation to cross border practise generally that, in 
fact, there is a commonality of concepts (eg. actio pauliana and variants thereof) across 
European jurisdictions, it is likely that greater convergence will occur. Against that background 
deliberate forum shopping driven by a search for efficient and expert courts, a concentration 
of legal and financial expertise in a particular jurisdiction and a willingness or openness to 
accept jurisdiction over cases may be a feature of future European practise. It is arguable that 
this has already developed in relation to the recognition of the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales as a restructuring centre in the last recession and the recognition of certain states, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as the location for the FinCos of inward investing 
multinational companies.  
9.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is not entirely clear that there will be an integrated European approach to 
preventive restructuring. This is for a variety of reasons. First, this is because of scepticism 
regarding the potential harmonising effect of the PRD. A second complication is the interface 
between the PRD and the EIR, which we have mentioned in various contexts throughout this 
report. Thirdly, while in some ways recognition determined by a COMI test under the 
Regulation may be fairly straightforward in the context of traditional insolvency processes, we 
do not expect that this will be the case in preventive restructuring; first, because not all of the 
processes will be covered by the Regulation but secondly even where they are, we expect to 
see secondary proceedings arising to protect the interests of the parties in the face of such 
radical rules as an ongoing stay, cram down and cross class cram down. In this context, it is 




the EIR Recast – in that there is an opt out for the insolvency practitioner without the necessity 
to justify the decision – thus, we anticipate that this may yield a similar result, namely multiple 
proceedings in order to protect the interests of local parties and perhaps, even as a 
commercial decision. Fourthly, even if a process implemented under the PRD is covered by 
the Regulation, we remain puzzled by the empirical evidence surrounding a lack of cross-
border insolvency issues. We consider the role of the practitioner in retaining jurisdiction for 
whatever reason is important here. Fifthly, even where the issues arise, we also detected 
considerable concern from the judiciary regarding the mechanics of co-operation and the 
interface between co-operation and concern for procedural transparency and consequent 
issues of administrative and constitutional propriety. 
As a way forward, we intend to continue our focus on the procedural and substantive issues 
that judges, in particular, may experience in the future when dealing with obligations to co-
operate. In keeping with the aims and deliverables of the Project, we will consider these issues 
through the creation of case studies, which will consider hypothetical scenarios based on the 
rescue processes envisaged in the PRD and potential obstacles to co-operation that may arise. 
In addition, we will also further consider the guidelines analysed in this Report and how they 
could pertain to these issues, by providing information to judiciary and other relevant parties 
on how to address situations where co-operation is not possible and how the obligations 
imposed under the Regulation could be addressed. It is hoped that this solution-driven 
research in the coming months will help to ameliorate some of the difficulties that judges 
might experience in the future. 
In terms of future research questions that might be pertinent to consider, it is anticipated that 
further research will be required to consider how the PRD is transposed by different Member 
States, and whether an integrated and harmonised approach materialises. In addition, as the 
Recast Regulation becomes properly embedded into EU law in time, it is anticipated that 
further research will be required to consider how recognition relates to co-operation in light 
of different approaches in case law to assistance (which we would consider to be an 
equivalent concept to co-operation) as distinct from recognition or enforcement of court 
orders. Furthermore, additional research is called for as to how co-operation will practically 
be carried out by the judiciary across the variety of jurisdictions in the European Union, which 
at present display different characteristics in terms of judicial culture.
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Case Study for consideration by the Judicial Wing and by the Turnaround Wing at INSOl Europe 
Annual Conference, Copenhagen September 2019. 
© Professor Irene Lynch Fannoni 
StylishHotelGroup is a hotel group with its COMI in Ireland. It has a range of corporate entities in a 
group structure. Some of these companies are property ownership companies, some are 
operational. Typically the property ownership companies have 1-5 employees, whereas the 
operational companies in the group have on average 100 employees (operating the hotels).  
In the period 2005-2010 the Group engaged in considerable expansion and borrowed over €500 
million euro from its main banker. This loan eventually became a non-performing loan which was 
temporarily taken over by the Irish state agency (NAMA) but was then sold on to GermanBank AG 
In 2017 StylishHotelGroup and GermanBank AG entered into a contractual debt settlement 
agreement which wrote down the total amount owed on the loan and provided for a longer 
repayment plan. Although concluded in Ireland the contract contained a choice of German law 
clause. [‘the 2017 agreement’] 
In 2018, finding itself unable to comply with the terms of the ‘the 2017 agreement’ 
StylishHotelGroup decided to avail of the Irish preventive restructuring process- and petitioned the 
Irish High Court to have an Examiner appointed.ii Most of the trade creditors were supportive of the 
application to have an Examiner appointed but GermanBank AG objected strongly. 
The High Court refused to appoint an Examiner on the grounds that there was no reasonable 
prospect of all of the companies in the group receiving the required investment to survive. However, 
the parent company appealed to the Irish Court of Appeal and an Examiner was appointed to all the 
relevant companies in the StylishHotelGroup despite the objections of GermanBank AG and despite 
the presence of the existing ‘2017 agreement’ whereby this bank had already agreed to a write down 
of its debt. 
The Examinership process is very similar to the process envisaged by the European Directive on 
Preventive Restructuring 2019/1023 in its most robust form. It involves the imposition of a stay or 
moratorium on all actions against the company and any related company (i.e. member of the group) 
for a pre-determined period of 3 months, which can be extended by the court. It also provides for 
intra and cross class cram- down on approval by the court.  
The Examinership has commenced. Unhappy with the prospects of further write down, GermanBank 
AG seeks to bring an action on foot of ‘the 2017 agreement’ to enforce this prior agreement in the 
court in Germany. The Irish companies argue that the Examinership proceeding in Ireland takes 
precedence. 
GermanBank AG argues that ‘the 2017 agreement’ must exclude the possibility of the companies 
applying for the Examinership process as GermanBank AG have already taken a discounted debt 
repayment proposal under this ‘2017 agreement’. There is no specific statement to this effect in the 
agreement. The Irish court had rejected this argument in its initial decision to appoint an Examiner.  
For information the Irish Examinership process, although pre-dating the new EU Directive 2019/1023 
by thirty years, was modelled on the US Chapter 11 and contains many features of the Directive in its 
most radical form. In particular it is possible that as the Examinership or rescue progresses, the 
GermanBank AG debt (which represents 98% of the companies’ debts) will be written down a second 
time and the debt repayment agreement could be substantially altered by the process. This is of 




in the German court. In contrast the Irish companies argue that the possibility of rescuing the entire 
group as a viable entity is reliant on the company availing of the preventive restructuring process 
(the Irish Examinership process) and re-arranging its debt structure with the agreement of its 
creditors:- 
It might be of interest to note the following statement regarding the Irish preventive restructuring 
process known as Examinership from the Irish Court of Appeal in the case on which this case study is 
based:- 
“78. Measured, therefore, against the statutory objectives of Part 10 of the 2014 Act, …[the 
Examinership process]… I can accordingly see no real difference in principle between the two types of 
contractual agreements so far as the appointment of an examiner is concerned. Of course, it may be 
said that such an application for examinership is inconsistent with prior contractual agreements and 
commitments on the part of the petitioning company or companies, but, as I have already sought to 
explain, this is true almost by definition of every application for examinership. 
79. Putting this another way, I cannot find anything in the 2014 Act which enables a court 
considering an application for examinership to distinguish between the inevitable breach of a loan 
agreement (with, for example, a promise to repay a loan by a given date) on the one hand and a 
breach of the obligations contained in a debt settlement agreement regarding the orderly disposal of 
assets for debt reduction purposes on the other. One cannot really beautify by fancy words or nice 
phrases that which for some - and for secured lenders in particular - must be an unpalatable feature 
of the examinership process, namely, that it involves the judicial variation and dishonouring of all 
types of commercial contracts. 
80. The fact, therefore, that an application for examinership would be inconsistent with the 
performance of the obligations imposed on a company under the terms of a settlement agreement 
cannot in itself - and I stress these words - be a dispositive consideration for a court determining 
whether to appoint an examiner under s. 509(1) of the 2014 Act, precisely because the entire 
examinership system is premised on the assumption that pre-existing commercial contracts (of 
whatever kind) will be overridden, varied, negated and dishonoured in the wider public interest of 
rescuing an otherwise potentially viable company.”  
Issue 1 
In light of Articles 19 and 20 and Articles 42-44 of the EIR-Recast 848/2015 is the German court 
obliged to recognise the Irish rescue proceedings and co-operate with the Irish court thus allowing 
main proceedings with a stay to continue even though  
a. this affects other proceedings being opened elsewhere and  
b. would operate quite drastically on the rights of the German creditor?  
If yes, how would an obligation to co-operate work in this context?  
In your experience, if relevant what sort of issues would typically arise which would require co-
operation? 
The first issue is the applicability of Article 19 of the EIR-R (European Insolvency Regulation- Recast) 
which imposes the obligation to recognise “any judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed 
down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3…. from the moment 
that it becomes effective.”  
The second issue relates to the obligations imposed on courts and insolvency practitioners to co-




2015/848. These relate in the first instance to the facilitation of “the coordination of main, territorial 
and secondary insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor”, and in the second instance to 
the facilitation of “the effective administration of the proceedings” where the proceedings relate to 
“two or members of the same group”.  
Issue 2  
If the German court recognises the Examinership process which it most likely will, this will mean that 
the stay operated under the Irish Examinership process will operate against GermanBank AG.  
Then the question is if the GermanBank proceeds in the German court what will the approach of the 
German court be?  
Is it possible to open secondary or territorial proceedings which might allow for enforcement of 
the 2017 agreement against the principle of the stay? 
Do the co-operation obligations affect the decision to open/not to open secondary 
proceedings…will they make a difference?  
Does the obligation to co-operate add an additional constraint on the German court? 
Alternatively is the obligation to co-operate something less significant than the initial question of 
recognition? 
For example does the obligation to co-operate simply mean that if the German court sought clarity 
on how the Examinership process would proceed, the Irish court might be obliged to co-operate 
with this request?  
Would this involve an obligation to provide information on the process in general and/or on the 
specific process? 
Issue 3  
GermanBank AG seeks to enforce the debt settlement agreement- ‘the 2017 agreement’ as a 
contract subject to German law. GermanBank AG intends to argue before the German court that 
this action in the German court relates to a specific contract and is not primarily related to 
insolvency and so the Recast Regulation does not apply and that the German court is free to hear 
this action and enforce ‘the 2017 agreement’, despite the Examinership process proceeding in 
Ireland. Similar arguments have been made in some recent cases which have been considered by the 
CJEU.iii 
Does this argument sideline the Regulation? iv 
Bear in mind the Irish proceedings are opened and the Irish stay affects all actions.  
Should the German court co-operate to make the stay effective thus facilitating the rescue 
regardless of the argument?  










i I would like to thank particularly, The Honourable Judge Michael Quinn, The High Court of Ireland and Judge 
Nicoleta Nastase, Romania for their assistance in clarifying this case study. The case study itself is derived from 
an Irish case Re Kitty Hall Ltd. [2017] IEHC and [2017] ICEA 247. Some adjustments to the facts have been made 
including the insertion of the German choice of law clause and the move on the part of the German Bank 
seeking to enforce the ‘2017 Agreement’ in a German court. In reality the compromise or scheme proceeded 
and was approved by the Irish High Court in December 2017, Baker J.  
 
ii First introduced under the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990 and now contained in Part X of the Companies 
Act 2014.  
iii The following cases are relevant to the final Issue 3  
Case 535/17 NK (liquidator) v BNP Paribas Fortis NV, 6 February 2019. 
NK v BNP Paribas 
 
Prior to insolvency proceedings money transferred to Fortis bank- this amounted to an act of embezzlement. 
During the insolvency proceedings conducted in the NL proceedings were brought against the bank. Under 
Dutch law the liquidator can bring an action in tort against a bank to repay money where the money has been 
paid at a disadvantage to other creditors: - ‘Peeters- Gatzen-vordering (PGV). (This is similar to a claim arising 
out of mistaken payments).  
In Dutch law, this is an action in tort, which can be brought by individual creditor / liquidator and/ or anyone 
affected. The defendant bank, NK Fortis, said it was a tort claim and therefore should be brought in Belgium. In 
contrast the Dutch liquidator argued that this was a claim normally brought by a liquidator and therefore the 
Dutch court had jurisdiction. 
ECJ disagreed. It decided that just because the liquidator brings the claim it does not mean it is an insolvency 
procedure. It is still a tort and because individual creditors can bring the claim the Belgian court could have 
jurisdiction. The PGV is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 
1(1) Judgement Regulation:- 
 
 “26 The Court has held that only actions which derive directly from insolvency proceedings or which are closely 
connected with them are excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention and, subsequently, Regulation No 
44/2001 (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 February 1979, Gourdain, 133/78, EU:C:1979:49, paragraph 4, 
and of 19 April 2012, F-Tex, C‑213/10, EU:C:2012:215, paragraphs 22 and 24). Consequently, only those actions, 
as described, fall within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000 (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 
2017, Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau, C‑641/16, EU: C: 2017:847, paragraph 19 and the case-law 
cited). 
 
27   Moreover, that same criterion, as stated in the Court’s case-law on the interpretation of the Brussels 
Convention, was set out in recital 6 of Regulation No 1346/2000 in order to delimit the subject matter of that 
regulation, and was confirmed by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2015 L 141, p. 19), not applicable ratione temporis to the present 
case, which provides in Article 6 that the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency 
proceedings have been opened have jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from the insolvency 
proceedings and is closely linked with them. 
 
28   The decisive criterion adopted by the Court to identify the area within which an action falls is not the 
procedural context of which that action is part, but the legal basis of the action. According to that approach, it 
must be determined whether the right or obligation which forms the basis of the action has its source in the 
ordinary rules of civil and commercial law or in derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings (judgments 
of 4 September 2014, Nickel & Goeldner Spedition, C‑157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 27; of 9 November 
2017, Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau, C‑641/16, EU:C:2017:847, paragraph 22; and of 20 
December 2017, Valach and Others, C‑649/16, EU:C:2017:986, paragraph 29).” 
… 
“33 Also, according to the case-file submitted to the Court, the action brought by the liquidator against Fortis is 
an action for liability for a wrongful act. The purpose of such an action is therefore for Fortis to be found liable 






cash withdrawals made by PI amounting to EUR 550 000, because, according to the liquidator, the withdrawals 
gave rise to the loss suffered by the creditors. 
 
34   Therefore, having regard to these factors, such an action is based on the ordinary rules of civil and 
commercial law and not on the derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings…” 
 
 
Case 337/17 Feniks sp. z o.o. v Azteca Products & Services SL 4 October 2018 
Feniks/Azteca 
Feniks was a creditor of Coliseum (a general contractor with whom Feniks had an investment agreement 
regarding a construction project in Poland). Coliseum was technically insolvent in that it was unable to pay 
subcontractors, but proceedings had not yet been opened. Coliseum sold property (in Poland!) to Azteca 
(Spain) in partial fulfilment of prior claims by Azteca. This transaction would normally be subject to some sort 
of clawback action. Under Polish law any creditor (and not just an insolvency practitioner or appointed 
liquidator) can bring a claw back action. Feniks as a creditor of Coloseum brought a claw back action against 
Azteca to clawback money before Polish court on the basis of Article 7(1) (a) Judgment Regulation. Azteca 
argued that the correct forum was the Spanish court  
The question for the CJEU was whether an actio pauliana is covered by the rule of international jurisdiction 
provided for in Article 7(1)(a) Judgment Regulation? Such an action is where a person entitled to a debt 
repayment requests that an act, whereby his debtor has transferred an asset to a third party which is allegedly 
detrimental to his rights, be declared ineffective in relation to the creditor,  
And the response from the CJEU was that an actio pauliana which is based on the creditor’s rights created 
upon the conclusion of a contract, falls within ‘matters relating to a contract’ of Article 7(1) (a) Judgment 
Regulation. In terms of the interface between the Recast Regulation and these provisions of the judgement 
regulation there is a lack of certainty and clarity as to the borderline between insolvency matters and other 
causes of actions.  
 
 
iv I wish to acknowledge the lecture provided by Lucas Kortmann RESOR at the EIRC Conference, hosted by 
hosted by German Arbeitsgemeinschaft Insolvenzrecht und Sanierung with INSOL Europe and the Law Society, 
Brussels 27 June 2019 which provided references and explanations for these cases amongst others. 
 
v This publication was funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020). The content of this 
document represents the views of the authors only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission 
does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 
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Annex II(a): Survey of Judicial Practice in Cross-Border Restructuring 
Cases - Co-Operation and Communication 
Introduction 
The Judicial Co-Operation for Economic Recovery in Europe (JCOERE) Project (No. 800807) is 
a research action project funded by the EU Commission DG Justice. The project has a number 
of research goals:-  
• The most important part of the project focuses on the obligation imposed on courts in 
the Recast Regulation 848/2015, which provides a procedural framework for resolving 
cross-border insolvency cases, to co-operate in cross-border insolvency matters. To 
this end, the project undertook to engage proactively with the European judiciary to 
document their perception of the obligation to co-operate in practice, including 
possible obstacles and proposed resolutions. 
• The obligation to co-operate in insolvency matters does not of course occur in a 
vacuum. Accordingly, the project focuses on restructuring and rescue frameworks to 
determine if there are substantive or procedural obstacles to court-to-court co-
operation. This is particularly important given the new EU Preventive Restructuring 
Directive.  
• The first part of the project interrogated the following jurisdictions: Ireland, Italy, 
Romania, France, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Poland, Spain, and 
the UK with a view to identifying different substantive rules which might raise 
problems regarding co-operation. We are now in the second phase of the project. 
Identifying procedural aspects of these and other European jurisdictions which might 
raise obstacles to co-operation. For this reason we are conducting this survey and we 
are particularly interested in hearing from members of the judiciary in the sample of 
Member States listed above. However, if you are a member of the judiciary of another 
EU Member State, we welcome your participation as well. 
• It might be timely to let you know that at this point in the research project, our 
impression is that while court to court co-operation is in no way resisted, it does not 
really express itself in a formal way, nor does it seem to arise as much as might have 
been expected given policy investment in this issue and academic commentary. We 
have received this impression from engagements with the Judicial Wing and the 
relevant practitioner forums through the INSOL Europe network. The research has in 
effect become more open ended. For this reason, we are very interested in your 




The purpose of this short survey is to engage with the European judiciary along with civil 
servants and administrators who deal with cross-border insolvency and restructuring cases to 
gather data on your experience with court to court co-operation. Please note that the survey 
should take you about 15 minutes, unless you choose to offer additional commentary.  
We would be grateful for your response by 24th May 2020. 
You have two choices as to how you wish to complete this short questionnaire:  
1. Access our online survey here.  
2.  Fill out this form and send it to jennifer.gant@ucc.ie. The boxes below can be “ticked” 
by simply clicking in them.  
Responses via the survey link are fully anonymous and any surveys returned by email will be 
treated anonymously as well. The data gathered with this survey will form a part of Report 
that will be submitted to the European Commission and processed according to EU and 
University College Cork ethical rules. 
We thank you in advance for taking the time to participate in our project. Should you have 
any questions at all, please do not hesitate to contact Professor Irene Lynch Fannon, Principal 
Investigator (i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie) or Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant, Post-Doctoral Researcher on the 
project (jennifer.gant@ucc.ie).  







Preliminary Survey Questions 
This first set of questions are general questions about your role as a person who may decide 
insolvency or restructuring cases in your jurisdiction. Their purpose is mainly to help us to 
categorise the information we obtain. Thank you in advance for engaging in this survey. Your 
time and participation is greatly appreciated. 
 
1. What is your current role?  
Judge       ☐ 
Mediator or Arbitrator    ☐ 
Other Administrative Authority   ☐ 
Civil Servant         ☐ 
Other              ☐ 
If other, please explain:  
 
 
2. Which of the following choices best describes what you do in your role?  
I hear insolvency and/or restructuring cases only:    ☐ 
I also hear commercial and/or corporate law cases:    ☐ 
I hear all kinds of civil cases:        ☐ 
 
 
3. Common law and civil law jurisdictions differ in the way that the members of the 
judiciary are trained generally. Before you qualified as a judge or administrative 
decision-maker, were you required to take specific training? If so, please describe the 







4. Were you required to take specialist training in order to decide on insolvency and/or 
restructuring cases in your jurisdiction?  
Yes  ☐   
No  ☐ 
a. If so, what training were you required to take? (describe in a few words, if possible) 
 
 
b. If you specialise in insolvency cases, what requirements does your jurisdiction have for 




c. Have you received any specialist training in insolvency and restructuring related cases 
in the last 5 years? If so, how many days approximately does this training amount to?  
0    ☐ 
1-5    ☐ 
6-10    ☐ 
More than 10   ☐ 
 
5. Have you taken any training about judicial co-operation and/or communication with 
the courts of other Member States?  
Yes  ☐   
No  ☐ 
 
a. Have you co-operated directly with courts of another state on insolvency and 
restructuring matters at all in your career? 
Yes  ☐   
No  ☐ 
b. If you have co-operated directly with courts of another state in insolvency and 
restructuring matters, has it been:  




Only on cases with jurisdictions outside of the EU            ☐ 
On international cases including both EU and non-EU jurisdictions           ☐ 
   
c. Have you co-operated directly with courts of another state in non-insolvency matters 
within the EU? 
Yes  ☐   
No  ☐ 
d. Have you co-operated directly with courts of another state in non-insolvency matters 
outside of the EU?     
Yes  ☐   
No  ☐ 
e. If you have co-operated on other matters directly with courts of another state, which 
matters have you co-operated on and with which jurisdictions? Please note them in 
the comment box. 
 
 
6. How long have you been deciding on insolvency and/or restructuring cases?  
0-3 years:          ☐ 
3-7 years:         ☐ 
7-10 years:         ☐ 
10-15 years:         ☐ 
More than 15 years:        ☐ 
 
7. In which jurisdiction do you work? 
Austria ☐ Italy ☐ 




Bulgaria ☐ Lithuania ☐ 
Croatia ☐ Luxembourg ☐ 
Cyprus ☐ Malta ☐ 
Czech Republic ☐ The Netherlands ☐ 
Denmark ☐ Poland ☐ 
Estonia ☐ Portugal ☐ 
Finland ☐ Romania ☐ 
France ☐ Slovakia ☐ 
Germany ☐ Slovenia ☐ 
Greece ☐ Spain ☐ 
Hungary ☐ Sweden ☐ 






Survey of Judicial Practice in Co-operation and Communication 
Questions 8 and 9 refer to co-operation generally, while questions 10, 11 and 12 relate to 
insolvency and/or restructuring specifically. 
 
8. Have you ever needed to co-operate or communicate with a court in another 
European jurisdiction in a cross-border matter generally?  
Yes  ☐    
No  ☐    
 
9. How many cases have you heard in your career that have required you to 
communicate and/or co-operate with a court in another jurisdiction, generally?  
 
0   ☐ 
2-10  ☐ 
11-25  ☐ 
More than 25 ☐ 
NA   ☐ 
 
10. Have you had to co-operate with a court in another European jurisdiction in an 
insolvency or restructuring case?  
Yes  ☐   No ☐ 
 
11. How many insolvency related cases per year do you have to decide that require cross-
border co-operation or communication with court in another EU Member State? 
0     ☐ 
1-5     ☐ 
More than 5   ☐ 
 
12. How many insolvency related cases have you decided on in your career that have 
required you to communicate and/or co-operate with a court in another EU Member 
State?  
 




2-10  ☐ 
11-25  ☐ 
More than 25 ☐ 
 
Survey of Awareness of Co-Operation and Communication Guidelines 
13. One observation made on the JCOERE Project so far is that cooperation between 
courts is not as big an issue as we initially believed. As such, the following questions 
are academic in nature to test the general awareness among the EU judiciary of the 
guidelines and projects that have been done in this area to date. In your career have 
you ever heard of any of the following guidelines and projects relevant to court-to-
court co-operation?  
Yes  ☐    
No  ☐    
 
14. If you have heard of any of the guidelines relevant to court-to-court cooperation, 
please indicate which ones below:  
1 European Communication and Co-Operation Guidelines for Cross-border 
Insolvency (Coco Guidelines) 2007 
☐ 
2 The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles 
(JudgeCo) [2014]  
☐ 
3 The UNCITRAL Model Law ☐ 
4 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Core Principles 
for an Insolvency Law Regime (2004) 
☐ 
5 The Role of the Judge in Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (INSOL 
Europe Judicial Wing) [2013]  
☐ 






7 Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) Statement 
2018/01 in Insolvency Regulation (Recast) and National Procedural Rules 
☐ 
8 Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution 
in the Shadow of the Law (CODIRE) [2018] 
☐ 
9 Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best 
practices, blockages, and ways of improvement in the EU (ACURIA) [2019] 
☐ 
10 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Insolvency Procedure (2005) ☐ 
11 World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes 
[2011] 
☐ 
12 ALI Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in 
International Insolvency Cases [2012] 
☐ 
13 The American Law Institute (ALI) General Principles (2000) ☐ 
14 The ALI-III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-
border Cases (2000) 
☐ 
15. Have you ever referred to any of the guidelines listed in the question above in order 
to assist you in protocols for communication or co-operation in cross-border 
insolvency or restructuring cases?  
Yes  ☐    
No  ☐    
 
16. Would you prefer to create a protocol for communication and co-operation on a case 
by case basis?  
Yes  ☐    
No  ☐ 
 
17. If you have referred to any of the listed guidelines or project publications, please 
indicate which (if any) that you have referred to in the past by reference to the 
guidelines and projects listed in question 13:  




If the guidance or documentation you referred to was not listed above, please note it here:  
 
  
18. Have you ever attended international or European judicial events? (For example, the 
European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) or the INSOL Europe Judicial Forum): 
Yes ☐  
No ☐ 
What events do you attend (or plan to attend)?  
 
 
19. Would it be helpful for you to have access to information about substantive rules in 
other jurisdictions, such as the mechanisms of preventive restructuring?  
Yes   ☐  
No    ☐   
Unsure  ☐  
 
20. Are there rules in your legal system about how you can obtain information external to 
the cases you hear, such as information about substantive rules in other jurisdictions?  
Yes   ☐  
No    ☐   
 
21. If there are rules restricting your freedom to access to information about substantive 
rules in other jurisdictions, please specify here if possible.  
 
 
22. How would you prefer to access information about substantive insolvency rules in 




Information provided by the state or courts      ☐ 
A practitioner’s textbook         ☐ 
An academic text or report        ☐ 
Downloadable PDFs of country reports and other information   ☐ 
A simple website presenting information      ☐ 
An interactive website        ☐ 
A combination of the above or something else entirely (please specify below):  
 
 
23. Would it be helpful to have access to information and case-studies that provide 
different experiences with court-to-court co-operation in cross-border insolvency or 
restructuring cases?  
Yes ☐  
No  ☐   
Unsure ☐  
 
24. In what format would you prefer to access this information: 
A book or set of documents      ☐ 
An e-book or documents sent by email    ☐ 
Downloadable PDFs of country reports and case studies  ☐ 
A simple website presenting the information    ☐ 
An interactive website      ☐ 
A combination of the above or something else entirely (please specify below):  
 





25. The JCOERE Project is also tasked with developing case studies exemplifying situations 
in which court-to-court co-operation has occurred. These will be included in a 
database accessible by all European judges who may find it useful to see how similar 
problems have been dealt with in different jurisdictions. If possible, please provide an 
example from your experience where you have had to co-operate or communicate 
with a court in a different jurisdiction with a brief summary of the case facts, the issue 
that required co-operation or communication, and how you resolved or otherwise 
dealt with the co-operation and communication. You can either set it out below or 
email jennifer.gant@ucc.ie or i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie at your convenience with your 
case study example.  
 
 
26. Thank you for your kind participation in this project. If you would like to receive 
updates or be informed when our databases have been completed, please provide 
your email here or send a separate e-mail to jennifer.gant@ucc.ie or 
i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie.  
 
 The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  







The content of this document represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility.  
The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 




Annex II(b): Sondaj privind practicile judiciare în cazurile de 
restructurare transfrontalieră - Cooperare și comunicare 
 
Introducere 
Proiectul de Cooperare Judiciară pentru Redresare Economică în Europa (JCOERE) (nr. 
800807) este un proiect de cercetare finanțat de Comisia Europeană Direcția Generală Justiție 
și Consumatori. Proiectul are o serie de obiective de cercetare: 
• Cea mai importantă parte a proiectului se concentrează pe obligațiile impuse 
instanțelor de Regulamentul (UE) 848/2015, care oferă un cadru de reglementări 
procedurale pentru soluționarea cazurilor de insolvență transfrontalieră, pentru 
cooperarea în problemele de insolvență transfrontalieră. În acest scop, proiectul s-a 
angajat să colaboreze în mod activ cu sistemul judiciar european pentru a documenta 
percepția acestuia asupra obligației de cooperare în practică, inclusiv obstacole 
posibile și soluții propuse. 
• Obligația de a coopera în materie de insolvență nu apare desigur fără rost. În 
consecință, proiectul se concentrează pe reglementările referitoare la restructurare și 
redresare pentru a determina dacă există obstacole de fond sau de procedură pentru 
cooperarea între instanțe. Acest lucru este deosebit de important având în vedere 
noua Directivă a UE privind restructurarea preventivă. 
• Prima parte a proiectului a analizat următoarele jurisdicții: Irlanda, Italia, România, 
Franța, Olanda, Germania, Danemarca, Austria, Polonia, Spania și Marea Britanie, în 
vederea identificării unor reguli de fond care ar putea ridica probleme în ceea ce 
privește cooperarea. Acum suntem în a doua fază a proiectului: identificarea 
aspectelor procedurale din aceste jurisdicții și din alte jurisdicții europene care ar 
putea ridica obstacole în calea cooperării. Din acest motiv, efectuăm acest sondaj și 
suntem interesați în special de punctul de vedere al membrilor sistemului judiciar din 
eșantionul de state membre enumerate mai sus. Cu toate acestea, dacă sunteți 
membru al sistemului judiciar al altui stat membru al UE, sunteți bineveniți să 
participați. 
• Ar putea fi oportun să vă anunțăm că în acest moment al cercetării în cadrul 




împiedicată, ea nu se exprimă cu adevărat într-un mod formal și nici nu pare să se 
ridice la nivelul așteptat, având în vedere investiția politică în această problemă și 
comentariile academice. Am primit acest punct de vedere prin parteneriatul cu Aripa 
Judiciară (Judicial Wing) și prin intermediul forumurilor practicienilor prin rețeaua 
INSOL Europe. Cercetarea a devenit, în realitate, mai deschisă. Din acest motiv, suntem 
foarte interesați de părerile dvs. și de experiența dvs. sau lipsa de experiență în aceste 
probleme. 
Scopul acestui scurt sondaj este de a colabora cu sistemul judiciar european, împreună cu 
funcționarii publici și administratorii care se ocupă de cazurile transfrontaliere de insolvență 
și restructurare pentru a colecta date despre experiența dvs. privind cooperarea între 
instanțe. Vă rugăm să rețineți că sondajul ar trebui să dureze aproximativ 15 minute, cu 
excepția cazului în care alegeți să oferiți comentarii suplimentare. 
V-am fi recunoscători dacă ne-ați transmite chestionarul completat pana cel târziu la data de 
.........2020. 
Aveți două opțiuni cu privire la de completare al acestui scurt chestionar:  
3. Accesați chestionarul online aici.  
4.  Completați acest chestionar și trimiteți-l pe adresa 
nicoletamirelanastasie@gmail.com sau cristidrg@yahoo.com. Căsuțele de mai jos pot 
fi “bifate” printr-un singur click.  
Răspunsurile prin link-ul sondajului sunt pe deplin anonime și orice sondaje transmise prin e-
mail vor fi de asemenea prezentate ca fiind anonime. Datele colectate cu ocazia acestui sondaj 
vor face parte dintr-un raport care va fi transmis Comisiei Europene și prelucrat în 
conformitate cu normele etice ale UE și Universitatea Colegiul Cork. 
Vă mulțumim anticipat că ne-ați acordat timpul necesar pentru a participa la proiectul nostru. 
Daca aveți orice fel de întrebări, va rugam sa contactați fără ezitare pe Professor Irene Lynch 
Fannon, Principal Investigator (i.lynchfannon@ucc.ie) sau Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant, cercetător 
post-doctoral in cadrul proiectului (jennifer.gant@ucc.ie).  






Întrebări preliminare ale sondajului 
Acest prim set de întrebări reprezintă întrebări generale despre rolul dvs. de persoană care 
poate soluționa cazurile de insolvență sau de restructurare din jurisdicția dvs. Obiectivul lor 
este în principal să ne ajute în structurarea informațiilor pe care le obținem. Vă mulțumim 
anticipat pentru implicarea în acest sondaj. Timpul și participarea dvs. sunt în mod deosebit 
de apreciate. 
 
1. Ce funcție îndepliniți in prezent? 
Judecător     ☐ 
Mediator sau Arbitru    ☐ 
Altă autoritate administrativă  ☐ 
Funcționar public       ☐ 
Alte funcții            ☐ 
În cazul in care îndepliniți un alt rol, vă rugăm să explicați: 
 
 
2. Care dintre următoarele alternative descrie cel mai bine ce faceți în virtutea funcției 
pe care o dețineți??  
Sunt specializat doar în cazuri de insolvență și / sau restructurare:   ☐ 
Soluționez și cauze de drept comercial și / sau corporatist:     ☐ 
Soluționez toate tipurile de cauze civile:       ☐ 
 
3. Competența în sistemele de tip common-law și cele de drept civil diferă în funcție de 
modul în care membrii sistemului judiciar sunt instruiți în general. Înainte de a vă 
califica ca judecător sau factor de decizie administrativă, a trebuit să urmați o pregătire 






4. A trebuit să urmați o pregătire de specialitate pentru a putea soluționa cauzele de 
insolvență și / sau de restructurare ce vă revin spre competentă soluționare?  
Da  ☐   
Nu  ☐ 
d. Dacă da, ce pregătire a trebuit să urmați? (descrieți în câteva cuvinte, dacă este posibil) 
 
 
e. Dacă sunteți specializat în cauze de insolvență, ce forme de pregătire sunt prevăzute 
de legislația dvs. pentru dezvoltarea profesională continuă în acest domeniu??  
 
 
f. Ați participat la cursuri de specialitate în materia insolvenței și restructurării în ultimii 
5 ani? Dacă da, cate zile a durat aproximativ această pregătire? 
0     ☐ 
1-5     ☐ 
6-10     ☐ 
Mai mult de 10   ☐ 
 
5. Ați participat la cursuri de instruire cu privire la cooperarea judiciară și / sau 
comunicarea cu instanțele din alte State Membre?  
Da  ☐   
Nu  ☐ 
 
f. In cariera dvs, v-ați întâlnit cu situații în care a fost nevoie de cooperare judiciară în 
materie de insolvență și restructurare? 
Da  ☐   
Nu  ☐ 
g. Dacă v-ați confruntat cu situații de acest gen, au fost:  
Doar cazuri în interiorul Uniunii Europene        ☐ 




În cazuri internaționale ce includ atât Uniunea Europeană,  
cât și jurisdicții jurisdicția din afara UE                                          ☐ 
   
h. Ați cooperat în alte domenii decât cel al insolvenței în interiorul Uniunii Europene? 
Da  ☐   
Nu  ☐ 
i. Ați cooperat în alte domenii decât cel al insolvenței ce vizează jurisdicții din afara 
Uniunii Europene?     
Da  ☐   
Nu  ☐ 
j. Dacă ați cooperat în alte probleme cu alte jurisdicții, care sunt problemele în care ați 
cooperat și cu ce jurisdicții? Vă rugăm să le notați în caseta de comentarii. 
 
 
6. De cat timp soluționați cauze în materie de insolvență/restructurare?  
0-3 ani:          ☐ 
3-7 ani:         ☐ 
7-10 ani:         ☐ 
10-15 ani:         ☐ 

















Sondaj în materia practicilor judiciare în cooperare și comunicare 
Întrebările 7 și 8 se referă la cooperare în general, în timp ce întrebările 9, 10, și 11 se referă 
în special la insolvență și / sau restructurare 
 
7. Ați avut vreodată nevoie de cooperare sau comunicare cu o instanță dintr-o altă 
jurisdicție europeană într-o chestiune transfrontalieră, în general? 
Da ☐    
Nu ☐    
 
8. Câte cazuri ați soluționat în cariera dvs. care v-au solicitat să comunicați și / sau să 
cooperați cu o instanță din altă jurisdicție, în general? 
 
2   ☐ 
1-10  ☐ 
11-25  ☐ 
Mai mult de 25 ☐ 
Nu este cazul ☐ 
 
9. A fost necesar să cooperați cu o instanță din altă jurisdicție europeană într-un caz de 
insolvență sau de restructurare?  
Da  ☐   Nu ☐ 
 
10. Câte cauze legate de insolvență în care este necesară cooperare transfrontalieră sau 
comunicare cu instanța de judecată dintr-un alt stat membru al UE, trebuie să 
soluționați pe an? 
0    ☐ 
1-5    ☐ 
Mai mult de 5  ☐ 
 
11. Câte cauze legate de insolvență ați soluționat în cariera dvs., care v-au solicitat să 
comunicați și / sau să cooperați cu o instanță dintr-un alt stat membru al UE? 
 




2-10  ☐ 
11-25  ☐ 
Mai mult de 25 ☐ 
Sondaj privind cunoașterea ghidurilor de îndrumare în materie de cooperare 
și comunicare 
12. O observație făcută până acum în proiectul JCOERE este aceea că cooperarea dintre 
instanțe nu este o problemă atât de mare cum am considerat inițial. Ca atare, 
următoarele întrebări sunt de natură academică pentru a testa în ce măsură sistemul 
judiciar din UE are cunoștință de ghidurile de îndrumare și proiectele realizate până în 
prezent. În cariera dvs., ați auzit vreodată de oricare dintre următoarele ghiduri și 
proiecte relevante pentru cooperarea între instanțe? 
Da  ☐    
Nu  ☐    
 
13. Dacă ați aflat despre oricare dintre îndrumările relevante pentru cooperarea judiciară, 
vă rugăm să indicați care din cele de mai jos:  
1 European Communication and Co-Operation Guidelines for Cross-border 
Insolvency (Coco Guidelines) 2007 
☐ 
2 The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles 
(JudgeCo) [2014]  
☐ 
3 The UNCITRAL Model Law ☐ 
4 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Core Principles 
for an Insolvency Law Regime (2004) 
☐ 
5 The Role of the Judge in Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (INSOL 
Europe Judicial Wing) [2013]  
☐ 
6 European Legal Institute (ELI) Project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency 
Law [2017] 
☐ 
7 Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) Statement 





8 Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution 
in the Shadow of the Law (CODIRE) [2018] 
☐ 
9 Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best 
practices, blockages, and ways of improvement in the EU (ACURIA) [2019] 
☐ 
10 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Insolvency Procedure (2005) ☐ 
11 World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes 
[2011] 
☐ 
12 ALI Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in 
International Insolvency Cases [2012] 
☐ 
13 The American Law Institute (ALI) General Principles (2000) ☐ 
14 The ALI-III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-
border Cases (2000) 
☐ 
 
14. V-ați referit vreodată la oricare dintre materialele enumerate în întrebarea de mai sus, 
pentru a vă ajuta în protocoalele de comunicare sau cooperare în cazurile 
transfrontaliere de insolvență sau de restructurare? 
Da  ☐    
Nu  ☐    
 
15. Ați prefera să creați un protocol pentru comunicare și cooperare de la caz la caz? 
Da  ☐    
Nu  ☐ 
 
16. Dacă v-ați referit la oricare dintre ghidurile enumerate sau publicațiile de proiect, vă 
rugăm să indicați (dacă este cazul) la care v-ați referit în trecut, cu referire la ghidurile 
de îndrumare și proiectele enumerate la întrebarea 12: 




Dacă ghidul sau documentația la care faceți referire nu a fost enumerat mai sus, vă rugăm să 
notați aici:  
 
  
17. Ați participat vreodată la evenimente judiciare internaționale sau europene? (De 
exemplu, cele organizate de Rețeaua Europeană de Formare Judiciară (EJTN) sau 
Forumul judiciar INSOL Europa): 
Da ☐  
Nu ☐ 
La ce evenimente ați participat (sau aveți de gând sa participați)?  
 
 
18. Ar fi util să aveți acces la informații despre regulile de baza din alte jurisdicții, cum ar 
fi mecanismele de restructurare preventivă? 
Da   ☐  
Nu    ☐   
Nu sunt sigur  ☐  
 
19. Există reguli în sistemul dvs. judiciar despre cum puteți obține informații ce exced 
cauzelor pe care le soluționați, cum ar fi informații despre regulile de fond din alte 
jurisdicții? 
Da   ☐  
Nu    ☐   
 
20. Dacă există reguli care restricționează accesul dvs. la informații despre regulile de fond 







21. Cum preferați să accesați informații despre regulile de insolvență din alte jurisdicții?  
Informații furnizate de stat sau instanțe       ☐ 
Un manual al practicianului          ☐ 
Un text sau raport academic         ☐ 
Fișiere PDF descărcabile ale rapoartelor altei țări și alte informații    ☐ 
Un site web simplu care prezintă informații       ☐ 
Un site web interactiv          ☐ 
O combinație între cele de mai sus sau cu totul altă variantă (vă rugăm să specificați mai jos):  
 
 
22. Ar fi util să aveți acces la informații și studii de caz care oferă jurisprudență diferită cu 
privire la cooperarea judiciară internațională în cazurile de insolvență transfrontalieră 
sau de restructurare? 
Da        ☐  
Nu        ☐   
Nu sunt sigur   ☐  
 
23. În ce format preferați să accesați aceste informații: 
O carte sau un set de documente      ☐ 
Un e-book sau documente transmise prin e-mail    ☐ 
Fișiere PDF descărcabile ale rapoartelor de țară și studii de caz  ☐ 
Un website simplu care furnizează informații     ☐ 
Un website interactiv        ☐ 










Studii de caz privind cooperarea între instanțele de judecata în materie de 
insolvență și restructurare (opțional) 
24. Proiectul JCOERE are, de asemenea, sarcina de a dezvolta studii de caz care ilustrează 
situații în care a avut loc cooperarea între instanțele de judecată. Acestea vor fi incluse 
într-o bază de date accesibilă tuturor judecătorilor europeni, cărora le-ar putea fi de 
folos să vadă cum au fost rezolvate probleme similare în diferite jurisdicții. Dacă este 
posibil, vă rugăm să furnizați un exemplu din experiența dvs. în care ați fost nevoit să 
cooperați sau să comunicați cu o instanță dintr-o jurisdicție diferită, cu un scurt 
rezumat al datelor din speța respectivă, problema care a necesitat cooperare sau 
comunicare și modul în care ați rezolvat sau v-ați descurcat cu problemele de 
cooperare și comunicare. Puteți să o descrieți mai jos sau prin e-mail la 
nicoletamirela.nastasie@gmail.com sau cristidrg@yahoo.com , după cum doriți, cu 




25. Vă mulțumim pentru amabilitatea de a participarea la acest proiect. Dacă doriți să 
primiți actualizări sau să fiți informați când baza noastră de date este completă, vă 
rugăm să ne furnizați e-mailul aici sau să trimiteți un e-mail separat la 




 The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  







The content of this document represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility.  
The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 




Annex II(c): Questionario sulle prassi giudiziarie in tema di 
insolvenza transfrontaliera - Cooperazione e comunicazione 
 
Introduzione 
Il progetto The Judicial Co-Operation for Economic Recovery in Europe (JCOERE, n. 800807) è 
un progetto di ricerca finanziato dalla Direzione Generale Giustizia della Commissione 
europea. Il progetto ha una serie di obiettivi:  
• La parte più importante del progetto si concentra sull'obbligo di cooperazione in 
materia di insolvenza transfrontaliera imposto ai tribunali dal Regolamento n. 
848/2015, che fornisce un quadro procedurale per la risoluzione dei casi di insolvenza 
transfrontalieri. A tal riguardo, il progetto si interfaccerà in modo proattivo con la 
magistratura europea per documentare la percezione di quest’ultima riguardo 
all'obbligo di cooperazione nella pratica, compresi i possibili ostacoli e le proposte di 
risoluzione di questi ultimi. 
• Ovviamente, l'obbligo di cooperare in materia fallimentare si inserisce in un contesto 
normativo. Pertanto, il progetto si concentra sui quadri di ristrutturazione e 
salvataggio al fine di determinare se vi siano ostacoli sostanziali o procedurali alla 
cooperazione giudiziaria. Ciò è particolarmente importante in considerazione della 
nuova Direttiva UE sulla ristrutturazione preventiva.  
• La prima parte del progetto ha coinvolto i seguenti ordinamenti: Irlanda, Italia, 
Romania, Francia, Paesi Bassi, Germania, Danimarca, Austria, Polonia, Spagna e Regno 
Unito, al fine di individuare le diverse norme sostanziali che potrebbero sollevare 
problemi in materia di cooperazione. Siamo ora nella seconda fase del progetto che 
consiste nell’identificare gli aspetti procedurali dei diversi ordinamenti europei che 
potrebbero creare ostacoli alla cooperazione. Per tale motivo abbiamo elaborato il 
presente questionario e siamo particolarmente interessati a ricevere un feedback dalla 
magistratura degli Stati membri sopra elencati. In ogni caso, se appartiene alla 
magistratura di un altro Stato membro dell'UE, accogliamo con favore anche la Sua 
partecipazione. 
• Appare opportuno comunicarLe che, giunti a questo punto del progetto di ricerca, la 




osteggiata, non abbia trovato alcuna veste formale, né sembra aver luogo nella misura 
che ci si sarebbe potuto aspettare, in considerazione dell'investimento in termini di 
regolamentazione e dell’analisi dottrinale compiuta. Abbiamo ricevuto tale 
impressione dall’interazione con la componente giudiziaria e i relativi forum di 
professionisti della rete INSOL Europe. La ricerca si è, dunque, allargata. Per questo 
motivo siamo molto interessati alle Sue opinioni e alla Sua esperienza o inesperienza 
rispetto a tali temi. 
Lo scopo di questa breve indagine è di coinvolgere la magistratura europea, insieme ai 
funzionari e agli amministratori di procedure di insolvenza che si occupano di casi 
transfrontalieri in materia fallimentare, al fine di raccogliere i dati relativi alla Sua esperienza 
nella cooperazione con altri tribunali. Si prega di notare che l'indagine dovrebbe durare circa 
15 minuti, a meno che non si scelga di fornire un commento aggiuntivo. 
Le saremmo grati se volesse farci pervenire la Sua risposta entro il giorno ________. 
Ha a disposizione due opzioni per la compilazione di questo breve questionario:  
5. Compilare il presente modulo ed inviarlo all’indirizzo mail 
nuovodirittofallimentare@dipp.unifi.it 
Le caselle sottostanti possono essere "spuntate" semplicemente cliccandoci sopra.  
6. Accedere al nostro sondaggio online, qui.  
Le risposte al sondaggio fornite tramite il link sopra indicato sono completamente anonime ed 
anche i moduli restituiti via e-mail saranno trattati in modo anonimo. 
La ringraziamo in anticipo per il tempo dedicato alla partecipazione al nostro progetto. Per 
qualsiasi domanda, non esitate a contattare il Prof. Lorenzo Stanghellini all’indirizzo e-mail 
stanghellini@unifi.it. 







Questa prima serie di domande generali riguardano la posizione da Lei ricoperta. Lo scopo di 
queste ultime è, principalmente, quello di aiutarci a classificare le informazioni che otteniamo. 
La ringraziamo in anticipo per la Sua partecipazione a questo questionario. Il Suo tempo e la 
Sua partecipazione sono molto apprezzati. 
27. Quale delle seguenti opzioni descrive meglio l’attività da Lei svolta?  
Tratto solamente casi riguardanti la materia fallimentare:    ☐ 
Tratto anche casi in materia di diritto commerciale e/o societario:    ☐ 
Tratto ogni tipologia di casi in materia civile:      ☐ 
 
28. Gli ordinamenti di common law e di civil law differiscono nel modo in cui i membri 
della magistratura sono formati. Prima di ottenere la qualifica di giudice, le è stato 
richiesto di seguire una formazione specifica? In caso affermativo, descriva la natura 
della formazione richiesta nel suo ordinamento.  
  
 
29. Le è stato richiesto di seguire un corso di formazione specialistica per decidere casi in 
materia di diritto fallimentare nel suo ordinamento?  
Sì  ☐   No ☐ 




h. Se è specializzata in materia fallimentare, quali sono i requisiti previsti nel Suo 
ordinamento per l’aggiornamento professionale in tale materia (opzionale) 
 
 
i. Ha frequentato un corso di formazione specialistica in materia fallimentare negli ultimi 
5 anni? In caso affermativo, in quanti giorni è consistito approssimativamente? 
0    ☐ 




6-10    ☐ 
Più di 10   ☐ 
 
30. Ha seguito un corso di formazione sulla cooperazione giudiziaria e/o sulla 
comunicazione con le corti di altri Stati membri? 
Sì     ☐ 
No     ☐ 
a. Ha mai cooperato in materia fallimentare? 
Sì      ☐ 
No      ☐   
 
b. Se ha cooperato in materia fallimentare, è stato:  
Solo all’interno dell’UE       ☐ 
Solo al di fuori dell’UE        ☐ 
In casi internazionali riguardanti ordinamenti UE e non UE   ☐ 
c. Ha cooperato con riferimento a questioni attinenti ad una materia diversa, all'interno 
dell'UE? 
Sì ☐   
No ☐   
d. Ha cooperato con riferimento a questioni attinenti ad una materia diversa, al di fuori 
dell’UE? 
Sì         ☐   
No         ☐   
e. Se ha cooperato con riferimento a questioni attinenti ad una materia diversa, di quale 
materia si tratta? Si prega di riportarle nella casella dei commenti.  
 
 




0-3 anni:          ☐ 
3-7 anni:         ☐ 
7-10 anni:         ☐ 
10-15 anni:         ☐ 






Questionario sulle prassi giudiziarie in materia di cooperazione e 
comunicazione 
Le domande 8 e 9 si riferiscono alla cooperazione in generale, mentre le domande 10, 11 e 12 
riguardano specificamente il diritto fallimentare. 
32. Avete mai avuto la necessità di cooperare o comunicare con il tribunale di un'altro 
ordinamento europeo riguardo ad una questione transnazionale, in generale? 
Sì  ☐   No ☐ 
 
33. Quanti casi ha conosciuto, nel corso della sua carriera, che le hanno richiesto di 
comunicare e/o di collaborare con un tribunale di un altro ordinamento, in generale?  
4   ☐ 
2-10  ☐ 
11-25  ☐ 
Più di 25  ☐ 
NA   ☐ 
 
34. Ha dovuto collaborare con il tribunale di un altro ordinamento europeo nell’ambito di 
un caso in materia di diritto fallimentare?  
Sì  ☐   No ☐ 
 
35. Quanti casi in materia fallimentare deve decidere, in un anno, che richiedono una 
cooperazione transfrontaliera o di comunicare con il tribunale di un altro Stato 
membro dell'UE? 
0    ☐ 
1-5    ☐ 
Più di 5   ☐ 
 
36. Quanti casi in materia fallimentare ha deciso, nella sua carriera, che le hanno richiesto 
di comunicare e/o di collaborare con un tribunale di un altro Stato membro dell'UE?  
 
5   ☐ 
2-10  ☐ 




Più di 25  ☐ 
  
Si prega di inserire nella casella sottostante qualsiasi ulteriore informazione ritenga rilevante:  
 
 
Questionario sulla conoscenza delle linee guida aventi ad oggetto la 
cooperazione e la comunicazione  
37. Nel corso del Progetto JCOERE è emerso che la cooperazione tra tribunali è una 
questione che presenta un rilievo inferiore rispetto a quanto previsto all'inizio dei 
lavori. Per tale motivo, le seguenti domande sono di natura accademica, al fine di 
testare la consapevolezza generale della magistratura dell'UE in merito alle linee guida 
e ai progetti realizzati in questo settore fino ad oggi.  
Nel corso della Sua carriera è venuto a conoscenza dell’esistenza delle seguenti linee guida 
e progetti riguardanti la cooperazione giudiziaria?  
Sì  ☐    
No  ☐    
38. In caso affermativo, si prega di indicare quali:  
Linee guida e progetti in materia di cooperazione giudiziaria 
1 European Communication and Co-Operation Guidelines for Cross-border 
Insolvency (Coco Guidelines) 2007 
☐ 
2 The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-operation Principles 
(JudgeCo) [2014]  
☐ 
3 The UNCITRAL Model Law ☐ 
4 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Core Principles 
for an Insolvency Law Regime (2004) 
☐ 
5 The Role of the Judge in Restructuring of Companies within Insolvency (INSOL 





6 European Legal Institute (ELI) Project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency 
Law [2017] 
☐ 
7 Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) Statement 
2018/01 in Insolvency Regulation (Recast) and National Procedural Rules 
☐ 
8 Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution 
in the Shadow of the Law (CODIRE) [2018] 
☐ 
9 Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best 
practices, blockages, and ways of improvement in the EU (ACURIA) [2019] 
☐ 
10 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Insolvency Procedure (2005) ☐ 
11 World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes 
[2011] 
☐ 
12 ALI Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in 
International Insolvency Cases [2012] 
☐ 
13 The American Law Institute (ALI) General Principles (2000) ☐ 
14 The ALI-III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-




39. Ha mai fatto riferimento ad una delle linee guida sopra elencate al fine di trovare 
supporto nell’ambito di protocolli, aventi ad oggetto la comunicazione o cooperazione 
in casi transfrontalieri di diritto fallimentare?  
Sì  ☐    
No  ☐    
 
 
40. Preferirebbe fare ricorso ad un protocollo per la comunicazione e la cooperazione, 




Sì  ☐ 
No  ☐ 
 
41. Se ha fatto riferimento ad una qualsiasi delle linee guida o dei report elencati, La 
preghiamo di indicare a quale ha fatto riferimento in passato tra le linee guida e i 
progetti elencati nella domanda 12:  
1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐10 ☐ 11 ☐ 12 ☐13 ☐ 14 ☐ 
Se la linea guida o il documento a cui si fa riferimento non risulta elencato sopra, si prega di 
indicarlo di seguito:  
 
  
42. Ha mai partecipato ad eventi internazionali o europei riservati alla magistratura? (Ad 
esempio, l’European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) o l’INSOL Europe Judicial Forum): 
Sì  ☐    
No  ☐    
A quali eventi ha partecipato (o intende partecipare)?  
 
 
43. Riterrebbe utile avere accesso alle informazioni sulle norme sostanziali di altri 
ordinamenti, come i meccanismi che regolano la ristrutturazione preventiva?  
Sì   ☐  
No    ☐   
Non so   ☐  
 
44. Sono presenti nel Suo ordinamento regole per l’ottenimento di informazioni esterne 
al giudizio, come ad esempio informazioni sulle norme sostanziali vigenti in altri 
ordinamenti?  
Sì  ☐    





45. Se vi sono regole che limitano l'accesso alle informazioni sulle norme sostanziali in 
vigore in altri ordinamenti, si prega di specificarle di seguito, se possibile.  
 
 
46. Come preferirebbe accedere alle informazioni sulle norme sostanziali in materia 
fallimentare di altri ordinamenti?  
Informazioni fornite dallo stato o dai tribunali      ☐ 
Un libro di testo scritto da un professionista       ☐ 
Un testo o un report accademico        ☐ 
Un PDF scaricabile contenente un report e altre informazioni    ☐ 
Un semplice sito web contenente le informazioni      ☐ 
Un sito web interattivo         ☐ 





47. Sarebbe utile avere accesso a informazioni e a casi di studio che forniscano esperienze 
diverse di cooperazione giudiziaria transfrontaliera in materia fallimentare?  
Sì  ☐  
No  ☐   
Non so ☐  
 
48. Quale formato ritiene migliore per ottenere tali informazioni: 
Un libro o un insieme di documenti     ☐ 




Un PDF scaricabile contenente un report e casi di studio  ☐ 
Un semplice sito web contenente le informazioni   ☐ 
Un sito web interattivo      ☐ 









Casi di cooperazione giudiziaria in materia fallimentare (facoltativo) 
Il progetto JCOERE ha anche il compito di sviluppare casi di studio che esemplifichino 
situazioni in cui si è verificata una cooperazione tra corti. Questi ultimi saranno inclusi in una 
banca dati accessibile a tutti i giudici europei che ritengano utile venire a conoscenza di come 
problemi simili sono stati affrontati in ordinamenti diversi. Se possibile, si prega di fornire un 
esempio tratto dalla Sua esperienza in cui ha dovuto cooperare o comunicare con un tribunale 
di un diverso ordinamento con una breve sintesi dei fatti del caso, la questione che ha 
richiesto la cooperazione o la comunicazione e come ha risolto o altrimenti trattato le 
questioni riguardanti la cooperazione e la comunicazione. Può indicarlo, a Sua discrezione, qui 
di seguito o inviare una e-mail a nuovodirittofallimentare@dipp.unifi.it con l'esempio del caso 
di studio.  
 
 
La ringraziamo per la gentile disponibilità a partecipazione a questo progetto. Se desidera 
ricevere aggiornamenti o essere informata quando i nostri database saranno stati completati, 
La preghiamo di fornirci la Sua e-mail nella casella sottostante o di inviare una e-mail a 
nuovodirittofallimentare@dipp.unifi.it.  
 
 The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  
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Annex III: Chapter 6 - Additional Guidelines  
As indicated in the course of Chapter 6, there are additional guidelines and projects, which 
were not discussed as part of that Chapter, that have addressed some areas or aspects 
relevant to cooperation. First, as the JCOERE project focuses on cooperation within the EU, it 
was felt that the Asian Development Bank Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law (“ADB 
Standards”) may not be as relevant as the European and International guidelines contained in 
the Chapter. As a result, the analysis of this standard under the two relevant headings – the 
sharing or obtaining of information and disclosure requirements and asset co-ordination – will 
be conducted in the coming paragraphs. As also indicated, while both the ACURIA (Assessing 
Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: best practices, blockages and 
ways of improvement) 622 and CODIRE (Contractualised distress resolution in the shadow of 
the law: Effective judicial review and oversight of insolvency and pre-insolvency 
proceedings)623 projects refer to issues such as information disclosure, the main focus of the 
projects was not as directly relevant to court-to-court and practitioner   
The ADB Standards: The sharing of information about the debtor 
The Asian Development Bank, in its Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law of 2000, takes 
into consideration the sharing of information. Good Practice Standards 8.1 and 8.2 provide 
that “the law should prescribe, as fully as possible, for the provision of relevant information 
concerning the debtor” and that, in addition, also an independent comment and analysis on 
such information should be provided.  
This provision is particularly relevant if we consider the principal aims of the Good Practice 
Standards elaborated by the Asian Development Bank, which include the creation of a 
common basis for the insolvency laws of the Asian countries and the enhancement of a 
dialogue between their courts and representatives.  
 
622 Catarina Frade, et al, ‘Assessing Courts’ Undertaking of Restructuring and Insolvency Actions: Best Practices, Blockages, and Ways of 
Improvement’ (European Commission 2019) (hereinafter referred to as ‘ACURIA’). 
623 Lorenzo Stanghellini, Riz Mokal, Christoph G Paulus, and Ignacio Tirado, Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress 




The availability of proper information and the consequent transparency that derives from it 
is understood by the Asian Development Bank studies as a fundamental element of an 
effective co-operation and, more in general, of shared insolvency law standards. This point is 
particularly highlighted with regard to the rescue process of a business. 
In summary: 
- All relevant information about the debtors must be provided, along with an analysis of such 
data. 
The ADB Standards: Stay in the context of a reorganisation 
The Asian Development Bank deals with the present issue with its Good Practice Standards n. 
5.4 and 5.5. 
Good Practice Standard 5.4 provides that, in the context of a reorganisation, “the automatic 
stay or suspension of actions should be as wide and all-embracing as possible” and that it 
should apply to all creditors and persons bearing an interest in the property of the debtor. 
Instead, Good Practice 5.5. provides that the stay should be of “limited specific duration” and 
that relief from the stay should be granted on the application of affected creditors or other 
persons. 
The above-mentioned provisions of the Asian Development Bank seem to be aligned with the 
other guidelines and best practices proposed by other international institutions and, also in 
this case, the value of a reorganisation efforts that preserve the assets and going concern of 
the debtor seems to be fully recognised. 
 
In summary: 
- In a reorganisation scenario, an automatic stay, as wide as possible, is recommended.  
- A relief from such stay should be granted on application of the creditors or other actors. 
CODIRE: The need for adequate and updated information 
CODIRE is a research project carried out by Università degli Studi di Firenze (Project Co-
ordinator), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. 
Two main objectives drove the project action: 
a) the formulation of harmonised guidelines for effective judicial review of and oversight 
of fair and efficient insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings; 
b) the development of policy recommendations addressed to policymakers at European 




The project also aimed to cast light on other key issues, highlighted both in the 
Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency (2014/135/EU)624 and 
in the Preventive Restructuring Directive (2019/1023/EU),625 henceforth PRD.626 
More specifically, in order to remove or at least reduce obstacles to an effective cooperation 
between foreign courts, such provisions consider possible incentives for the creation of a 
common ground in the European insolvency context by providing shared, core principles to 
the actors involved in the restructuring process.627 
The CODIRE project, suggests a set of guidelines and policy recommendations that focus on: 
a) The importance of identifying (and addressing) the crisis in a timely fashion; 
b) The role of fairness during the proceedings, both under a procedural and substantive 
point of view; 
c) The development of a common basis with respect to the content and structure of 
restructuring plans and the role of the professionals involved; 
d) The development of best practices with regard to the confirmation and 
implementation of restructuring plans. 
It is hoped that the adoption and implementation by the various Member States of the best 
practices outlined in the CODIRE project may, therefore, achieve the goal contained in both 
the PRD and in the EIR Recast, namely the creation of common basic norms in order to remove 
obstacles to an effective cooperation between foreign courts.628 
With specific regard to the sharing of information and disclosure requirements, it is worth 
noting that Policy Recommendation n. 2.5 of CODIRE requires adequate information to be 
 
624 European Commission, ‘Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency’ [2014] OJ L 74/65, 
COM (2014) 1500 final. 
625 Council Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, 
on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18. 
[Hereinafter Preventive Restructuring Directive or PRD]. 
626 Lorenzo Stanghellini, Riz Mokal, Christoph G. Paulus and Ignacio Tirado, Best practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress 
Resolution in the Shadow of the Law (Wolters Kluwer, 2018), Introduction, p. XVIII. The full report is available at 
<https://www.codire.eu/publications/>. Many CODIRE guidelines and policy recommendations are relevant in the context of the analysis of 
substantive and procedural obstacles to judicial cooperation (and coordination) in cross-border insolvency cases. In fact, as already noted in 
Report 1 of JCOERE Project, the PRD envisages provisions that - both directly and indirectly - impact the framework set by the Regulation 
848/2015 See JCOERE Report 1, Identifying substantive rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including the Preventive Restructuring 
Directive which may be incompatible with judicial co-operation obligations, p. 10. The full report is available at < 
https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/ 
627 In this regard, it is worth remembering that Recital 12 of the PRD, once explained the scope of Regulation 848/2015 and its limits (‘that 
Regulation does not tackle the disparities between national laws regulating those procedures’), stresses the ‘need to go beyond matters of 
judicial co-operation and to establish substantive minimum standards for preventive restructuring procedures as well as for procedures 
leading to a discharge of debt for entrepreneurs’.  
That said, Recital 13 of the PRD is coherent with the premises laid down by Recital 12. Pursuant to it, the PRD ‘aims to be fully compatible 
with, and complementary to, that Regulation, by requiring Member States to put in place preventive restructuring procedures which comply 
with certain minimum principles of effectiveness’ see Appendix to the Exposition of the terms of the PRD. 
628 With regard to this specific issue see the Note on ‘Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at Eu Level’, 2010, requested by the European 
Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs and Rolef J de Weijs, ‘Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law and the Need to Tackle Two 




provided to stakeholders. Further recommendations refer to additional information 
requirements benefitting the actors involved in a restructuring process. Whilst these 
principles will feed into the quality of restructuring practises in Europe and are reflected in 
the PRD they only indirectly affect the ability of courts to cooperate as envisaged by the EIR 
Recast.  
In summary: 
à Actors involved in a restructuring process should be provided with an adequate and updated 
set of information. 
CODIRE: The role of professionals to maximise the value of the assets  
CODIRE’s Policy Recommendation 7.2 concerns the sale of debtor’s assets and the best 
practices to maximise their value. In this regard, this Recommendation provides that, if the 
plan is completely or mainly based on the realisation of the debtor’s assets, ‘the law should 
provide for the appointment of a professional entrusted with the task of implementing the 
plan concerning the sale of the debtor’s assets in the best interest of creditors’.  
Similarly, regarding restructuring plans, Guideline 7.2 recommends the appointment of a 
professional to realise assets should the restructuring plan envisage the sale of assets ‘having 
a relevant economic value’. These two provisions, read together, stress the importance of the 
appointment of a professional that is invested with the necessary power to maximise the 
value of the debtor’s assets in the best interest of all the parties involved. With a view to 
harmonising the insolvency law of the countries involved in cross-border insolvency 
proceedings, it might be useful to incorporate, at a domestic level, the best practices 
mentioned above and, therefore, develop a common ground for the coordination of the 
actors involved. 
In summary: 
à The appointment of a professional invested with the necessary power to maximise the value 
of the debtor’s assets is recommended.  
ACURIA: Disclosure and transparency 
ACURIA is a research project carried out by the Centre for Social Studies of Portugal (Project 
Co-ordinator), Università degli Studi di Firenze, Uniwersytet Gdanski and Maastricht 
University. It was aimed at identifying best practices and legal and procedural strategies in the 
field of business insolvency and restructuring law that are suitable for replication in different 
jurisdictions. This, in turn, was in order to enable courts to provide a better response in those 
cases. 




a) support the development of stronger legislation and policies at domestic and EU levels, 
with special regard to insolvency and cross-border insolvency; and 
b) promote the cooperation between the academic world, practitioners and economic 
actors. 
ACURIA takes into consideration the substantial and procedural rules that become relevant 
during an insolvency proceeding (intended to also include restructuring proceedings) and 
conducted a comparative analysis between various European jurisdictions, namely Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. 
The findings of the research show that these jurisdictions have some common features, for 
example, their favour for ‘rescue-solutions over liquidation outcomes’ and ‘the absence of 
specialised courts to trial insolvency and restructuring cases’.629  
Resonating with our discussion in Chapter 4 of this Report, ACURIA also highlights a deep 
heterogeneity amongst the relevant jurisdictions, regarding some procedural and substantial 
aspects of their insolvency laws, such as the existence of precautionary measures in order to 
prevent further damage to the insolvent’s estate and the appointment of the insolvency 
practitioner. 
Furthermore, the project focuses on some possible ways to enhance the response of the 
courts when facing insolvency cases and, in this regard, it stresses the importance of: 
a) timelines of the proceeding, by creating and developing early warning devices; 
b) predictability and legal certainty, by providing specialised training to judges and 
insolvency practitioners in insolvency law, economic sciences, and accounting;630 
c) haste and efficiency, by means of new information technologies, in order to streamline 
the communication between the parties involved, including judges and insolvency 
practitioners; 
d) participation by simplifying the interaction of all the relevant parties of the proceeding 
and by implementing technological devices to allow meetings to be held at a distance; 
e) transparency by means of clear communication with the stakeholders and requiring 
appropriate disclosure.631 
With a particular focus on the sharing of information and disclosure, ACURIA stresses the 
importance of transparency in the context of corporate restructuring and insolvency 
 
629 See ACURIA Comparative perspective of four EU countries, p. 1-2, available at 
https://acuria.eu/index.php?id=16486&id_lingua=2&pag=16491. See also articles in a special edition of the International Insolvency Review 
on the ACURIA project (2020) 29(3).  
630 This issue is considered in Chapters 4 and 8 of this Report. 





procedures and, for this reason, it requires the relevant actors to disclose ‘information at the 
decisive stages of the process, such as the sale of assets, through transparent methods’ 
pursuant to Guideline e) of the ‘Ways of improvement’.  
Guideline e) accounts for both the ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ aspects of the disclosure 
duties in this context, by also suggesting the use of ‘publicised virtual auctions’ in order to 
effectively share the relevant information. 
In summary: 
à The disclosure of all the relevant information and the adoption of transparent methods 
during the decisive stages of the proceeding are recommended. 
 
 The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  
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